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The Catholic Encyclopedia.

Pope Leo XIII

The Leader of Neo-Scholasticism

THE PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

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TO MY WIFE
ELIZABETH B. McDONALD
AND OUR CHILDREN
MILO, JOHN, WILLIAM, ELIZABETH AND HELEN.
THEY HAVE PROVIDED THE COMFORTS AND DELIGHTS
APPROVED BY TRUE PHILOSOPHY.

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PREFACE

The man of practical affairs is prone to look upon the study of philosophy with a certain measure of disdain. He thinks of it as a subject far removed from the every day concerns of life. Nothing, however, could be further from the truth. To one who thinks deeply essential reality and the basic meaning of life and life's activities must always be of superior interest. It could not be otherwise because the study of philosophy is above all things else a practical pursuit.

It is true that the philosopher holds himself apart from the stress of business and social conflict. He holds himself apart in order that he may think and in order that he may have the necessary quiet and peace of mind which are essential to a solution of the fundamental question that confronts us all—What is the meaning of life? The philosopher betakes himself to the mountain tops. On those same mountain tops also grow the loftiest pines. As man reaches out for these giant trees and brings them to the level plains below to serve as building material for his homes, so does he reach out for the truths which philosophy enunciates. He brings these truths to the level of the commonplace and by reason of them understands, really understands, both his commercial and his social relationships.

Philosophy, therefore, is the most practical of studies. The student of philosophy should view the subject as of direct aid to him in his attempt to understand the whole process of living. From its study the student should gain not only an intellectual understanding of the thoughts men of deep thinking have evolved, but in addition, an individual philosophy, a personal philosophy of life.

INTRODUCTION

The study of philosophy arises as a result of man's desire to secure an all-inclusive view of reality. Man has always been interested in himself and in his surroundings. Through philosophy he secures that basic groundwork of understanding by reason of which he is enabled to relate himself in both an intellectual and a practical, dynamic manner toward problems of theory and action. It is through philosophy that he grasps the reasons which impel him adequately to control life's values.

Philosophy is a separate science exactly as is every other science. The different sciences classify facts into special groups for purposes of detailed study. The study is made in order that the laws governing the facts of phenomena may be determined and formulated. The physicist looks at experience for the explicit purpose of determining physical phenomena and the laws governing the operation of these phenomena. In like manner acts in his own field the biologist, the chemist and the psychologist. Each science has its own domain and the science of philosophy offers no exception to the general rule.

In the field of philosophy, however, the mind makes the effort to surmount the view-point of the other sciences. It attempts to scale a hill higher than all the other scientific eminences and from this hill to view human behavior and human knowledge. The effort of philosophy is to explain not the action of particular laws determining definite phenomena but rather to explain universal fact. It attempts to arrive at an understanding of the causes of things and to gather all apparently separate causes into the unity of a universal cause. It

attempts to explain why reality is as it is. The human mind instinctively reaches out for an understanding of this primal cause. The human mind throughout all ages has been desirous of reaching finality.

This brief history of philosophy makes the attempt to indicate in limited manner the explanations arrived at by philosophical minds as a result of studies to discern the primal cause. The student will come in contact with terms which must be comprehended fully if he is to understand the reasoning presented. We attach, therefore, the following definitions, not as an exhaustive list, but rather as a minimum though compulsory one for him who would read intelligently in philosophy.

PHILOSOPHICAL DEFINITIONS

ONTOLOGY, OR METAPHYSICS, is philosophy in its search for a primal cause.

POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OR POSITIVISM is philosophy which emphasizes not the search for a first cause, but rather an effort to make a scientific synthesis of existence.

Scepticism is positivism which justifies itself on the theory that systems of philosophy contradict one another.

Criticism is positivism which justifies itself on the analysis of the functioning of the human mind.

Dogmatism is positivism which justifies itself on a belief in the power of the human mind to reach an objective knowledge of reality and its primal cause.

RATIONALISM is philosophy which claims to reach objective knowledge of reality and its first cause by *a priori* reasoning.

EMPIRICISM is philosophy which claims that there is only one road by which objective knowledge and its first cause can be determined and the road is that of observation plus induction or *a posteriori* reasoning.

IDEALISM is that form of philosophy which regards thought as the original entity, prior as to begetting and superior to what is commonly regarded as reality.

Spiritualism is that form of idealism which ascribes personality to the first cause and thereby considers it not simply as an idea which becomes reality, but as a being.

Transcendentalism or *supernaturalism* is that form of idealism which considers the first cause not only

as a being but as a being which hovers about reality.

Theism is that form of idealism which considers the first cause not only as a being which hovers above reality but who, in addition, directs reality by *free will.*

Deism is that form of idealism which considers the first cause not only as a being which hovers above reality and directs it, but who directs it by reason of unchangeable laws.

NOTE: Spiritualism, transcendentalism, theism and deism all insist upon a duality of creator and nature as opposed to pantheism, naturalism and monism.

PANTHEISM considers the first cause to be the genuine substance of the thinghood of reality. The first cause is to be found, according to pantheism, *in* things. This is the doctrine of the immanency of God.

MONISM regards all reality as a living union of a collective being.

NATURALISM regards all reality as a living union of a collective being which union is governed by laws which emanate from the nature of the collective being.

REALISM is that form of philosophy which considers thought as derived from what is commonly regarded as reality.

MATERIALISM or MECHANISM is that form of realism which regards the first cause as acting without consciousness and without volition.

GENERAL PLAN OF STUDY

For purposes of study and particularly of gaining through study a thorough grasp of the progressive

developments of philosophical thought throughout the ages we shall consider the history of philosophy under the following major divisions:

PAGAN PERIOD

- Greece
- Rome
- Alexandria

CHRISTIAN PERIOD

- Church Fathers
- Scholasticism

MODERN PERIOD

- Early
- Middle
- Contemporary

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Socrates
469-399 B.C.

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THE PAGAN PERIOD

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

The earliest European philosophy of which we have record is that which arose among the Grecian people during the seventh century B. C. This early speculative thought was related closely on the one hand to religion and on the other to poetry. It is extremely interesting to note that the pioneers of Greek philosophy were students of the operations of the universe. They were mathematicians, naturalists, astronomers. Aristotle applies to them the title of "physicians". It is to be expected, therefore, that early philosophy should in reality be a cosmology, i.e., a science concerning itself with the cosmos, or universe, as it revealed itself to man by its parts and its apparent laws of operations. Chief among these early Greek philosophers were Thales, Xenophanes and Pythagoras.

The School of Miletus

The school of Miletus may be said to have been founded by Thales of that town. According to the philosophy of Thales the fundamental principle, primal nature, of which all other forms are mere embodiments to a greater or less degree, is water. The earth is entirely surrounded by water and is held in place as a floating object upon a vast ocean. This explanatory concept of the first principle is all that has remained to us of the philosophy of Thales.

Anaximander was a fellow-townsman as well as a disciple of Thales. He, however, differed from his master in that he regarded the fundamental principle to be atmosphere rather than water. From this first cause, which was uncreated and eternal, everything else was derived. Everything, too, reverts in time to this first

principle. All that we see, hear, and touch is but a derivative of all pervading atmosphere, was the teaching of Anaximander. He considered the earth to be cylindrical in shape and to float in the eternal atmosphere, held in position by reason of its placement at an equal distance from all the other heavenly bodies.

From the indestructible atmosphere water was derived and all animals, man included, were originally products of water. In the original substance which was perpetuated by its own vitality were to be found neither heat nor cold, dryness nor dampness. As each object reverted to the universal substratum, eternal atmosphere, it cast off all accidental characteristics and fused with the original divinity, atmosphere.

Anaximenes, who also belongs to the school of Miletus, was a disciple of Anaximander. His philosophy does not differ materially from that of his master. He regards the first principle as atmosphere, but he formulates more definitely all the implications of Anaximander's teachings. He considers atmosphere more as a living breath which generates all other forms of life. As life develops new forms appear. These new forms are but modifications of the original breath, but the changes which appear in the new forms may be not only new but of greater complexity. In other words, as life develops simplicity gives way to complexity. The changes are real, but all possibility of change, of becoming, was inherent in the primal principle, eternal air or breath.

These three cosmologists, Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, are often referred to as the Ionian philosophers.

THE PROBLEM OF BEING

Implicit in the philosophy of the school of Miletus are to be found the essentials of the first great problem of philosophy. To better understand the problem we shall express it in question form. How can the eternal principle called *being* persist forever and in unchanging form and yet be the cause of other forms which come into existence and pass away? How can being exist, cease to exist and never be non-existent?

According to Thales, so far as we are permitted to learn of his philosophy through the scant portion of it which remains, water constituted the universal substratum of the whole universe, and every separate form is but a modification of the all pervading and never changing eternal principle. Anaximander's philosophy was essentially the same except that instead of water he believed the eternal principle to be atmosphere. In the philosophy of Anaximenes, however, a new element is introduced. The eternal principle is no longer regarded as eternally unchanging atmosphere, but rather as generative breath which is perpetually bringing into existence new forms. Thus we see that in the Ionian philosophy there is the note of discord between eternal sameness and eternal change. This discord is known in philosophy as the metaphysical contradiction of being and becoming. This distinction or contradiction gave rise to three separate philosophical systems. These systems are:

1. The Eleatic System,
2. The System of Heraclitus,
3. The Atomistic System.

We shall consider each of these in turn.

THE ELEATIC SYSTEM

While Ionian philosophy was in process of development at Miletus Xenophanes of Colophan, himself an Ionian, travelled throughout Greece as a wandering singer. His songs were of philosophical content and gradually assumed the character of a system of speculative thought. In the course of his journeying he came to Elea in Lucania, where he became popular. So many pupils did he secure that he made Elea his home city. Among his pupils were Parmenides, Melissus and Zeno.

Xenophanes maintained that there was but one eternal principle. This principle was unchangeable and immovable. It had neither beginning nor end; it was changeless forever and ever; it was God. God was infinite and supreme. He existed everywhere in all substances as well as in man. He controlled the world by thought and cared for mankind by infinite solicitude. God was pure Being.

Parmenides of Elea formulated the teachings of his master and emphasized the implications of his thought. He taught as did Xenophanes that pure being is eternal. Since it is eternal it could have had no beginning. To say that it had beginning would be equivalent to saying that it was derived from earlier being or came from nothing. To hold the former view is to hold that which is unnecessary; to hold the latter view is to hold that which is absurd. Everything is being.

Opinion, says Parmenides, may lead us astray. This is especially true of opinions based upon the experience of our senses. We apparently see motion, but there is no motion. If being were to move there would be nothing for it to move in except in being, since all is being. If it moves within itself it has not changed its position, it

has not moved. Furthermore, if it were to move it would move in space but space is but another name for being. As a separate entity there is no space. There is nothing but being. All seeming differences are but illusions. Being is indivisible. You may even be convinced that you think, but you are wrong. There is no distinction between the thinker and his thought—both are being, not modifications of being.

Parmenides, in the distinction he draws between that which is made known to us through the senses and that which is, is the forerunner of spiritualism, though he himself could not be considered a spiritualist. Platonic Idealism is resident within his teaching, though he is not an Idealist. There is no line of demarcation in the teaching of Parmenides between spirit and matter. All that exists does so exist by reason of its identity with the infinite, unchanging, eternal, indivisible One. The monism of Parmenides was the seed from which many systems of philosophy, both spiritualistic and materialistic, have grown; but he was conscious of nothing but the Oneness of the eternal primal principle.

Three other philosophers of less importance carried on the teachings of the Eleatic school of speculative thought during the fifth century B. C. These philosophers were Melissus, of Samos; Zeno, of Elea; and Georgias, of Leontinum.

Melissus derived, from the philosophy of Parmenides, a system of thought foreign entirely to the speculations of the founder of the Eleatic school. Parmenides posited being, pure spirit, as the universal substratum of the universe. Melissus departed from the teachings of the master in that he held it was idle to try to arrive at the primal cause of the visible. The essential fact is that

change or becoming is impossible. As it is impossible, therefore, the universe is to be identified with being and being is infinite both in time and space. Therefore, what we see is real. Melissus held, however, that being was a perfect sphere of which only half is visible. His identity of being with the visible universe makes of him a materialist.

Zeno, who received instruction from Parmenides, was more skilled in the art of teaching than in the science of philosophy. He served to popularize the philosophy of Parmenides. In a sense he may be rightfully considered as the originator of a school of specious thought, that of sophistry, which we shall consider at a later period. Zeno denied all possibility of becoming as his master had taught and by a process of reasoning raised apparently insurmountable obstacles to the acceptance of the idea that there could be any possibility of change, such as change of position, within the infinite. Zeno held that a seemingly moving object in reality did not move for as all distance is infinite an object would never be able to reach its destination, since it is clearly impossible for a so-called material object to reach infinity.

Georgias, of Leontinum, was taught by Zeno. He went far beyond the teachings of his master, however, in his contention that not only space and time were infinite and movement and change both impossible, but also held being itself was impossible. Nothing exists, said Georgias, not even being. If being were to exist it would necessarily be infinite, as Parmenides had held; but if it were to exist it would have to exist in time and place which, held Georgias, are both finite entities. Being, the infinite, therefore, would be limited by the finite, which is a contradictory and untenable position unless we hold that all is shadow and deception. This Georgias

maintained. The extreme position set forth by this philosopher violated all experiences of man, helped to hasten the decline of Eleatic thought and gave impetus to the rise of a new system of speculation, that of Heraclitus.

THE SYSTEM OF HERACLITUS

Heraclitus developed his system of thought at the city of Ephesus, where he lived in the closing days of the sixth century B. C. According to Heraclitus, beyond all knowledge which comes to us through the senses and beyond all knowledge which we may acquire through human reason, lies the unchangeable and eternal Law. The Law, however, is not the source of regulation of the universe or of man's contact with it. The Law, which Heraclitus seemingly identifies with God, is not concerned with the physical universe or with man. From what remains to us of his book "On Nature" we gather the idea that the Law is a cold reality, sufficient unto itself and without interest in earthly affairs.

The system of Heraclitus constitutes a complete negation of the philosophy of Xenophanes and his disciples. The Eleatic school held firm to the notion that the universal substratum of all reality is being and the visible universe must necessarily be identified with this primal substance. There is but one reality and that reality is changeless. Heraclitus, in contrary manner, advanced the thought that there is no constant reality but the disinterested Law with which the visible universe and man are not to be identified. The reality to which the universe and man have relationships is the reality of eternal flux, of never ending change. Instead of the

variety apparent to the senses being but an illusion, as the disciples of Xenophanes held, the only reality in the whole scheme of things, declared Heraclitus, was the notion that nothing was constant, everything was motion, everything was alteration. The universe and man were both brought into existence by a primal cause, a symbol of the absolute instability of everything, fire. The end of all earthly existence is a return to eternal fire which, however, rises from its own ashes to begin the game of change all over again.

As a natural corollary of such a philosophy the senses can not possibly apprehend truth and so scepticism is the highest pinnacle man's knowledge, as derived from his senses, can attain. Man has, it is true, reason; but it has been granted to him evidently for the sport of the eternal Law, since by its use man can never attain the truth of life, resident in the Law. In this concept Heraclitus reveals a deep chagrin, a note of despair, a wail of man declaring the supreme uselessness of the struggle of existence.

The philosophy of Heraclitus emphasizes the note of struggle. Change is brought about by clash of forces. It is not a quiet but effective procedure which makes for change. Light struggles for supremacy over darkness; good constantly struggles against evil. There can be no pleasure unless we experience pain. All individual existence is a vain struggle. There can be no abiding reality except the Law which man can never understand. Heraclitus is a pessimist in that he stresses the utter vanity of individual life. His philosophy is important in that it foreshadows, by its sceptical note, the later critical systems of thought. It portrays vividly, too, Ionian philosophy advancing higher on the ladder of thought

in that it evidences suspicion concerning its own methods and seems to suggest that ontology is a problem too difficult for man to solve. The Eleatic school, in its later thought as reflected by the philosophy of Georgias, was affected so seriously by the speculation of Heraclitus that it is difficult to include Georgias among the followers of Xenophanes.

THE BROTHERHOOD OF THE PYTHAGOREANS

Pythagoreanism represents a connecting link between the two conflicting notions of speculative thought that we have thus far encountered, namely, the Eleatic philosophy and the system of Heraclitus. Of Pythagoras we know only that he lived and apparently established a brotherhood. Heraclitus mentions a mathematician, Pythagoras by name, as living in the fifth century B. C. Whether or not this is the man who established the brotherhood we have no definite knowledge, and much that we read of the Pythagoreans would seem rather to identify their founder with Buddha. The practices of the Pythagoreans had much in common with Buddhism.

The Pythagoreans as described by Jamblichus, a neo-Platonic philosopher, were members of a religious brotherhood of men who had banded themselves together so that they might put into practice the principles of the sage of Samos, Pythagoras. Their practices were ascetic and consisted largely in devotions, self-examinations, meditations and the rigid observance of a rigorous life of self-denial and mortification. In this atmosphere they developed that form of philosophy known as Pythagorean speculation.

According to the philosophy of the Pythagoreans, the primal principle is not to be identified with matter, but rather is it to be identified with number. What interests the philosophers of this school is not the material universe, its origin or its changes, but the order and precision which characterize its manifestations. It is the immaterial, not the material, which reveals to the Pythagoreans the primal principle. This primal principle is number.

The Pythagoreans were basically mathematicians. From mathematics as a base they reasoned that everything, whether in geometry, in astronomy, in music or in whatever field of human experience it might be, could be reduced to numbers. Hence they derived the thought that number is the innermost principle of reality. Everything is basically posited upon number. Everything that exists has its corresponding number and the quest of all philosophy is to find for each being its number. Number is the essence of reality, and the distinguishing characteristic of number is oneness. Therefore, when we reduce to the One we have found the unity that underlies the multiplicity of forms which constantly confront us.

Pythagoreanism includes two separate divisions of unity:

First, there is the absolute unity, the Arch Monad, the God of all reality;

Second, there is the relative unity, the first in a series of derived numbers, the unity which is to be distinguished *from* and which is determined *by* the two, the three and every other plurality. This One is a created monad.

By this concept of unity as found in number, the Pythagoreans explained all the manifest varieties of

human experiences. They explained heat and cold, dryness and dampness, love and hate, good and evil, finite and infinite by the essential contradictions between the one and many; between the odd and the even.

Pythagorean speculation is important chiefly because it introduces into Greek thought an attempt to reconcile the philosophy of the Eleatic school with the philosophy of Heraclitus. Matter is made up, according to the Pythagorean philosophers, of minute particles called monads. These monads or atoms change their relative positions incessantly, thereby establishing the truth of the Heraclitean theory of becoming. This change, though real, is however not the only reality. The proof of mechanism or change of position of atoms does not necessarily demand that we deny the existence of a never-changing reality or being. As *becoming* is real, so also is *being* real. Both *becoming* and *being* exist. *Being* is the unalterable monad of monads from which all other beings or created monads are derived. The struggle of created monads is due to their attempts to reach the perfection of the One, the first in the series of created groups. This is a relative perfection, but it is the only perfection possible of attainment by created monads. Beyond this struggle, comprehending it all, lies the absolute and unopposed entity, the unchanging unity—the Arch Monad.

OTHER PHILOSOPHIES OF COMPROMISE

In addition to the philosophy of the Pythagoreans, which substantially was an effort to explain away the contradictions between Eleatic philosophy and Heraclitean speculation, three other philosophers made an effort by diverse paths to effect this reconciliation. These philosophers were Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus.

Empedocles, who lived at Agrigentum in Sicily about 450 B.C., was a physician. His philosophy is found embodied in a poem of length and weight which reflects his metaphysical speculations. Empedocles maintained that the essential error of all prior philosophy was the attempt to reduce the primal principles to a single unity. The notion of essential and primal unity must be disregarded, said Empedocles, if we are to arrive at a reasonable understanding of man and his relation to the universe in which he lives. Air, ether (breath), earth and water must not be regarded as original elementary unities from which other substances are derived, but all are to be regarded as original. Instead, therefore, of *being* consisting of one primal principle, in reality it consists of four principles all equally primal.

These four primal elements, air, ether, earth and water move and in their movement generate new forms. The movement which creates the changes is not resident in the primal principles but is contributed by two other primal principles which, however, are immaterial rather than material. The immaterial principles are Love and Discord. Between these two there is eternal strife. Discord makes constant effort to separate the four original unities which Love strives ever to unite. It is this struggle which produces change or *becoming*. Thus did Empedocles reconcile, at least apparently to his own satisfaction, the philosophy of the Eleatic school with the philosophy of Heraclitus. His philosophy, however, offers but little in the way of genuine reasoning, since it evades difficulties by setting up in reality six primal unities, four of which are material and two immaterial. Empedocles sets forth in his philosophy that while *being* and *becoming* both are real, one of the realities—

being—is essentially good; while the other reality—*becoming*—is essentially evil. Ultimately the struggle between Love and Discord will cease. Love will have conquered. By reason of the cessation of hostilities evil will disappear. Evil will disappear, it should be noted, because change or *becoming* will have ended.

It is a logical conclusion from the reasoning of Empedocles that everything that can be done to hasten the end of the struggle is praiseworthy. Individual existence itself is but change and a manifestation of the desire to reach finality. Therefore life itself, since it interferes or delays a return to original unity, is evil and of doubtful necessity. The sooner life ends the better for the individual. In this contention Empedocles anticipates the pessimistic note struck at a much later period by Schopenhauer.

Anaxagoras, who was born in Ionia, took up his abode at Athens about 460 B. C. He was an extremely popular philosopher and became the central figure in a group of the most learned men of Athens at the period of its greatest interest in intellectual pursuits. Among his closest friends were Pericles, Euripides and Protagoras. The storms which gathered about these men in the political and social life of the city were visited upon Anaxagoras too, and in some measure were responsible for his retirement to Lampsacus where he died in 429 B. C. Anaxagoras himself, however, drew the fire of the populace by reason of his pronounced and oft-repeated words of contempt for the religion of the Greek people.

The philosophy of Anaxagoras is related to that of Empedocles except that he rejects the theory of four material and two immaterial primal causes. Instead of four primal causes of reality Anaxagoras speaks of an infinite number of primal elements. These elements per-

sist for all time. They exist as individual entities and have no power of changing or of being changed into other substances. Nothing, contends Anaxagoras, can be made to suffer change; everything retains its individuality for all time. Nothing comes into being and noth ing passes away. Life and death are respectively but the mixtures of primal elements and the separation of these elements. There is no coming into being except as we understand the language we use to describe the mixture of primal elements. There is no death except as we identify death with the separation of elements. The elements remain always the same, exist forever and unite and separate as automata in response to a separate immaterial primal cause.

The primal immaterial cause is in possession of intelligence. It is mind. It has always existed and has known all things that are, that have been, and that will be. It has arranged the mixtures and separations of primal elements from eternity and will govern them throughout eternity. Mind is, according to Anaxagoras, both beyond things as a separate intelligence and in things as a component part of them. Anaxagoras seems at one time to identify mind as a spiritual substance of far more worth than all the infinitude of material substances apparent to man and at other times he refers to it as the highest manifestation of matter. His logic is not sound and Aristotle criticises him severely for his manipulation of words conveying the thought that mind is both the creator of changes brought about by mixtures and separations and also but a necessary part *of* and resident *in* the primal elements. Anaxagoras, in other words, is illogical in that by his reasoning mind is made both intelligent cause and automatic result.

The philosophy of Anaxagoras is dualistic. It is interesting, as an effort to break away from Ionian physics. Its immediate result, however, was to intensify the materialistic note in Greek philosophy.

Democritus represents the most powerful and intelligent effort of early Greek philosophy to arrive at a reconciliation of the problem of *being* versus *becoming*. On the one hand Democritus held with Anaximenes that there is but one primal principle and that all matter, though represented to us by our senses under various forms, is essentially homogeneous. On the other hand, this philosopher agreed with Anaxagoras that all matter is divided into an infinite number of atoms which by fusion and separation create changes.

Democritus disagreed with Anaxagoras as to the nature of the primal cause. Anaxagoras held it to be an intelligent cause. Democritus held it to be unintelligent and identified it with absolute law or necessity. The world is governed not by the design of a primal efficient cause, but by necessity which governs the cause equally as much as it does the effects produced by the cause. Nothing, says Democitus, happens without cause; but all things happen by necessity. Everything is as it is because it could not be otherwise.

If all matter is homogeneous, why then it may properly be asked, do we have change or *becoming?* Why does not being, which remains forever unchanged, remain forever motionless? Democritus answers this question by assuming as a second principle empty space or *the void*. There must be a void, according to Democritus, since to deny it would be to deny the possibility of movement which is apparent to our senses, and to deny the possibility of our power to distinguish bodies and atoms from one another. The void is the indispensable con-

dition of existence. It is a manifestation of Necessity. Homogeneous matter and the void are the two inseparable aspects of the philosophy of Democritus. Matter is made up of atoms which move in the void because of the nature of their beings, because of necessity.

The atomic theory of Democritus was made the basis of the explanation of all phenomena. Each being is true to its native capacity for life and action when it retains all the atoms of which it should be possessed. When some of our atoms leave our body we become drowsy and fall, as gradually as they leave, into slumber. When a greater number depart from us we fall into a deeper slumber which we call death. The atoms, however, have not changed. They remain perpetually the same. They effect changes manifest to sense, which is our only source of knowledge, according to Democritus, as they act in conformity with the demands of necessity.

Necessity is the supreme law of action and re-action. To its dictates Nature, Man and Gods must bend. There is no denying it and we might just as well yield gracefully as attempt to fight a battle which must end in failure if we attempt to pit our strength against its powerful torrent.

There is in this philosophy the same note of pessimism that characterizes the speculation of Empedocles. Greek philosophy, though lost in the quagmire of doubt and gloom for a period by reason of the leadership of Democritus and of those who followed his teaching, did in time question the doctrine of Necessity. The Atomists, as the disciples of Democritus were called, accomplished good indirectly, in that they created a situation out of which arose in later times intellectual vigor and moral consciousness.

LATER GREEK PHILOSOPHY

The line of demarcation between what we term early Greek philosophy and this second period which we shall call the period of later Greek philosophy, is one demanded by the logic of the situation. The early period which we have considered was characterized strongly in the beginning and to a large degree throughout by fanciful conceptions more akin to the dreams of the poet than to the severe scrutiny of reality by human reason. Gradually, however, as we have noted in the philosophical speculations of Greek thinkers, there arose a vague consciousness of the activity of the human mind. Thought processes were used but not analyzed. The process of reasoning, however, was responsible for the tragic note of pessimism so prominent in the philosophical thought of the closing years of the early Greek period. Implicit in all the attempts made by the Greek philosophers so far considered was the doubt that human consciousness could ever know reality, could ever explain the happenings of the phenomenal world.

Out of this embryonic scepticism arose the full fledged sophism of Protagoras. Protagoras was a native of Thrace. He was a close friend of Democritus and shared his views with reference to the source of knowledge. Democritus held that all knowledge comes to us through the senses and that we know nothing except what we have gained through sensation. Protagoras, however, accepted this simply as an initial principle, and from it argued that sensations would be as diversified as the number of individuals in existence. What is relatively sweet to one may be relatively sour to another; what seems warm to one individual may seem cold to

another. There is no constant reality, held Protagoras, since all reality becomes known to individuals through their senses and sensation differs with individuals. In other words, the judge of reality is the individual man. Upon this thought was predicated the only judgment which the followers of Protagoras, known as Sophists, claimed could validly be made, namely: that the *individual* man is the measure of all things.

There were many implications in this philosophy which were directly opposed to the thinking of conservative Greeks. The times, however, in which Protagoras lived were not conservative. The military successes of the age had brought renown and wealth to Athens. It is true in our day as then that such periods affect the lives of the people, particularly of the youth, by causing them to adopt revolutionary attitudes toward the ideals, both social and religious, which are strongly adhered to by the older men and women of the times. It is in such a time that radicals and reactionaries are thrown into bold relief. Protagoras seized upon the opportunities of the period and popularized his thought by lectures to the youth of Athens. Protogoras was no ascetic. He loved fame, honor, glory and wealth with all the pleasures that wealth could give quite as much, if not more, than he loved philosophy.

Philosophy should not concern itself, according to the Sophists, with idle attempts to find primal cause; with foolish efforts to discover truth. There are no absolute realities, no absolute truths so far as man is concerned. All truth, all goodness, all evil, is a matter of individual temperament. Therefore, why bother to argue concerning apparent contradictions. Such contradictions are possible. What is truth to one may be false-

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hood to another and that is the end of the matter. Let man occupy himself with the one reality that is of any practical importance—himself. So far as philosophy is concerned, it is far more important for him to learn how to express eloquently an idea than it is to spend time discussing the ultimate validity of the idea. Philosophy is, according to the Sophists, made up of three distinct branches:

1. The art of living correctly—practical ethics,
2. The art of thinking correctly—dialectics,
3. The are of speaking correctly—rhetoric.

The Sophists under the leadership of their founder, Protagoras, emphasized the practical aspects of life. Their philosophy represents a very low ideal. It was, however, a logical outgrowth of the philosophical scepticism of the earlier period. The error made by Protagoras was in making the individual man the measure of reality. He exaggerated the differences in sensational experiences and failed to recognize those elements which are essentially the same in human sense experience and in human reasoning. This fundamental error served Socrates with material for combating the pernicious social effects of Sophistic reasoning.

Chief among the contemporaries of Protagoras were Georgias of Leontine, Hippias of Elis, and Prodicus of Ceos.

Georgias taught that all things were false. The reports made by the senses were unreliable and simply indicated that nothing could be known.

Hippias is representative of the Sophists at their worst. He boasted of the fact that he could speak with equal force upon either side of any question. He made a great show of knowledge and argued brazenly that he

could contribute something new to the discussion of any topic, regardless of the abilities of those who had previously discussed it.

Prodicus is a representative Sophist though his efforts were far more praiseworthy than those of his contemporary, Hippias. He held that while we could never know reality and that is true which seems to the individual to be true, still we can estimate the value of acting in accordance or in disagreement with the lives of others. We can, in other words, act goodness, truth and beauty though we can not define them. Prodicus zealously exhorted the young to lead good lives.

The work of the Sophists, while to a large extent destructive of the foundations of Greek life, had one outstanding result of marked benefit to the progress of philosophy. They, by their insistence upon disputation, forced consideration of the workings of the mind. This emphasis hastened the end of Greek polytheism and of the other fantastic explanations of reality.

In one sense, therefore, the Sophists may rightfully be considered as closing the period of early Greek philosophy rather than as inaugurating a second period characterized by a critical investigation of the means to be used in ascertaining truth. They stand between the two periods, looking back to the old, and forward to the new. For that reason we have chosen Protagoras and his followers as points of departure from which we shall travel the road constructed by the new Greek thought. It must not be understood, however, that the Sophists by their work gave rise to the superior search for guides to truth and conduct which we find in the outstanding philosophers of this later period, namely, those of Plato and Aristotle.

SOCRATES

Socrates was born at Athens in the year 469 B. C. In his early life he was a sculptor following the profession of his father Sophroniscus. We know that from his youth he was a close student of the teachings of Parmenides, Heraclitus and in particular, it would seem, of Anaxagoras. We do not know, however, by what means he gained his knowledge. Plato in his "Apologia" informs us that Socrates received instruction direct from the Gods to become a philosopher and to make Athens the scene of his teachings.

It is certain that he abandoned the profession of his father and devoted himself to what he was pleased to call maieutic—the art of giving birth to ideas—after the calling of his mother Phaenarete, who was a midwife. Socrates taught in the streets of Athens. He made the effort to clarify the ideas of any intelligent person whom he might meet and who would be willing to spend time in conversation with him. For his services he would accept no remuneration and so differed from the Sophists, whose brazenry, foppishness and venality he condemned.

It is interesting to note that the common people of Athens regarded him simply as another Sophist. In fact, they hated Socrates more genuinely than they hated his contemporaries because he appealed by his outward form to all the prejudices of the Greeks. Socrates was an ugly man. He was careless in dress and manner. The Greeks loved physical beauty and admired grace of body and charm of manner. Socrates was the antithesis of the Greek ideals and so contrasted forcibly with such a Sophist as Hippias who appealed in dress, manner and

speech to all that the senses of the Greek people had been trained to respond. Socrates in his own day had less repute than men whose names as philosophers have long since been forgotten. His fame is traceable without doubt to the superior wisdom which marked his teaching, but it is due, too, in no small degree to the records of his work left by his illustrious pupils, Xenophon and Plato.

Socrates was a true Athenian. He regarded as did the Sophists the true goal of philosophy to be life. His philosophy had much in common with Sophism in that it was a search for standards of living, it was a philosophy of morals. Like the Sophists he ridiculed metaphysical speculations, natural sciences and mathematics. All such study, Socrates contended, could lead only to atheism and barren judgments. With the Sophists he held that *man* is the measure of all reality. It is no wonder, therefore, that the average Greek citizen failed to realize wherein Socrates differed from the Sophists against whom they were prejudiced. To their prejudices Aristophanes, a noted playwright of the times appealed, and in a drama called "The Clouds" held Socrates up to scorn as the most stupid of the Sophists.

The teaching of Socrates, however, was a notable advance upon the thought of the Sophists. Sophism held that the individual man was the measure of all things. Whatever would serve the purpose of an individual was to be approved since the only truth, the only good, was that which for the individual proved to be true, proved to be good. Whatever contributed to the happiness of an individual was thereby sanctioned, since there was no higher sanction than individual sanction, no higher morality than individual morality. Socrates

in direct contrast to this though, said that while man is the measure of all things, it is not the individual man who can so measure. It is the universal in man, or more properly speaking, mankind which is the measure of all reality.

Socrates in his emphasis upon the universal was but maintaining that individual judgments are but opinions. Beyond such opinions are the universal truths. These truths such as love, beauty, honor, honesty and so forth are the same for all men. They are absolute, immutable and universal. Good and evil are not relative terms; they are not dependent upon individuals. Good can not become evil and evil good. They are eternal verities not subject to change. The individual may act in accordance with them or in disagreement with them, but he can not change them. Moreover, Socrates maintained that it was possible to ascertain truth by study and that ethical action would follow an intellectual understanding of the moral law. He held, in other words, that virtue is teachable. Men choose evil, according to Socrates, because they mistake it for good. Men are not of their own free will bad. Bad actions result simply from ignorance. We always act in accordance with our knowledge.

It follows logically that the most important task of the philosopher is to teach men to understand what is meant by such words as truth, honor, courage, honesty and the like. The first great task is the task of definition. The work of Socrates is remarkable for his untiring patience in conversation so that he could force men to clarify their ideas. He was an excellent listener and an adroit questioner. In conversation, and Socrates held that only by conversation could truth be ascertained, he

seemingly at the beginning agreed with the person to whom he was talking. This practice of his teaching is called Socratic irony. Then by skillful questioning leading his fellow conversationalist to deny statements he had already made, he proceeded to show that a dilemma existed. His friend must necessarily make a choice, but to make it creates an absurd situation because by making it he would say less or more than he had in mind to say. Socratic questioning aimed to cause a revelation of ignorance. It aimed to show that the symbols of knowledge did not constitute knowledge. Most often in such situations Socrates would be asked for his opinion. This he at times, though not always, gave and in the giving of it taught directly. Such teachings were, however, rare and brief. The whole art of teaching, contended Socrates, rested upon conversation.

The great contribution of Socrates consists in his having stressed the importance of universal truth, of conscience in man. He had rare courage in emphasizing the unchanging moral law in a period which liked to be told that the only form of conduct was individual whim and caprice. It is regrettable that for his courage he received but the jibes of the populace and was finally condemned to death on a charge of corrupting the youth of Athens. He drank the cup of hemlock in 399 B. C.

THE APPLICATION OF SOCRATIC PRINCIPLES

The followers of Socrates may be grouped into three schools. These are:

The School of Aristippus, or more commonly known as Hedonism;

The School of Antisthenes, or Cynicism;

The School of Megara which we might call the school of the Socratic metaphysicians.

These three schools resulting from the teachings of Socrates represent not three advances upon the philosophy of their originator, but rather three interpretations, or more correctly speaking misinterpretations, perversions and exaggerations of his teachings. The Hedonists took their beginning from the stress which Socrates placed upon life as the true goal of all philosophy. The prime essential of living, Socrates had taught, was happiness. Aristippus of Cyrene, who founded the hedonistic school, had been, prior to the influence exerted upon him by Socrates, a sensualistic Sophist and posited his beliefs upon the teachings of Protagoras who held, it will be recalled, that all our knowledge is subjective and that we can never become acquainted with materialistic or objective realities. Combining this thought with the Socratic doctrine that virtue or happiness is the goal of life, the Hedonists advanced the thought that pleasure is synonymous with happiness.

According to Aristippus, permanent pleasures such as are to be derived from friendship, art, literature and

philosophy, are to be preferred to fleeting sense pleasures. Men will, in accordance with the degree of wisdom they possess, choose the higher mental pleasures rather than the lower appeals to their sensual appetites. Nevertheless, whatever does contribute to the joy of life, be it but a fleeting gentle pleasure of the moment, is worthy of man and is to be approved. Intelligence will indicate to us those pleasures which are to be chosen because of their lasting qualities. The goal of all life's activities, however, is pleasure.

This philosophy departed still further from Socratic doctrine in the teaching of a follower of Aristippus, called Hegesias. Hegesias taught that we must be governed by experience in the construction of a system of philosophy. It is our experience, he held as a member of the school of Aristippus, that men seek pleasure as the distinguishing characteristic of life. Men desire to be happy. Some seek happiness in sensuous pleasure; some seek it in mental pleasure. Experience also teaches, however, that there is more pain than pleasure in life. Experience forces us to realize that pain follows our efforts to realize pleasures. Hegesias by his reasoning reached a logical conclusion—a conclusion which must be arrived at by all who identify pleasure with happiness, namely, that the only genuine pleasure is death, since only in death will we achieve the utter annihilation of pain. Life, therefore, for Hegesias has no value and suicide is to be approved.

The principles advocated by Hegesias were in direct contradiction to Socratic philosophy. For Socrates life had greatest value because only by living beings could virtue or true happiness be achieved. In Socratic teaching, however, happiness is not identified with pleasure

and life exists and must exist as long as we hope to promote better ideals of living, since it is impossible to conceive of ideals unless we at the same time conceive of living beings in whose activities the ideals we approve are to be realized. The philosophy of Hegesias, in other words, was not implicit in the philosophy of Socrates.

Cynicism originated in the teachings of Antisthenes, who taught in the gymnasium of Kynosarges. Antisthenes posited his philosophical notions upon the idealistic teachings of Socrates. These notions he held were the only guides to moral actions. Happiness is the goal of life, but happiness rather than being identified with pleasure, as was done by the hedonists, is to be identified with moral duty or virtue. Man, to be virtuous, to live morally, must renounce all pleasure whether of the low sensuous variety or of the higher intellectual type. Pleasure in and of itself is pernicious, is evil. It interferes with moral behavior.

The Cynics, as the followers of Antisthenes were called, were radical in their principles and radical in their conduct. They despised or affected to despise not only honor, wealth and station, but the ordinary politenesses common to mankind. The thought of Socrates that Man is the measure of all things was distorted by the Cynics to mean that the individual could be discourteous, violate every decency and convention of life just so long as he held fast to whatever he considered to be his duty. If something were desired by the individual not because of the pleasure it would give, but because he willed it, nothing was to be permitted to stand in the path of its realization. The story of Diogenes is illustrative of the point. Diogenes was supposed to have had his residence in a tub and was visited there by Alex-

ander the Great. Alexander asked what he might do for the benefit of the philosopher. Diogenes is said to have replied by asking the great Alexander to stand to one side so that he would not obstruct the sunlight. The Cynic wished to indicate that greatness and display meant nothing to him and he desired no more from Alexander than he would ask of the most ignoble of men—simply to let him alone. While this meeting in all probability never took place, the story serves to help us realize how the Cynics were regarded by the people of their age.

The School of Megara, or the school of Socratic metaphysicians, was founded by Euclides. This philosopher made the effort to reconcile the teaching of Parmenides, that being is eternal and that everything is being, with the Socratic philosophy in regard to the moral principles of life. Though this school of Megara did not flourish, we know that Euclides is entitled to a high place among the philosophers prominent during the period at Athens. His philosophy centered around the notion that eternal being is to be understood as goodness. The only true being, therefore, is that reality which exists in living men and to which he gave the name mind or goodness.

THE DENIAL OF MATTER AND THE REALISM OF THOUGHT

Plato of Athens is a true representative of the superior heights to which the human mind can ascend. He was born about 427 B. C. In contradistinction to Socrates, his cherished master, he belonged to the aristocratic class of the city and shunned the haunts and street corners frequented by the great exponent of dialectic reasoning. Plato was not only of superior birth, of reserved manner but he was in addition a poet who loved in all sincerity, the true, the beautiful and the good. It is essential that we emphasize the poetic elements in the character of Plato since by an omission of such emphasis it is not only possible but highly probable that we shall read into his philosophy a modern note and give to him credit for what in reality he never had in mind. The poet in Plato often speaks out strongly and leads him to make assertions not founded upon cold reasoning and to explain contradictions in his speculations which could not be cleared except by the free use of poetic license. While the philosophy of Plato is lofty it must always be borne in mind that he was neither modern nor Christian but that at all times he was at heart a poet.

Plato as a youth of wealthy and aristocratic parentage had full opportunity for study. We find that he came under the influence of several men representative of different schools of Greek thought. Among these men were Cratylus of the school of Heraclitus, Socrates, Euclides of Megara, and the minor followers of Pythagoras. From 385 B. C. to 347 B. C. in which year he died, he taught philosophy in the Academy at Athens. At the Academy, which was a gift to him personally by

some of his wealthy friends in Athens, he not only worked out in detail his advances upon the philosophical speculations of his teachers, among whom he estimated Socrates to have been the greatest but in addition he laid the foundation of the Platonic school of thought which for centuries identified itself with the Academy. In fact the followers of Plato came in time to be called the Academicians.

Many treatises on philosophy which have been preserved are ascribed to Plato. Some like the "Parmenides," the "Sophist" and the "Philebus" are probably the work of other men. There are in existence, however, nine works which are clearly of his authorship. There are:

(1) The Phoedrus. This is a study of the search for truth as opposed to the selfish doctrines and false rhetoric of the Sophists.

(2) The Protagoras. This is an analysis of the teachings of Socrates with reference to true virtue.

(3) The Georgias. In this work Plato paints a picture of a genuine philosopher and the contrast he presents to the Sophists of the times.

(4) The Theoetetus. An analysis is presented by Plato in this treatise of the fundamentals of human knowledge.

(5) The Symposium. In these dialogues Plato presents through Socrates the growth of the philosophical devotion to beauty, truth and goodness.

(6) The Republic. This treatise presents in Utopian form Plato's theories of government. The State is advanced as the agency through which justice is realized.

(7) The Timoeus. Plato presents in these dialogues his theories concerning the nature and origin of the world.

(8) The Phaedo. The immortality of the human soul constitutes the question under discussion in this contribution by Plato to philosophical thought.

(9) The Laws. This work written after the Republic advances ideas opposed to those in the latter work. The Laws represents in all probability the more conservative attitude toward government taken by Plato in the later years of his life.

Through a study of his writings, which are in dialogue form, we learn how much Plato wove into his own system of thought of what he had learned from his teachers. The school of Heraclitus had taught him that the visible world was nothing but endless change. Socrates had impressed upon him the necessity for knowing himself and acquiring information concerning the characteristics of the highest good from the workings of his own mind. The Pythagoreans left upon him their indelible imprint for mathematics seems to have been throughout life a great attractive force to Plato. He looked upon it as essentially a true science since its deductions were all based upon ideal rather than sensible realities. The figures common to the geometrical reasoning of the Pythagoreans were changeless. No matter what processes characterized the manifestations of variety in the material world lines, circles, angles and triangles remained the same for eternity.

In the philosophy of Plato we in reality find a composite of the separate philosophies which had exerted their influences upon him. He saw the changes in the

material world but he also saw the absolutely basic, independent and changeless truth of mathematical reasoning. These apparent contradictions he strove to reconcile through dialectics or the Socratic method of search for the Good through the conscience of man which would unalterably and consistently choose the good from among the opportunities for choice presented to it. From this brief outline of the thought of Plato we can discover the three essential elements in his system of speculation. These essentials, which we shall consider in turn, are:

1. The Idea or permanent reality,
2. Nature or the changes wrought by reason of the resistance presented to the Idea by the plastic principle,
3. The Good or the ultimate goal of all the manifestations of Nature.

THE IDEA OR PERMANENT REALITY

Plato's philosophy is posited upon *a priori* intuitions. These intuitions resemble, to the point of being identical with, those geometric truths of the Pythagoreans which had nothing in common with those approximations to truth received by man through his senses. So true was the identity, in Plato's mind, that he used the vocabulary of mathematics to portray his thought and called the eternal types of all changing sense realities Ideas—or unchangeable forms. The philosophy of Plato is founded upon the Idea. To Plato the Idea is a generalization. It is that which corresponds to every common noun in language. The senses make us acquainted with individual objects but beyond the indi-



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Plato

427-347 B.C.

vidual object is the Idea to which that object corresponds. The Idea, however, is not simply as Socrates held, a general notion derived by the mind from things of sense. Sense objects were according to the Socratic thought realities and the great effort of the teaching of Socrates was to show man how to acquire concepts or general ideas from sense objects and so gain control over them. In his use of the word Idea Plato makes a distinct departure from Socratic thought. The idea according to Socrates was, as we have said, regarded simply as a mental product but according to Plato it is a reality.

It is important that we understand clearly Plato's meaning for unless we do we shall lose the basic thought of his philosophy, which is essentially a philosophy of Ideas. Ideas, therefore, are to Plato objects of our thoughts. They are not the thoughts alone and they are not produced by contact of the mind with sense objects. They are objective causes. Just as objects of sense are the material from which sense perceptions are created so too, ideas are the materials from which we gather our concepts. General ideas which we express by language as honor, courage, modesty are realities. So too are ideas which we call chair, table, man and so forth. All as ideas are realities. We make the most grievous mistake, according to Plato, when we ascribe reality to the objects which our blunt senses reveal to us and deny reality to those Ideas which reason presents. The Ideas of reason do not vanish. They are eternal. They are more real than those entities which we in our careless thought and speech call reality. According to Plato Ideas are real. This theory of the reality of the Idea is the basic notion of Platonic philosophy.

What purpose we may well ask is served by the visible universe? This is, in the Platonic system, a very

difficult question to answer. The world of sense does not produce our Ideas as was held by Socrates. Ideas, which are unchangeable and eternal, are intuitions. They may come to us as direct messages from the most comprehensive Idea or they may, as Plato seems to imply, be latent in our minds as inheritances from a prior existence in which we came into direct contact with pure Idea. All that the senses do is to show us objects which resemble and provoke our remembrance of the originals which exist in our minds as native endowments. Sensation therefore simply serves to reinstate in our minds the true reality which is the Idea corresponding more or less closely to the object of sense. The correspondence is never exact but only at best very close. The discrepancy always present is, however, not due to any distortion of the Idea. It is due to the fact that our senses do not report accurately or that the object of sense, which we erroneously call the real object, is but a very poor copy of its original, the Idea.

The Idea of Plato is real because it is unity. Moreover it is unextended and abides nowhere. It is sufficient unto itself. Many Ideas exist and together form a complete organization. Among them there are many gradations according to quality and worth. The more lofty Idea embraces the one lower in the scale of values. The graduation is not complete until we reach the most complete Idea which embraces all other Ideas. This Idea is the Highest Idea, the Highest Good or the God of Plato's philosophy. It must be admitted, however, that there is much of poetry in Plato's conception of Deity. At times he seems to regard God as the source of all Ideas; at other times, if we read him correctly, he seems to say that Ideas limit the action of God. The

most logical conclusion at which we are able to arrive is that, according to Plato, God or the Highest Good is identical with the most Comprehensive Idea. It is inclusive of every reality.

THE IDEA IN ITS ACTION UPON MATTER OR NATURE

Objects of sense serve only to enable us to recall Ideas which are latent in our minds. Such objects are but replicas of reality. Platonic realism is the realism of Ideas and is not to be confused with modern realism which is the realism of objects made known to us through sensation. Though Ideas are the only realities, they can not propagate themselves in time and space except by exerting influence upon matter which is the negation of everything that has form. Matter is unlimited and can not be described since even the most meagre description would serve to determine it, to set limits upon it, whereas it is indeterminate and unqualified. It is however the condition of the existence in sensible form of the Idea. Matter though formless and passive presents a resistance to the efforts of the Highest Good to impress form or reality upon it. The resistance limits the action of the Highest Good so that sense objects are never more than approximations to the perfection of the Idea.

Man represents the most successful effort of the Highest Good to realize itself in Matter. He is the paragon of all created substances. Everything in his body is arranged according to design; everything on earth is made for his purposes. Moreover he, in contrast to all other forms of creation, is intelligent. He is endowed

by reason of his intelligence with immortality, since his rationality is pure Idea limited in its activities by a body which is material and mortal. The body is according to Plato a tenement for the soul but so skilfully constructed a tenement that every part of it tends to educate the soul and make it ready for that supreme moment when it shall leave the body and be encompassed by the Highest Good.

That the soul is immortal is proved, Plato argues, by the strong desire resident within the thoughtful man to get rid of bodily impediments and converse concerning truth in terms of pure Idea. Moreover, Plato continues, we know that Ideas have existed prior to our meeting their counterparts in the world of sense. If the soul, which is Idea, existed prior to the body is it not reasonable to maintain that it will continue to exist after the body has perished? The truth will always be clouded, Plato further maintains, just so long as we are endeavoring to arrive at it through its duplication in objects of sense because matter itself is formless and passing. The only certain knowledge is the knowledge of Ideas. Where Ideas are distorted by sense we must supply the omissions and correct the distortions by faith.

THE IDEA AS THE GOAL OF NATURE

As all nature exists for the benefit of man so man in his action should strive to use the forces of nature that he may make himself and it resemble the Highest Good or God. The goal of man therefore is not pleasure but justice because God is above all things else just. How can man attain justice? He can not do so without instruction nor can he do so unless as a member of a social group, maintains Plato. He must live as an educated

social being if he is to resemble the Creator since otherwise he will be without the ability to know justice and without the power to practice it. It is upon this basic idea that Plato places his demand for a governmentally controlled collection of men called the State.

In the ideal State of Plato three divisions of citizens are provided to correspond with the three gradations in his philosophy characterizing man's efforts to realize justice in human society. These three classes are:

1. The ruling class or the philosophers. These men constitute the intelligence of the State. They enact the laws and attend to their execution.
2. The soldier class or the warriors. These men constitute the defensive force of the State. They are to protect it against the enemy both abroad and at home.
3. The artisan class or the servants. These men constitute the providers of the material wants of the State. They are the merchants, the farmers and the builders.

These three classes set forth the unity to be attained by a collection of human beings. The unity that is brought into existence is one in which is found wisdom (the ruling class), courage (the soldier class), and obedience (the servant class). This same unity is to be attained by man in his own personality and as a result of the experience gained through his membership in the social group. He is to be a man of wisdom, of courage and obedience. He will have an intelligence partaking of the intelligence of the Highest Good; he will in addition have the will to battle for his principles and yet the

humility to obey not only the mandates of God but the mandates of his own higher nature.

Reflection upon the characteristics of the State as Plato conceived it will intensify not only our appreciation of the philosophical speculation of the great Greek thinker but will serve to clarify our knowledge of his philosophy. The Idea is given to us not by sense objects but it is one with the types to which sense objects only partly correspond. The State itself is real only in so far as it partakes of the ideal type of which it is a replica. A collection of pure Ideas will be characterized by wisdom, courage and obedience. The Highest Good will be a perfect combination of all three. Collection of beings and the individual being must therefore strive to be like God who is perfect justice. In consequence the truly righteous man, the man of perfect character, is he who is wise, courageous and obedient. To be such a man should be the ideal toward which we should all strive.

THE ACADEMICIANS

The most important contributions to philosophical thought were made by Plato in the earlier years of his life. As he grew old the Pythagorean influence dominated the thought of the founder of the Academy. He leaned toward the mystic element in philosophy and numbers with all the inner meanings which the Pythagoreans attached to them became of supreme importance to him. His pupils, with one notable exception, following the master without question, developed the thought of his later years.

After the death of Plato dissension arose among the members of the Platonic Academy. One of the pupils

of Plato, Aristotle, felt that a grave mistake was being made in devoting so much attention to the speculations of Plato's declining years. He felt that the Academy should realize that the most fruitful period of Plato's life was the earlier period and that the philosophy which had been developed by the master in those years offered the best promise. Aristotle was opposed by the greater number of Plato's former pupils and eventually he set up, as we shall see when we consider his philosophy, a separate school of his own called the Lyceum. The members of the Platonic Academy continued their work under Speusippus, a nephew of Plato.

In considering the Platonic Academy it is customary to classify the scholarchs or head teachers as belonging to the Old, the Middle and the New Academy. Speusippus, Xenocrates, Heraclides of Pontus, Philip of Opus, Crates and Crantor were leaders of the Old Academy. Arcesilaus and Carneades were important scholarchs of the Middle Academy. Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon were names prominent in the New Academy and in their writings is to be found the most illogical development of Plato's thought.

The Old Academy was occupied in the interpretation of the Platonic theory of Ideas so as to harmonize completely the teachings of the founder of the Academy with those of Pythagoras. This movement flourished until about 250 B. C.

The Middle Academy may be said to have risen with the election of Arcesilaus as scholarch or successor of Plato. In reality he departed in his philosophy distinctly from Platonic thought. Arcesilaus was a sceptic and to him is attributed the saying that "a wise man should regard it as a matter of duty to refuse to believe

any proposition". Scepticism is the characteristic tendency of those identified with the Middle Academy.

The New Academy though it abandoned the scepticism, which had dominated it under Arcesilaus and his successor, Carneades, did not exemplify true Platonic thought. Its speculations are more representative of the period of decay of Greek thought. The teaching of the Stoics, whose philosophy we shall discuss later, had made its influence felt and in the work of the two most noted scholarchs of the New Academy, Philo of Larissa, and Antiochus of Ascalon, there is no evidence that the Academy was a logical development of the institution founded by Plato. Though the institution could trace its history to the original Academy, the philosophy taught was an illogical development of Plato's thought. As in Plato we can best glimpse the teachings of Socrates so in Aristotle we find the true development of Platonic thought.

ARISTOTLE

Aristotle was born at Stagira, near Mount Athos, in 384 or 385 B. C. His father was royal physician at the court of King Amyntas of Macedon. In the year 367 B. C. he came to Athens where he was instructed by Plato. Though there is no record of discord between pupil and master it is certain that Aristotle questioned the validity of much of Plato's teaching. In 343 he left Athens by reason of his appointment as tutor to Alexander, son of Philip of Macedon and heir apparent to the throne. Between Aristotle and Alexander there arose a strong friendship which was of special advantage to the philosopher. Alexander's love for his master led him to spend considerable money in securing for Aris-

totle vast collections of specimens. By reason of the specimens Aristotle was given the opportunity to study natural science with more precision than had ever been accomplished by any student prior to his time. In 334 Aristotle returned to Athens and established the Lyceum. His disciples were accustomed to walk with him in the neighborhood of the Lyceum buildings and hence there came into use an epithet in connection with his school which remained with it throughout its existence. Aristotle and his pupils as well as their successors were called the Peripatetics. With the death of Alexander the fortunes of Aristotle declined. He was accused of heresy and forced into exile at Chalchis where he died in 322 B. C.

We have said that Plato reveals to what heights the human mind by pure reason can ascend. Plato was a poet, an idealist, and we marvel at the sublimity of his thought. Aristotle was not a poet. In him we find none of the poetic fancy so prominent in Plato's reasoning. In place of it, however, we have a thought process founded upon reality, upon life as the philosopher viewed it. If in Plato we have revealed to us the heights of poetic fancy, in Aristotle we have presented for our study the mind of a superior student. He was without doubt the clearest thinker that ever lived in pagan times. His thought processes were profound and the results of his speculation corrected as they have been by revelation, by the close thinking of the Schoolmen and by modern additions to the field of scientific knowledge, still stand today as the best exposition of true philosophical reasoning.

As Aristotle was a profound student so also was he a most prolific writer. He has left studies in the fields

of mathematics, physics, theology, ethics, politics and aesthetics. In physics, for example, he wrote separate treatises upon the History of Animals, the Parts of Animals, the Progression of Animals, the Generation of Animals. His work on physics or the science of living things was followed in a collection of his works by a number of writings totalling fourteen books on what Aristotle called First Philosophy. Since these followed the *physics* they were called *metaphysics* to distinguish them from the foregoing matter. This term has been used to mean philosophy ever since Aristotle's time though the master himself never used the term in its derived sense.

FIRST PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy is defined by Aristotle as the classification of the knowledge of universals. Every minor science classifies knowledge but the knowledge it deals with is but a part of total knowledge. The knowledge given to man by the separate sciences (second philosophy) is understood rationally only in the light of general principles which general principles constitute the subject matter of philosophy proper (first philosophy). Philosophy, therefore, is a science with a subject matter of its own. The subject matter of philosophy is universal truth. First philosophy is co-ordinated with second philosophy by its acceptance from the separate sciences of the facts ascertained in their fields by investigation and study. It interprets and explains these facts as they appear in the light of the subject matter peculiar to its own field of knowledge—universal truth.

We see, therefore, in Aristotle a philosopher who claims the validity of sense knowledge but who also

maintains that man because he partakes of the active intellect of God rises above sense knowledge to universal truth. You will recall that Plato also maintained the possibility of sense knowledge and the possibility of universal truth. There is a great wall, however, between Plato and Aristotle in their philosophical paths of explanation.

Plato held that the Idea existed from all eternity as did matter. To give matter form, however, the Idea has to overcome the resistance offered by the formless material substance. The Idea is never entirely successful in doing this, so that at best objects of sense are but imperfect replicas of the Ideas for which they stand. They are poor copies of truth. They never give us truth but they occasion the Idea to rise in our mind by reason of their approximation to it. The only reality is the Idea. Aristotle maintained that Plato's theory of Ideas was fundamentally unsound. We gather our ideas, said Aristotle, from sense objects. "There is nothing in the intellect that was not first presented to the senses" is the basic truth of Aristotle's philosophy.

There are, therefore, in the process by which man secures knowledge, according to Aristotle, four entities. These are:

1. Sense objects,
2. The idea,
3. Active intellect,
4. Universal truth.

Objects of sense are material. Matter, however, is not formless as Plato contended. Matter has existed eternally and has always existed under different forms. That which has given form to matter is the idea which

has been resident within matter. The idea, it must be remembered, is not material. It is spiritual. It is not simply a production of the human mind by reason of its contact with objects of sense as Socrates taught. Neither is it a separate entity to which the material object simply crudely corresponds, as Plato contended. Ideas exist as universal truths, Aristotle held, in the active intellect of God. Every object after its own nature is attracted toward God and so by reason of tendency matter acquires form but man has been made a partaker in the power of the Divine intellect by his gift of reason through the possession of which he is placed above all brute creation. Man therefore has the power of recognizing the material object and of grasping the abstract reality by reason of which it has form, by reason of which it is an object.

The form of a living object whether it be a plant, a lower animal or man is its soul. The soul is the life force and it is through the soul that all self-activity, whether in the field of vegetable or of animal life, comes to pass. The soul of man, however, is a rationalizing element. The form that it creates is of the same nature as God's own form. Therefore man's soul has the ability to distinguish the spiritual within the material. Therefore man can know matter and only man can know it, Aristotle teaches.

The material object exists as an individual object within which and making it an object is form—universal truth—or in the case of a living object a soul—also universal truth. The material object when presented to man's senses creates in his brain phantasms or images. Man, through the power of reasoning granted to him by his soul, abstracts from the image the form

or quality which makes it meaningful to him. He notes its similarity or its dissimilarity to other forms and so arrives at the general concept or class under which it is included. He understands that which has given thinghood to the individual object. If this concept existed simply as a mental product the Socratic notion of the production of ideas would be correct. According to Aristotle it is more than that. If the concept existed by reason of being occasioned by the material object which imperfectly corresponds to it the Platonic thought would be correct. According to Aristotle the Platonic concept is both fanciful and unnecessary. Aristotle holds that the form existed from eternity in God and was also from eternity in the object of sense. Man's intellect by its rationality grasps its presence and thereby discovers the meaning of the object.

It would, in all probability, be of some help to the student in his effort to understand Aristotle's thought if he were to try to represent by drawings the differences among Socrates, Plato and Aristotle with reference to the birth of ideas in man's mind. The following diagrams represent graphically what the student should try to impress upon his mind concerning the fundamental thoughts of these three great philosophers:


SOCRATES
Mind of Man
Idea
Object of Sense
PLATO
Comprehensive Idea or God
Idea
Mind of Man
Comprehensive Idea or God
Form
Object of Sense
ARISTOTLE
Universal Idea or God
Idea
Object of Sense
Active Intellect
Idea
Mind of Man

In the First Philosophy of Aristotle are included Logic, Ontology, Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Theology.

In *logic* Aristotle not only laid the foundation of the processes of true reasoning but he did so thorough a piece of work that even today, after a lapse of over two thousand years, it can be truthfully said that in this field there has been no addition to the sum total of human knowledge. In his work Aristotle emphasized the existence of axiomatic truth, that is that objective reality which is grasped as truth by reason of the very constitution of man's intellect. From such basic truth he postulates that all deductions shall be made. This basic reality is the theory of the universal idea which we have outlined in a foregoing section. Aristotle not only advanced his theory of ideas as necessary to logical thought processes but he demonstrated the characteristics of the processes. He showed the differences between deductive and inductive reasoning and demonstrated how the human mind could arrive at truth through the use of proportions, judgments and syllogistic reasoning. Moreover he analyzed each of these manisfestations of the activity of man's mind and explained their operations.

When we consider the clear reasoning of Aristotle and realize that he was making an original contribution to knowledge we marvel at the profundity of his thought. For example in the world of sense objects he was not content to think of sensible wholes but considered them in their genus, species, differences, properties and accidents. He considered them under the general class to which they belonged, the particular illustration they displayed, how they differed from others of the same genus

and species, their essential characteristics as individuals and finally those individual characteristics which have no relationship to their species but which might be peculiar to them as individuals and might even be unessential to their existence as individual entities and as members of a definite species included within an also definite genus. It is thrilling to come in contact with a mind that could think so originally, so wisely and so thoroughly. It is, therefore, not so remarkable that in the field of logic man has added nothing in a period of over two thousand years to Aristotle's analysis of man's reasoning processes.

In *psychology* Aristotle was also a discoverer. He not only outlined the working of man's mind but carefully elaborated the processes of the life principle which he referred to as the soul of man. To this field much has been added since Aristotle's time by modern investigation and study. Even in the field of Rational Psychology which remains substantially similar to the psychology of Aristotle we believe differently from him with regard to two major problems. These are the problem of the origin of the soul and the problem of its immortality.

Aristotle while he recognized the necessity of believing that the soul had been created by God could not logically admit such creation since he held as we shall see that God was not able, by reason of His own nature, to will or do anything outside of Himself. Man's rational soul like God Himself simply proved to Aristotle's mind the Divine design of all that *is* but it did not necessarily prove that God had created the soul from nothing. It is at this point that scholastic reasoning excelled that of Aristotle. It is sometimes said that Plato



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Aristotle

384-322 B.C.

excelled Aristotle with respect to the origin of man's soul. It is true he did in so far as conclusions are concerned but we must always remember that Plato was writing from poetic fancy and not, as was Aristotle, from demonstrable proof. Aristotle was not excelled in rational phychology nor in theology until the speculative work of the Schoolmen crystallized itself into conclusive proof.

Aristotle does not admit the creation by God of the soul, neither does he mention at any point the possibility of the soul's immortality. He did not admit it because he could not prove it. Plato admitted it but did not prove it. The Scholastic reasoning of the Middle Age not only held to its possibility but proved its actuality. The Schoolmen in this regard made another advance upon Aristotle's thought.

In *ontology* Aristotle rested his proof of a primal cause not so much upon the evident design in the constitution of the universe and in each component part of it as upon the need of some entity to change potentiality into actuality. Every being, maintained Aristotle, is either possible or actual. If it is actual some power must necessarily have caused the change from a potential possibility into actual circumstance. Some other being or force must have acted upon it. It could not however have been an unintelligent force since in the effects produced intelligence is displayed. It must possess personality since personality is in man one of the manifest effects of a prior cause. It must be rational since man is rational. It can not with reason be maintained that the possibility of intelligent effects is inherent in natural objects since such hypothesis does not in reality explain anything. It can not either be proved that an infinitude

of causes and effects would be responsible since the very thought of such infinitude precludes the possibility of there ever being a primal cause. The ultimate first cause is omniscient. It not only knows all that is to be known and so is inclusive of all effects that are but all that are to be. Moreover it itself has had no prior cause therefore it is an active first cause creating motion in all else outside itself. This primal cause is God.

Though Aristotle's proof of God's existence is complete, his conception of the attributes of God prevented his granting to the Supreme Being power to interfere personally in the direction of the affairs of the world. Aristotle considered God as prime being, from whose qualities nothing could be taken nor to whom anything could be added. God knows all things but such knowledge is always within Himself. He can gain knowledge from no person or thing because by so doing He would be adding to perfection, which is impossible. Moreover all activity is within Himself. He can therefore never think, will nor do anything beyond Himself. The life of God is a life of pure contemplation. Any other assumption, claims Aristotle, would be illogical.

In *theology* Aristotle's errors and omissions were corrected by the scholastic thinkers of the Middle Ages. It must be realized, however, that their task was far easier than that which presented itself to the great pagan philosopher. They had not only his work to build upon but Divine revelation of God to man through Christ had given their philosophical speculation a beacon of which the "master of those who know" had been deprived.

Aristotle held that though God logically can not and does not act nor think beyond Himself He draws all things

to Him. He is not only Supreme Intelligence and also Supreme Activity but He is in addition Supreme Goodness. Every created object therefore in seeking goodness which is the goal of its activity is drawn towards God. He is therefore the object of tendency or desire of every being and thing that is. Hence the activity of the world though not caused directly by Him as a personal agent is nevertheless due to his qualities as God.

The pivotal point of man's chief concern, that of personal immortality, is at no time the question of specific discussion by Aristotle. Logically he could not admit such immortality. His thought processes were as we have said profound but while they illustrate how keen an instrument man's mind can be they show too how possible error is. The inspired word of Holy Writ which assured man that he had been created from nothing by God and would if he obeyed His commands be admitted to His presence went far beyond the reasoning of Aristotle. He, however, is not to be censured because God had withheld inspiration from him. Plato by poetic flight had conceived the individual immortality of man. His reasoning, however, was so unsound that it can hardly be claimed that the Divine spirit had spoken through the philosopher. It is not to be marvelled at, however, that the early Church Fathers felt that Plato was in reality the expositor in pagan times of Christian philosophy. The rationalization of Christianity was, in the early centuries of the history of the Church, a rationalization along Platonic lines. The wisdom of Aristotle's thought was not realized until a much later period.

In *Ethics* Aristotle by his rejection of the thought of individual immortality was forced to explain man's relationship toward life from the viewpoint of the practical advantage it would be to the individual to live

one way rather than another. He believed that God by his very nature attracted man toward Him. The good life, therefore, would be one determined by a standard derived from a study of God's goodness. Man is to choose not the ephemeral pleasures of the fleeting present but the permanent virtues which are of God's own essence. The rationality of his soul demands that he live a life of good conduct regulated by a norm of justice to himself, other men and God. A life of a different kind would not be in conformity with his own nature as a rational animal.

In *Politics* Aristotle clearly enunciated his belief in the superior rights of the family as they might be questioned by the demands of the State. Plato had made the State autocratic and subordinated all family and individual rights to those of the body politic. Aristotle held that the State must not interfere with family life. In this he was correct. His justification for his contention could rest upon no firmer ground, however, by reason of his logic and theology, than the well-being of individuals in the life of the times.

FINAL PHASES OF GREEK THOUGHT

The birth of Socrates in 469 B. C. may be considered as marking the beginning of a period during which Greek philosophical thought reached its highest pinnacle. In like manner the year of Aristotle's death, 322 B. C., may be remembered as definitely ending the greatness of Greece as a philosophical center. As a matter of fact fifteen years before the death of Aristotle the Macedonian power, in the battle of Chaeronea, had gained control over Hellas. The political organization of the peninsula had never been strong, and what strength it had possessed was in a weakened condition at the time of the conquest due to a preceding civil war between Sparta and Athens. The national feeling was seriously impaired, however, by the victory of the Macedonians. After the battle of Chaeronea Greece suffered a steady decline which ended in her complete subjugation by Roman power in 146 B. C. In this year Hellas was reduced to the condition of a colony belonging to imperial Rome.

As her national feeling declined the philosophical speculation which was best when the star of Greece was in the zenith likewise declined. The schools, if such they might be called, which came into existence after the death of Aristotle had nothing in common with the profundity of his thought nor did they partake at all of the lofty speculation of his predecessor, Plato. They were products of an age in which men were trying to find solace in lives as citizens of the world when lives as free Greeks were no longer possible. They were philosophies which aimed to enable man to endure if he could not forget.

The philosophies which flourished, though as rank weeds, during the final period of Greek thought were philosophies not only of decline but also of decay. The three most prominent schools of the period are known as Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Scepticism. All three are off-shoots of Aristotle's failure to justify a good life upon a higher basis than its efficacy in promoting one's happiness.

EPICUREANISM

Epicurus was born at Samos in the year 342 B. C. His philosophy, if we can believe his own testimony, was not formulated as the result of serious study of preceding philosophies. Though he offered it as original thought, it is hardly that. Epicurus was either egotistical or intellectually dishonest. Probably both assumptions are correct for Epicureanism is little more than the Hedonism of Aristippus, whose interpretation of Socratic principles we have previously set forth, tinted with the influence of Aristotle.

The school of Epicurus held that each man should regulate his life so that from it he would secure a maximum of pleasure and a minimum of pain. The emphasis was in practice placed by Epicurus and his followers upon the suppression of desires so that painlessness would ensue. Pleasure, in other words, though the end of activity is not the means of realization. If we seek pleasure immoderately its opposite, pain, ensues. Therefore the school maintained that the prime essential of all good living is to avoid pain. By striving for a negative condition characterized by an absence of pain we shall in reality reach a positive life of pleasure for pleasure is nothing but the absence of pain. This is a note

that was not sounded by the Hedonists of an earlier period.

It will readily be seen that such a philosophy lacked all nobility of thought and purpose. It was a practical attitude toward life and for that reason became popular. It was popular with those of wealth and station and never affected the whole mass of the population. It represents a decadence of Greek thought and points to the absence of morality and honor among those who held controlling influence in the last days of ancient Greece. It was this philosophy and its antagonistic school of Stoicism which were seized upon by the conquering Romans and which sowed in Rome the seeds which finally led to the downfall of the Imperial City.

STOICISM

Zeno, who was born at Cyprus in 350 B. C., was the founder of Stoicism. The school was named from the circumstance that Zeno taught at Athens in a painted porch (Stoa). His school which was founded about 310 B. C. was probably the result of the influence exerted upon him by the Cynic, Crates, and the Academician, Xenocrates.

Zeno and his followers held that pleasure was not the goal of man's existence if by pleasure is meant the absence of pain. The real end of existence is to lead a life of virtue, to adhere to the higher dictates of one's rational nature. By so doing, Zeno and his followers held, pleasure would result. The pleasure, however, would be due not to the absence of pain but to the power resident within the man to endure all things, even severe pain, and to the reaction upon himself which would ensue as a result of such endurance.

Superficial study of the tenets of Stoicism lead to an admiration for those who subscribed to them. The practicability of their aims and the absence of all depth of study, however, shows us how remote the thought is from real philosophy. The outlook is entirely material. They have no vision, no power to see beyond present circumstance. If their reason for their standards had been higher then the standards themselves would have been more correct. The standard, however, was in reality to be accepted in order that one might be apathetic, callous to "man's inhumanity to man." It was not by chance that Stoicism was popular with men who thought they should have both wealth and power but who in actuality were without them. It represents, therefore, a note of despair. Its adherents were noted for pride of spirit and rejection of law. The Stoics held that they were above the moral law. It is not remarkable, therefore, that in time Stoicism became so similar to Epicureanism, if we can judge the philosophy by the lives of the philosophers, that we have every right to believe that in practice the two became identical.

SCEPTICISM

Pyrrho of Elis was the founder of the School of the Sceptics. He was born about 365 B. C. and died in the year 270 B. C. He was a contemporary of Aristotle and shared with the great philosopher in Alexander's friendship. While Pyrrho recognized the ability of Aristotle and apparently marvelled at the depth of his reasoning still he felt that in so far as the practicalities of life were concerned all the speculation of Aristotle and others led nowhere. Pyrrho held with the Stoics and

the Epicureans that the *summum bonum* of life is happiness. He rejected philosophical inquiry since he maintained that by such inquiry man's effort to achieve happiness in life was frustrated.

Pyrrho and his disciples represent the nadir of Greek thought. The scepticism of those who followed the lead of Pyrrho was of more significance than the earlier scepticism of the Sophists. The Sophists had been more or less flippant in their attitude toward certainty. The point of view held by the sceptics of this later Greek period was arrived at as a result of a study of all the philosophies heretofore presented. The men of this school, therefore, reject consciously all the efforts of able minds to explain universal truth. They maintain that if we are to judge by the speculation presented to man for his counsel and guidance such truth is inexplicable. Man can never know and the struggle to learn only makes for acrimony and discontent. They seriously urge men, therefore, to counsel themselves by questions and commands similar to those voiced by many so-called practical, hard-headed business men of our day. Expressions like "what's the use?", "forget it" and "the first hundred years are the hardest" represent the only philosophy many men and women of our day have. Such a condition is regrettable now, and to Aristotle it was regrettable long before the advent of Christianity, but to Pyrrho and his followers it was the height of common sense.

The earlier scepticism was the means of raising man's minds to an inquiry into the ultimate. It represented a beginning. This later scepticism urged men to abandon the searches upon which philosophy had started them as such searches were proving fruitless and in addi-

tion were productive of unrest and unhappiness. Such an outlook means the ending of Greek speculative thought. Scepticism, however, became the most popular basis for governing life's activities during the declining days of Greece. The uplift of man's eyes toward universal truth, the goal of true philosophy, did not occur until Christianity presented its message to the world.

ROMAN PHILOSOPHY

The Romans were a practical people. They showed little or no interest in speculative thought. Early in the sixth century B. C. Pythagorean influence was felt to some extent in Italy but it never achieved the position that it had occupied in Greece. The utilitarian aims and purposes of the Romans stood as a barrier between them and the seemingly empty promises of philosophy. Long before the actual conquest of Greece the Roman people had been affected by the stream of Greek literature, customs, art and philosophy which trickled into Italy. In the city of Rome a determined stand was made against this foreign influence and particularly against Greek philosophy by the aged Roman Senator, Cato. The feeling against the introduction of Greek thought became so intense that in the year 161 B. C. a decree was passed by the Senate which refused philosophers and rhetoricians the right to enter the city of Rome.

The people of the city became more intimately acquainted with the Greeks by reason of Roman supremacy being established over Hellas in 146 B. C. The minds of the Romans were broadened as a result of the contacts and friendships formed. Rome ceased to hate the foreigner who had been foe and instead commenced to admire the beauty of Greek life, art and philosophy. The upper level of Roman life acquired a taste for things Grecian, which though at first a passing fancy, a style, became in a short while an influence of no mean proportion.

To the Roman with his practical turn of mind, the philosophical studies of Plato and Aristotle, the masters of Greek thought, seemed to be worse than useless. The

Romans had no sympathy with the problems raised by the Academicians or the Peripatetics. Such an attitude was to be expected. The Roman valued the bread and butter aims of life rather than those ultimate values which are emphasized by metaphysical research. So it is logical that in Rome the philosophies which flourished were the three systems with which we closed our discussion of Greek thought. Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism made their way in Rome first because they were ethical systems rather than true philosophies, and secondly because they fitted in with the relationships of leading Romans toward the political events of the period. Roman philosophies, if we may call the Latin adoption of Greek thought by such a name, never affected the lives of ordinary Roman citizens. They were philosophies adopted in place of faith in the Roman gods, by those who had wealth, power or influence. We do not mean to imply that even these philosophies existed in pure Grecian form in Rome. The Roman had a way of adapting whatever he adopted from the practices of other peoples to his own purposes. So it is that in Rome these three systems of philosophy—Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism, became merged into a loosely compounded school of thought to which has been given the name of Eclecticism.

ECLECTICISM

Eclecticism proper had been known in Greece. It was, therefore, not a new system of thought. As a matter of fact it is not deserving at all of recognition as a system of philosophical thought, for in reality it was but another manifestation of the Scepticism we have

previously discussed. Eclecticism maintained with Scepticism that it was impossible to reach basic knowledge. In place of such scientific values Eclecticism substituted common consent of man with reference to immediate knowledge as a working basis for the establishment of a norm by which life's activities could be measured. It was essentially a practical ethical system. As a system, however, it was not pure. Eclecticism as it appears in the writings and lives of some was close to Epicureanism, in other cases it was closer to Stoicism; in all, however, it bore resemblance to scepticism.

Marcus Tullius Cicero was the most noted Eclectic at Rome. He claimed nothing for the originality of his philosophical thought. He claimed credit simply for his ability, as a master of literature, to translate Greek thought into Latin. Cicero had read widely in the literature of the philosophies of the early and later Greek periods. Moreover, he had been instructed by philosophers in the schools of Plato, Epicurus and Zeno. He was, we know, somewhat modest in his claims, for Roman Eclecticism as represented by him was somewhat different from the Eclecticism of Greece. While his philosophy is in the main a restatement of the thought of the Sceptics, Cicero makes an earnest endeavor to reconcile the differences among the schools of the period and weld their thought into a common system.

We can gather some idea of the practical nature of Cicero's philosophy if we view it as an ethical system rather than as a serious search for universal truth. In fact, he abandons the search for the ultimate and claims that man must accept probability rather than certainty as his guide and goal. In this contention he is a Sceptic. In the achievement of life's purposes he urges men to

follow virtue. In this phase of his thought he is a Stoic. When, however, he argues that wealth, position, offices and civil honors are values to be sought in life, he comes close to the notions of the Epicureans. So we see that Cicero was not original in his philosophical speculation, but rather strove to unite prevailing philosophies into a workable system of ethical principles. To be fair to him, it must be said that this is all he claimed to do and yet the very practical attitude he reflects is in itself a contribution. He could not have done otherwise since he was essentially Roman.

Cicero was the outstanding Eclectic in Rome during the pagan period. Eclecticism had many other representatives. Chief among these before the advent of Christianity were *Varro*, who died in 27 B. C., and Quintus Sextius, who founded the school called after him—the School of the Sextians—which acquired great prominence during the reigns of the early emperors. Eclecticism flourished for a long while and we shall consider it again in our study of the philosophies of the Christian era.

ALEXANDRIAN THOUGHT

The city of Alexandria was founded in 332 B. C. by the great Macedonian conqueror. It will be remembered that between Aristotle and Alexander the Great there had been a strong friendship. As a token of appreciation for the many hours he had spent under the instruction of his famous tutor, Alexander resolved that the new city which was to bear his name would be a center of learning. The plans of Alexander were carried into execution by Ptolemy Soter. Alexandria became a center not only of commercial activity but also of intellectual pursuits. In the famous Museum were gathered over 700,000 volumes representing the literary and philosophical studies of the Greek, Roman, Jewish, Egyptian, Phoenician and Hindu peoples.

As a result of the intellectual activity and as a result of the fact that in the city of Alexandria eastern and western civilizations met, marked effects were produced upon philosophical thought. It was here, in connection with the development of Greco-Oriental philosophy, that exact science made rapid progress. The scientific spirit, particularly in the field of mathematics, had for centuries been a strong force in Egypt. While Scepticism had done much to undermine dependence upon knowledge gained through the senses and in a measure was responsible for the lack of progress in experimental science, it could not exert so marked an effect upon mathematical inquiry. The exact sciences, such as pure mathematics and mathematical physics, pursued a path of progress because the basic facts in their fields were dependent upon reasoning and not in the main upon sense. It was in the city of Alexandria that Euclid about the year 295 B. C. wrote

his "Elements of Geometry". Here also he issued his famous studies on Harmony, Optics and Catoptrics. In this center of Oriental culture Eratosthenes, probably the most famous of the royal librarians under the Ptolemies, made his contributions to mathematical science in the fields of astronomy and geography.

In the field of philosophy proper, as distinguished from the scientific studies which established themselves as offshoots of it, two major divisions existed. In Alexandria Greco-Oriental philosophy manifested itself under two forms. These were:

1. Greco-Jewish philosophy,
2. Neo-Pythagoreanism

Greco-Jewish philosophy was an effort to bring the Sacred Scriptures into harmony with the main principles of Platonic thought. The Alexandrian Jews held that Greek philosophy and the Sacred Scriptures were not basically opposed. They expressed admiration for the wisdom of the Greeks but they maintained that Grecian wisdom had had its initial inspiration from Jewish writings or from Jewish tradition. They felt that at some point in their history the Greeks had come in contact with Jewish life and as a result of such contact had appropriated or at least been influenced by the superior wisdom of the Jews. Jewish wisdom was superior, they held, because the highest possible form of truth is that supplied by God in the revelation of Himself to man. The Jews had been chosen by God. He had revealed Himself to Moses. He had directly given His commands and therefore the Jewish people were the custodians of God's truth. To this truth the Greeks in their search for wisdom must undoubtedly have been directed. Hence the

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Epictetus
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problem was one of reconciliation of Greek thought with Sacred Writing. Aristobulus, who wrote about 160 B.C., was the first to make the effort to effect this reconciliation. His writings were carried over into the Christian period by Eusebius and in the early part of this period Philo of Alexandria made the further effort to build upon the thoughts and studies of Aristobulus a system of philosophy.

Neo-Pythagoreanism held that philosophy is of itself insufficient. There must in addition be direct communication with the underlying divinity which governs the world. While the Neo-Pythagoreans were not accepting the religious ideas of their Jewish neighbors, they show by their emphasis upon the necessity of a mystic element that these religious ideas were producing an effect. The union with the divine spirit was to be effected, the Neo-Pythagoreans held, through numbers. Numbers are representative of ideas in the mind of God. If, therefore, we become acquainted with numbers we shall know God. They added to Pythagoreanism mysticism, emotionalism and prophecy and they interpreted numbers as guides to spiritual values. The most famous of the Neo-Pythagoreans in the pagan period was Figulus, who lived about 45 B. C.



THE PROGRESS OF PAGAN PHILOSOPHY

THE CHRISTIAN PERIOD

INTRODUCTION

In our study of the pagan period of philosophy we have seen how each succeeding philosophical system drew upon the philosophical speculations that had preceded it. As apperception is the fundamental cognitive process and we increase our knowledge in terms of what we already know, so in philosophy there may be said to be no absolutely new system of thought. The Christian period of philosophy offers no exception to the general rule. Into the Christian period there extended pagan philosophy in the forms of Stoicism, Epicureanism, Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism. Prominent also in the early days of Christianity was the attempt to reconcile the tenets of the Jewish faith with Grecian thought, to which school we have applied the name Greco-Jewish philosophy.

It may at first seem strange that we include these extensions of prior philosophies within the Christian period. It is logical, however, so to do. While Christianity proved to be so strong a force that in time its inception came to be regarded as a distinct line of demarcation between older civilizations and the new era, its impress was not so marked at the beginning. The growth of Christianity like all true developments was characterized by a quiet process of orderly evolution. Its manifestations in the lives and thought-processes of mankind, though marked from its beginning by strong contrasts in individuals, were not so marked in the cases of whole peoples. Life went on in the time of Christ and in the years immediately following His death much as

it had proceeded before His advent. It would be strange if it had not been so. His doctrines gradually won the acceptance of so many that eventually they colored the thinking and the lives of masses of people. The changes effected, however, were not abrupt and to many living through the period Christ was but another teacher comparable with his contemporary, Philo of Alexandria.

There is, however, one thought, an essential thought, which escaped many throughout the years of the Master's life on earth and in the period immediately following His death. This thought prevents an identity of Christ's teaching with the speculations of the philosophers of preceding ages or with those of His own time. This thought, so fundamental and so necessary to our understanding, is that Christ was not a philosopher. Philosophy is man's effort by the use of reason to reach a knowledge of the primal cause. Christ taught not as one who had arrived at an understanding of reality by virtue of his ability as a rational human being to know, to sympathize with and to control the essential values of life; but rather as One who was truth and who had authority dogmatically to reveal it by revealing Himself to man. He was the truth and the truth was to set men free. He was the Revelation of God, the Primal Cause, to man. Man could accept or man could reject. The issue was clear. It was not the message of a superior human mind only, which Christ delivered to man. It was not the message of a clear-thinking philosopher. It was the message of One having authority to teach. It was the message of God. It was Truth.

No one period of time can cut itself off, as we have indicated, from the age which has preceded it. Each year affects its successor after the manner in which it was

affected by the year which preceded it. No matter how grave the significance of the happenings of one period of time, those happenings will be interpreted by people who are living through the period in terms of their own past experiences. Therefore in the Christian period there persisted the philosophies of an earlier time. Some lived but a short while and passed into oblivion. Others survived for centuries. Still others are cherished by men and women of this twentieth century as their personal philosophies of life.

The tenacity of preceding philosophical systems had much to do with the interest of early Christians in philosophical thought. As time went on the followers of pre-Christian philosophers turned their philosophical systems as weapons against the ever-increasing strength of Christianity. The appeal of Christianity was not only to the few of superior minds, as had been the case in the rational philosophies of the pagan period, but likewise to the many. It was an appeal to faith and to morals. Its appeal was to the man and woman of limited intelligence as well as to those capable of close reasoning. Its emphasis was upon the knowledge and love of God plus the love of one's neighbor. Was it, however, to rest upon this emphasis as a norm of life and lose converts by reason of the ridicule heaped upon it by brilliant minds imbued with non-Christian philosophical ideals? Were the brilliant minds within the Christian fold to accept the onslaughts of non-Christian philosophers as challenges and to interpret the instruction to "Go and teach all nations" as counsel to perfect a philosophical system to show the reasonableness of Christianity? Early Christian philosophy grew out of the answers to these questions. It arose as a defense of faith.

Its development we shall trace. We shall include, however, within this Christian period those other philosophies to which we have made reference and which, though chronologically falling within the Christian era, are in no sense Christian.

NEO-STOICISM

Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius were the leading representatives of that form of Stoicism which prevailed at Rome during the early days of the Christian era. The Stoicism of this period differs markedly from the school established by Zeno. In its teachings it reflects the influences exerted by Oriental thought and in its later days by Christian ethics.

Lucius Annacus Seneca was born at Corduba about 4 B.C. and died at his villa near the city of Rome in 65 A.D. Seneca was not only a powerful influence in the political life of the period, but was in addition a prominent figure in the literary world. His prose works and his dramas entitled him to the renown he won as a leader in the world of letters. In his tragedies and in his philosophy he made an effort to secure the attention not of the common run of mankind, but of the socially and intellectually superior group.

Epictetus of Hierapolis was a freedman of Epaphroditus, who was closely associated with Nero. Epictetus taught philosophy at Rome until about the year 89 A.D. when he was banished along with all other philosophers by order of the Emperor Domitian. Though often referred to as the philosopher-slave, Epictetus reflected the same point of view as that stressed by Seneca. His pupils were recruited not from the masses of Roman people, but from among those of power and position. While Epictetus left no written record of his philosophical speculation, his views were recorded by a pupil, Arrian by name, who compiled a manual in which were listed the essential points of the teachings of his master.

In this manual we have the best exposition of the thought of the Stoicism of the Christian era. Epictetus taught that evil was avoidable and that men were at all times masters of their own destinies. They should aim to hold themselves aloof from the sordid elements in humanity and to lead lives of meditation and of study. From such pursuit there would develop in time a fellowship among philosophers which would make them not only rulers of mankind but render them superior as individuals to the moral law to which others would be obliged to conform.

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, the last great Stoic, was born at Rome in 121 A.D. and died at Panonia in 180 A.D. He was Emperor of Rome from 161 A.D. until his death. The philosophy of Marcus Aurelius, while representative essentially of Stoicism, is illustrative of an effort to construct a new faith to take the place of a decadent belief in polytheism. "The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius" ("Ad Se Ipsum"), the name of a work written in Greek by the Emperor, is one of the most noteworthy contributions of ancient systems of thought. It consists of reflections upon life and the ethical conduct of man. The teachings of the Emperor-philosopher are presented in the form of aphorisms and even to this day they are studied intently by many in their search for a guide to the attainment of good character.

Stoicism is representative of contradictions. Though it seemingly made an appeal to the best in man, in reality it aimed to release him from what the Stoics regarded as the thralldom of moral law. The end it sought to attain was basically low. It offered itself, however, as a religion but not as one in which every man could participate. It was only for the enlightened. By reason

of its essentially immoral aims and practices as revealed in the lives of many of its adherents, its influence was but limited and can not be compared with the progress being made at the time, among all classes, by Christianity. The work of Marcus Aurelius, however, represents Stoicism at its best. The Emperor-philosopher was influenced undoubtedly, directly or indirectly, by the lives of the followers of the Man of Galilee. His counsel to do good to all men is found repeated in the aphoristic writings of Marcus Aurelius. This last Stoic was essentially a good man whose practices and ideals were in conformity. He was from many points of view a noble pagan. Much of his nobility of character was an acquisition gained by him, it seems to me, from the permeating power of Christian ideals.

NEO-EPICUREANISM

In a strict sense it is improper to consider the Epicureanism of the first centuries as a form of philosophy different in any important respect from the Epicureanism of the pagan period. Essentially, as a philosophy, it was the same. In progress of thought there was none. Its progress was a matter of organization. Due to the protection it received during the period of the Emperors it perfected the system of the election of scholarchs and built up for itself power and influence. The influential position was used by the followers of Epicurus to annihilate the last vestiges of polytheism and to combat Christianity. To satisfy its philosophy of pleasure as the goal of life, it made holidays on which to entertain the populace by the death struggles of those who subscribed to supernaturalism, who followed the Christ and who believed in the immortality of their individual souls.

As a philosophy the Epicureanism of the Christian period had no more to offer than had been presented in the thought of Epicurus at the foundation of the school in pagan times. It set up pleasure as a goal in life. The essential problem which man confronts in Epicureanism is held to be that of weighing his pleasures against his pains so that the scales will always indicate a balance in favor of his enjoyment of life. Epicureanism admits of nothing beyond materialism. All is material, even the soul. The importance of this mechanistic philosophy during the Christian period consists not in the worth of its teaching, but in its influential power as an agent of the Emperors of Rome in their efforts to destroy that which they regarded as a menace:—Christianity.

GRECO-JEWISH ECLECTICISM

Philo of Alexandria, who lived in the first century of the Christian era, built upon the efforts made by Jewish philosophers in the closing days of the pagan period a system of speculative thought. In the construction of his philosophy he drew freely upon the contributions which had been made by the Academicians, the Peripatetics and the Stoics. His philosophy was an effort at reconciliation, upon a rational basis, of Jewish law with Greek wisdom.

The initial point in the philosophy of Philo is that God exists. We have evidence of His existence in the design of the universe. "The Heavens shew forth the glory of God and the firmament declareth the work of His hands", had sung the Jewish psalmist. Of God we know only that He is spiritual. The world, on the other hand, is material. The spiritual brought the material into existence through the Logos, the Word. The "Word of God" is equivalent in the philosophy of Philo to the Idea of Platonic thought. Philo undoubtedly chose Logos to describe his meaning because of the biblical expression "Word of God". The Logos, or Word, represents, therefore, Idea in the divine mind. The injection of the Logos into the world is descriptive of the creation of the material universe. Material objects, in consequence, exist because of the residence within them of the Idea. The Logos, Idea or Word, though not God Himself is a God, a Son of the Almighty. Beyond this extremely vague conception of the Logos, Philo does not advance. His thought was not clear, even to himself, as to the nature of the Logos, although his concept of its purpose was definite in its relationship to the world in the work of creation.

Philo held that man through the contacts which his body establishes with reality is constantly being drawn toward God. First he learns to know sensible objects; then reason makes manifest to him the relationships existent among them; finally, if he is found worthy, he ascends to a complete knowledge of them and their relationship to God. Certainty of this character, however, is not produced by any innate ability of man. It is a gift of God. It is a message from on high. It can be obtained only by prayer and is transmitted by God to man through the Logos. The Philosophy of Philo is strongly marked by mysticism and supernaturalism. He is truly Oriental in his placement of illumination from God as a superior means for the establishment of truth. Passivity of contemplation is exalted above all activity in his philosophical system.

There is in Philo's philosophy a strong mystical element. While this in part is a reflection of instinctive Oriental reaction, it is likewise evidence of the study the Jew of Alexandria, as he was sometimes called, had given to Platonical philosophy. His emphasis upon the philosophical theories of Plato had much to do with the domination of that philosophical system of thought in the rationalizations of the orthodox Patristic philosophers. The philosophy of the constructive thinkers in the very early days of the Church came into existence as a defense against heretical systems which in turn traced their beginnings in no small degree to the philosophy of Philo. His concept of God and of the Logos was made the basis of attack upon Christianity not only during the Patristic period, but also during a much later time when Scholasticism was the stronghold against which militant opponents of Catholicism directed their shafts of reason.

PYTHAGOREAN THOUGHT

Toward the close of our consideration of the progress of philosophical thought during the pagan period we directed attention to the growth of Neo-Pythagoreanism. This philosophy was essentially a development of the germ of mysticism which was resident in the speculations of the Sage of Samos and his followers. There had always been in the system of the Pythagoreans a supernatural significance attached to numbers. This supernatural element was emphasized immediately before the beginning of the Christian era by Figulus and was reiterated with a note not only of emphasis but of exaltation by several philosophers in the early Christian period, among whom Appolonius and Nicomachus are probably the most renowned.

This newest form of Pythagoreanism was in reality more of a religious belief than a philosophical system of thought. It made an effort to secure converts to a faith strongly marked by ascetic practices. An odor of sanctity was bestowed upon Pythagoras and in course of time even upon Appolonius. Both were portrayed not only as speculative thinkers of amazing profundity, but in addition as personal summations of all virtues. One aspect of the decadence of Platonic thought was the tendency made by many, but in particular manner by Jamblichus, to create a fusion of Pythagoreanism with Neo-Platonism. The effort aimed at the establishment of a religion in which Pythagoras was to be the central figure. He was to be regarded not only as a prophet of God, but also as a fit object for worship by humanity.

NEO-PLATONISM

Neo-Platonic thought traces its origin to the work of Ammonius Saccas, who lived at Alexandria from 176 A.D. to 242 A.D. Little is known of the life of this philosopher. He did not systematize his teachings in written form, but left them as germinal ideas in the mind of his famous pupil, Plotinus. From this latter philosopher, who was a prolific writer, we obtain in remarkably clear form the whole structure of Neo-Platonic speculation in the purity of its early stages. While Neo-Platonism undoubtedly owes its origin to the school of thought which Ammonius Saccas established at Alexandria, as a perfected philosophical system it grew in importance by reason of the effectiveness, both as writer and teacher, of Plotinus.

Plotinus

Though it bears the name of Plato, the philosophy which the Egyptian Plotinus taught posited its beginnings not upon the famous Dialogues of the master Attic philosopher, but upon a synthesis of his views made in all probability for the convenient use of the Academicians by some minor philosopher of the school which Plato founded. To these views Plotinus added his own reactions which were the result in part of his contacts with Oriental civilization and with Christian thought. Neo-Platonism had much in common with other philosophies in addition to that of the great Athenian idealist. In it we discover elements of Pythagoreanism, of Stoicism and of Aristotelianism as well as of Platonism. In point of fact in its beginnings it emphasized the

necessity of aiding the philosophical speculations of reason by establishing communication with a divinity of some sort. In this position it is pure Neo-Pythagoreanism. At other periods it draws freely upon the other philosophies we have mentioned in its endeavor to justify the validity of the positions taken.

Plotinus, who was a native of Lycopolis in Egypt, was born in the year 205 A.D. After having spent ten years as a teacher of philosophy at Rome he retired in 263 to Campania, where he died in 270. During his years of teaching at Rome many famous men and women, among whom were the Emperor Gallienus and his wife Salonina, attended his lectures. It was during this period that Plotinus revealed at length the tenets of Neo-Platonic teaching.

Plotinus started, as Philo of Alexandria had done two centuries before his time, with God as the central point of his system of thought. God constitutes the Form of all reality. God is the one supreme principle of existence. God is the Oneness of reality. The unity of God, though it contains all existence, is itself not divisible into parts. Other forms, inferior to the infinitely just, beautiful and truthful Form, do come into existence. They come, however, not as divisions of the Supreme Form but rather as emanations from it. Neo-Platonism, it must be confessed, finds it difficult to explain either the nature of the One or the manner in which separate forms can emanate from it.

God, according to Neo-Platonism, beggars all description. To attempt to describe Him is to attempt the impossible. He is not a composite of Ideas though he contains all Ideas. Beauty, goodness, truth and justice proceed from Him but He has not beauty, nor goodness,

nor truth nor justice. These are but terms which we use to make plain our thoughts to ourselves and others. God is pure thought. Every time we strive to describe Him we are in reality making an effort to limit Him. He can not be so limited. He is beyond all limitation and in consequence beyond all description. He transcends all reality, though the essence of all reality is in Him. We can not in justice ascribe even the descriptive word 'One' to Him. We can not maintain logically that he has knowledge, self-consciousness, individuality or free will. He *is* all these. To maintain that he *has* them is to lessen our appreciation of Him. We can not find God in the world of Ideas.

It is in his concept of God that Plotinus differs radically and essentially from the Academicians, the followers of pure Platonic philosophy. Plato held that God was to be identified with the Idea and hence man could come to a knowledge of God through the use of reason. God, according to Plato, is Comprehensive Idea and as we rise in our development from lower and simpler Ideas to higher and more inclusive Ideas we ascend the ladder toward the most Comprehensive Idea; we are thus brought directly in contact through reason with God. Neo-Platonic thought, on the other hand, held that while reason might help us advance toward an understanding of God it would never of itself achieve that understanding. The philosopher, in other words, is undoubtedly closer to an appreciation of God than is the man of low intellectual pursuits. The philosopher, however, will never know God until he learns to cast aside reason and enter into a life of pure contemplation. He will cast reason aside not because he despises it, but because reason itself has shown him the utter uselessness



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Giordano Bruno
1548-1600

of attempting to arrive at a knowledge of God through active effort. Only the man who has philosophized, maintains Plotinus, can appreciate the worth of meditation. The contemplative mind is not a vulgar mind but it is one which has been refined through the active reasoning of philosophical inquiry. It is, however, only the contemplative mind which can enter into a knowledge of God. The goal of human activity is calmness, peace and contemplation. Contemplation is not strictly speaking the goal of life; it is life itself. Life is contemplation and contemplation in purest form is God. All that *is* converges toward God because all things tend toward harmony. The spirit of man cries out for peace and harmony. Such harmony will be established, according to Neo-Platonic thought, when man learns to grow out of the commonplace through active intellect and by so doing ascend the mountain of contemplative reality. On its summit is Contemplation itself which is God. Man will enter into life because he will cast off individuality and live within the principle of life itself.

From this brief analysis of the Neo-Platonic concept of God we gather the note of mysticism which was so characteristic of this school of thought. It must not be forgotten, however, that in the philosophy of Plato there was resident a mystical element. Plato emphasized the joy of those philosophers who would be permitted to live in the world of pure Ideas. The intellectual enthusiasm of Plato had much in common with the development of the mystical contemplation of the school of Neo-Platonic thought. The essential difference between the two schools, as we have indicated, consisted in the differences of the concept of God and the means to be employed to reach a knowledge of Him.

Plotinus considered all creation to consist of emanations from the divine substance. The most important of all emanations and the one nearest in nature to divine substance is intelligence. Intelligence may be considered under either one or both of the two aspects in which it presents itself. We may consider it under the aspect of reason which grasps the essential meaning of reality as it contemplates it; or we may consider it as identified with the world giving meaning to reality and being the object of thought present in an intelligent consciousness. It may be viewed as that which is intelligent and that which is intelligible. It is both and yet the duality is only apparent. Basically it is a unity, an image of the divine nature. It has, however, power of introspection and in consequence knows that it is but an image. It therefore knows both itself and the object of thought. The intellect and the Idea constitute a unity.

Neo-Platonic thought was unable adequately to explain the process of emanation. It was compared to the beams of light radiating from the sun and to the warmth which proceeds from a fire. These illustrations concern themselves with the physical world and never satisfied the longing of Neo-Platonic thinkers to resolve the problem of creation. As the nature of God would always present itself as a mystery to reason, so they held that the knowledge of the process of creation must remain beyond man's power of comprehension until the miracle is explained for him as it will be when he has succeeded in lifting himself to the power of the mystical contemplation of God.

Though the world of intelligence and intelligibility could not be understood as to its creation, it could be understood as an actuality. There are just so many

Ideas in intelligence. It may appear to our reason that the supply is unlimited. The perfection of God from whom Ideas emanate demands otherwise. This same perfection demands that we distinguish between general forms such as activity, similarity, rest and specific Ideas such as Plato, Aristotle, Caesar and other individual entities. Each individual is the realization of an Idea. Hence individuals can not cease to be but must exist eternally at least in the sense that the Ideas which they realize exist eternally in God.

As creation is but another name for the productive power resident in the nature of God, so, too, this same power in incomplete and imperfect form is resident in intelligence, which after all is but an emanation from God. Intelligence, therefore, partakes of the power of emanation as does God Himself. From intelligence the soul emanates. As intelligence is inferior to God so the soul is inferior to intelligence. By the power of introspection which it possesses, as does intelligence, it is able to contemplate the Idea which the individual with whom it is identified realizes. Thus it comes to an understanding, at first in vague manner, of intelligence—the superior form of emanation from the divine. The struggle of the soul is to understand the intellect more clearly and to grow to resemble it. The effort of the soul is to achieve reason as the effort of reason is to achieve a placement upon the threshold of the knowledge of God. As there is but one God and one intelligence, so there is but one soul—the soul of the intelligible world. God is the unity of Form; intelligence is the unity of intellect though it appears in a number, yet an absolutely definite number, of forms. The soul of the world is the unity of soul, though it appears as does intelligence in a num-

ber, though again a definite number, of individual varieties.

The body exists as an emanation from the soul. As it is lower in the scale of emanations from the divine substance, so it is lower in the scale of values. As emanations are further removed from the divine substance they become more imperfect in form. The intellect is imperfect in that it is not pure Form; the soul is more imperfect than is the intellect and the body in turn is more imperfect than is the soul. Each form makes the effort to achieve the relative perfections of the form immediately higher than it. A body, though farthest distant from the source of reality, is characterized by reality which is its form. The form makes it whatever it is. Form imparts to it shape, extension, dimension, color and the like. The total absence of form gives rise to the multiplicity of bodies, to extravagances, to oddities, to ugliness and to evil. Such total absence of form is the essence of matter.

In the Neo-Platonic concept of matter we meet another genuine difficulty. To Plotinus matter is real. It is essential to the existence of the intellect, of the soul and of the body. It is mingled with each though in different proportions. It is that incorporeal principle of creative power resident in each. It is likewise resident in God as infinite potentiality. It will be readily seen, therefore, that the matter of the Neo-Platonic school of thought has nothing in common except the term with the matter of the mechanistic school of philosophy. It is not so apparent, however, that Plotinus was able to resolve the difficulty into which his concept of matter had thrown him. This difficulty is in the nature of matter which he held to be the essence of plurality. If matter

is plurality how can it possibly emanate from the absolute unity of divine Form? To this question Plotinus never made reasonable answer. As creation by emanation is a mystery, so plurality from unity is likewise a mystery. Both mysteries will be satisfactorily explained only in the state of ecstatic contemplation.

DECADENCE OF NEO-PLATONIC THOUGHT

Neo-Platonism, as represented by Plotinus, is the last respectable effort of pagan philosophy to support the struggle of the cultured pagan world against the steady inroads being made upon its forces by Christianity. The ethical system of Plotinus had much in common with Stoicism. It urged man to forego pleasure and to center his attention upon philosophy and the delights of meditation and contemplation. In this manner would he prepare himself for the only value that was worth attainment, the reunion after death with God. Such reunion meant for the Neo-Platonist not individual immortality, but rather the annihilation of individuality, even of consciousness itself, and the identification of the individual soul, through a loss of its individuality, with the divine intellect.

The message of Christianity made a far deeper impression upon man's reason than did Neo-Platonic thought. The struggle between the opposing forces was most unequal. The inequality was so apparent that the followers of Plotinus made the effort to prolong the life of paganism by constructing a religion upon the basis of Neo-Platonic thought. This effort is apparent in the work of Porphyry who, though for the most part opposed to superstitious practices, did provide, in the ad-

ditions he made to Neo-Platonism, for magic and demon worship. The tendency to substitute superstitious practices for philosophical inquiry became the dominant note in the pagan philosophy of the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian era.

Jamblichus of Syria, who died about 330, on the basis of Neo-Platonic and Neo-Pythagorean thought attempted a rationalization of polytheism. He wrote a life of Pythagoras and tried, as we have indicated in a foregoing section, to elevate the Sage of Samos so that he would be considered as an object of worship by the non-Christian world. The movement met with little or no success. The tide of Christian influence could not be stemmed by so puerile an attempt. As a matter of fact the forces of Christianity were during this time on the verge of rising as conquerors over the prostrate form of pagan civilization.

During the fifth century, however, another attempt was made to revive Neo-Platonic thought and with it the worship of the pagan gods. Its most brilliant advocate was Proclus, who was born in the year 410 and died in 485. He was from many points of view a man of superior intellect. He gave evidence of the superiority of his mind in his attempt, though an insufficient one, to resolve the difficulty with which Plotinus had struggled to explain the creation of matter. Proclus, however, had fallen upon decadent times. He was influenced by his age and we find him urging as means of reaching into the supersensuous so as to gain illumination from divinity all those practices to which a dying paganism had reduced itself, chief among which were magic and the worship of demons.

Neo-Platonic thought suffered so serious a decline that, except for a brief period at Alexandria, it soon

ceased altogether to exist. The religion of the followers of Proclus consisted in divination and demon worship. Such practices were far removed from the identification of true religion with justice as Plato had held. They were likewise far removed from the noble aspirations and the exercise of will which Christianity inspired. When in the year 529 the Emperor Justinian closed the school in which Proclus had taught, the action taken passed without appreciable notice or comment. This is mute evidence of how powerless pagan civilization had become and how little interest was taken in the tenets or the disciples of the last remnant of the philosophy of the pagan world.

EARLY CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

The Philosophy of the Church Fathers

In our discussion, thus far, of philosophy within the Christian period we have seen how deeply thought had been affected by a religious influence. Through Philo of Alexandria and his followers it had felt the force of Jewish teachings and by its contact with the tenets and the followers of Christianity it had become conscious of the necessity of taking into account the supernatural as a norm of understanding and of conduct. Pagan thought had throughout the history of its development recognized in the main but one measure of truth and that measure was human reason. When pagan thought became permeated with a religious note it was as an attempted justification of paganism and as a protest against revelation and faith in the expression of both, first by the Jew and later by the Christian. We have traced the path of pagan thought in this conflict. It was a path of descent. Pagan thought in its attempt to build religious practices upon reason alone sank into a pit of darkness, where magic, sorcery and divination by the worship of demons sought to stir the emotions of man and so prolong polytheism and with it the older culture of paganism.

We know how unsuccessful was the attempt. We have traced the degeneration to the point where pagan Neo-Platonism finally succumbed. In 529 A.D. when the Emperor Justinian forbade schools of philosophy within the city of Athens, the Neo-Platonists fled to Persia where for a period, a very brief period, they continued their philosophical teachings. The effort to pro-

long paganism was brought to an end and the curtain definitely drawn by the conversion of the last representatives of Neo-Platonism in pagan form shortly after the expulsion of the Neo-Platonists from Athens. These representatives were Philoponus and Olympiodorus.

While pagan Platonism passed away as a standard of the life of ancient civilization and culture, Christian Platonism came into existence as a part of the same struggle. As pagan thought was affected by the teachings of revelation so was Christian thought affected by pagan philosophy. The advance of Christianity was a toilsome uphill journey. It was forced to overcome not only the natural inclinations of men but likewise a highly systematized pagan philosophy constructed upon a close analysis of human reasoning. To combat pagan antagonism, the antagonism of intelligent men who felt the appeal of Christianity to the vulgar crowd meant the death of pagan culture, Christian leaders were forced to become acquainted with, and skilful in, the use of the tool which was being used against them—reason.

Early Christian leaders were, however, not in agreement upon the procedure to be followed. We know how practical the Roman people were and how thoroughly useless they regarded the philosophical inquiries of the Greeks to be. It was logical, therefore, that enlightened Christians of Latin origin felt that faith and good works were enough and that a Christian should not concern himself with philosophical speculations founded upon reason. With the Greek Christian of a cultured pagan ancestry the case was different. It was to be expected that into Christianity he would strive to inject philosophy. He would endeavor to explain Christian doctrine upon the basis of pagan thought. Christian

Platonism arose as a logical outcome of these opposite points of view within the early Church.

Chief among the Latin Fathers of the early Church, that is in the period extending from the first century to the destruction of Rome, were Tertullian, Arnobius, Lactantius, St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome and St. Augustine. The earliest of the Latin Fathers, notably Tertullian, felt a strong hostility to pagan philosophy. The emphasis should be placed, vigorously asserted the initial Apologists of Christian thought, not upon the reliability of reason but rather upon its unreliability. Man should believe the doctrines of the Church even when, as Tertullian is reputed to have said, these doctrines seem absurd to pure reasoning. The truth of the matter is that corrupted reason is at fault and not Church doctrine. It must be remembered, however, that Tertullian and the other Latin Fathers of the period were in the midst of controversies. Against the Church were being hurled many calumnies and many arguments woven from malicious sophistry. The Church, to its Apologists, was not a philosophical system. It was a living faith and so belief, the following of Christ and the formulation of Church doctrine were the necessary elements of Christianity. Idle speculation concerning the truth of doctrine was unnecessary, unessential and unseemly. As the Apologists of Christianity however, the Fathers were drawn into debate and necessarily had to make appeal to the pagan world by the use of the only tool the intellectual pagan world appreciated as proper for such disputation,—human reason. Therefore, philosophical inquiry did enter the early Christian Church though not with the consent of the earliest of the Latin Fathers.

Among the Greek Fathers, as we have indicated, the situation was different. They were products of a civilization which had raised philosophy upon a pedestal and so it was logical that they should embrace philosophical reasoning as a valuable ally of Christian thought. Chief among the early Greek Fathers were Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria and Origen. Of this early period, Clement and Origen are the outstanding figures. To Clement we are indebted for the distinction drawn, in true Greek fashion, between the Christian by faith and the Christian by intellectual assent. The doctrines of Christianity were reasonable doctrines but many men there were who either could not or would not exert their minds to an understanding of their logicality. Such people had faith but they had not the true *gnosis*. The superior Christian is he who believes but who in addition has come by his belief through the intellectual inquiry to which he has subjected faith. Thus did the ideal of the Greeks, "the man of thought and the man of action combined in one personality", find its way into Christianity. Origen, who was born in 185 and died in 254, was, during the early period of his life, in close association with Clement. He was not only an apt pupil but was superior to his master in his power of organization. He did more than any other one Christian leader of the Church in the days of its early struggles to combat heresies effectively and to formulate Church doctrine. It is he to whom we are indebted for the first scientific formulation of the doctrine of the origin of the universe by creation. He drew from the Greek philosophy the elements of truth which he found there and used both the form and the content of pagan thought in his exposition of the reasonableness of

Christianity. In this accomplishment he made demands upon Plato, Aristotle, Philo of Alexandria, Neo-Platonism and even the Gnosticism of contemporary thought.

The Gnostics were the followers of a heretical system of thought which had grown up within the Christian Church during the second century. With most of the heresies of the Church in its early period we have nothing to do as they relate themselves to theology rather than to philosophy. This is notably true of the doctrine of Arianism against which the Church ruled at the Council of Nice (Nicæa) in 325. Gnosticism, however, was a direct outgrowth of speculative thought concerning the origin of evil. The Gnostics held that reason must necessarily be the test of truth. That which contradicts man's reason can not be so. If man's understanding can not grasp the meaning of truth resident in an object or an idea the object or idea must be false. So the Gnostics held that the mysteries of religion were untrue unless it were to be assumed that the explanation of them was to be found in a secret doctrine which Christ made known to His disciples. This so-called esoteric doctrine of Christ was the Gnosis. This doctrine of the inner circle, the Gnostics claimed was in their possession and upon it all their reasoning was based. In reality Gnosticism was a philosophical system rather than a religion and the system was made up largely of extracts from the writings of Philo the Jew and Plotinus the Pagan, with an admixture of Christian thought. The Gnostics maintained the existence of two essential and eternal entities, spirit and matter. From these respectively proceed good and evil. Gnosticism emphasized knowledge rather than faith and good works as did the Christian. By the time the Council of Nice was held

the idea of salvation by knowledge had ceased to be a serious obstacle to the progress of Christian thought.

The period extending from the Council of Nice to the onrush of the barbarian hordes during the fifth century was one of great philosophical activity within the western Christian Church. During the period there was formulated a positive system of thought. It will be remembered that in the earlier centuries the philosophy of the Fathers concerned itself with a defense of the Church against its enemies both without and within the fold. While the period of combat had in no sense come to an end still the degree of calmness prevalent was more noticeable than the degree of strife. Chief among the Greek Fathers of the final days of the Patristic period in the East were Pseudo-Dionysius and St. John of Damascus. In the former, whose works were written in the fifth century, there appears for the last time a Neo-Platonic description of Christian thought while in the latter, who belongs to the closing days of the seventh century, we find a clear exposition of Aristotelian logic. It is, however, in the work of the Latin Fathers, contrary to what might be expected, that we find the best expression of the formulation of Christian thought and practice. It is to them that we must look for that system of Catholic thought which the Patristic period, perpetuating its influence throughout the barbarities of intervening centuries, bequeathed to the Middle Ages. Chief among those Latin Fathers to whom we have previously made reference stands St. Augustine.

ST. AUGUSTINE

In his "Confessions" the illustrious Augustine reveals in charming manner his own life history. He

tells us that he was born at Tagaste, now Souk-Ahras, Africa, in the year 354. His father, Patricius, was a pagan and remained so until 371 when shortly before his death he was baptized. Augustine's mother, St. Monica, has stood throughout the centuries, by reason of her tender solicitude for both father and son, as an ideal of womanhood. She was an exceedingly pious Christian and the dissipation which characterized Augustine's early life was undoubtedly a source of mental distress and worry to her.

Augustine portrays himself as a youth of strong passions glorying as a real pagan in his bodily vigor and rejoicing in the gift of a superior mind. He reveals himself to us in modest manner and yet we can not escape gathering from the picture he paints that the youth was proud, as proud as a pagan could be, of his intellectual abilities and accomplishments. He imbibed from his father, perhaps, his pride of spirit for Patricius fairly worshipped his son. He saw the boy outstrip his companions in the schools at Tagaste and Madaura and determined to send him to Carthage to prepare for that most illustrious of callings, from a pagan viewpoint, a forensic career.

In the time spent in collecting the necessary means, for Patricius while in comfortable circumstances was not rich, the current of Augustine's life history was changed. The days of idleness at Tagaste combined undoubtedly with a superior attitude of mind led him into depravity and into a form of thinking directly opposed to the faith that his mother, Monica, followed. It is difficult to understand how a mind capable of such original thought could have been induced to assent to the doctrines of the sect of the Manicheans.

The followers of the Persian Mani, who died in 276, had established upon the basis of the teachings of the Oriental thinker a religious brotherhood. About the year 320 the brotherhood was introduced into Africa. Its main contention was that the secrets of life were to be found in science. Nature itself told its truths to the Manicheans. proclaimed Dr. Faustus, the leader of the sect in Augustine's age. Among these truths were facts, said Faustus, which established contradictions in the Scriptures. The Manicheans, in addition, preached a doctrine of the dualism of good and evil and in consequence the moral irresponsibility of the individual.

Whether it was essentially the craving of a gifted mind to know the truth, particularly truths of science, or the desire to justify his licentious life of the period that induced Augustine to associate himself with the Manicheans, we can not be certain. Probably both points of view had something to do with it. He became an active force at Carthage, to which city he had gone, in winning converts to the coarse materialism resident in the teachings of the followers of Mani. Augustine, however, was completely disillusioned upon meeting Faustus of Mileve, the famous Manichean bishop who came to Carthage during the period of Augustine's life in that seat of pagan culture and degeneracy. Augustine found Faustus to be a man of mediocre ability, a bombastic rhetorician who lacked all the genuine scientific knowledge he was reputed to have. The scholarly mind of the young pagan had waited nine years to come in contact with one who would, upon a scientific basis, rationalize Manicheism for him. He was disappointed. He rejected Faustus as his leader and Manicheism as a form of philosophy to which he could longer subscribe.

Augustine at this period was about twenty-nine years of age. He returned to Tagaste but soon left the town in secret so as to escape the pleadings of his mother who desired him to remain with her. He felt he could not accept Christianity and it would be better for his mother if he did not further annoy her by his rejection of the faith to which she was so zealous an adherent. He went to Italy and established at Rome a school of rhetoric. In this venture he failed. He sought appointment to a vacant professorship at the noted city of Milan. He received the appointment and as a result of it Augustine met the saintly Bishop Ambrose, by whom he was so fascinated that he went to hear him wherever he preached.

The mind of Augustine, however, was not ready for the acceptance of Christian doctrine. He became at turn during the next three years a close student of Scepticism, of Neo-Platonism and of pure Platonic thought. It was in Plato that Augustine's mind found solace. In Plato Christianity was rationalized for him and in 386 he was baptized.

We have presented at some length the tribulations of Augustine's mind because they present a concept of Christianity which, though not generally appreciated even in our day, was emphasized by the illustrious Augustine. Tertullian, of the early period, it will be remembered, had urged belief as reasonable even when it contradicted the voice of reason. Tertullian felt that before we could possibly arrive at truth, before we could know, we must believe. The life history of Augustine is in direct contradiction to this viewpoint. Augustine's long struggle against the espousal of his mother's faith was that he could not find a rational base upon which to posit his belief. His attitude was "I must know

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St. Augustine
354-430 A.D.

After a painting in the Uffizi Gallery

before I will believe." Christianity had first to be rationalized. Seemingly he demanded far more of Christianity than he did of Manicheism. He yielded to the authority of Faustus but he would not yield to the authority of Christ. The strong resistance of the talented Augustine was of greatest good to the Church in the formulations of its theological doctrines and its philosophical bases. It manifested to the world a proof of Christianity upon the rationalism of Plato. It set forth for all time and bequeathed to the Middle Ages the essential thought that Christianity was to be approved not alone on the basis of authority but likewise upon the pagan basis of reason. From Augustine's time religion in the form of Christianity, though Christians sometimes lost sight of the contribution made by the greatest of the Church Fathers, was to be a reasonable entity presented for the consideration of mankind.

While in Augustine's reasoning as a Christian philosopher the lines of thought are purely Platonic, it is manifestly unfair to think of him as simply repeating the thought of the noble-minded Athenian sage. In the mental struggle through which he personally had gone in his antagonistic attitude to the approaches of Christianity he had emphasized the rule of reason. Upon that rule much was to depend. Yet as a clear thinker he saw that to know reality it is necessary at times to have faith. His subscription to Manicheism was a compound made up of a desire to secure demonstrable proof plus a belief in the wisdom and superior ability of Dr. Faustus, the leader of the followers of Manicheism. When his faith was shaken his toleration of Manicheism was no longer possible. Hence it is that we see in the attitude of Augustine towards Manicheism an implicit

recognition of the parallel principles which motivated the thought processes of the leaders of Scholasticism at a much later period in their complementary attitudes toward philosophy and religion. These two principles are—"I believe in order that I may know" and "I know in order that I may believe." Augustine, therefore, is no mere Gnostic. He does not subordinate revelation nor the mysteries of religion to reason but considers them as logical deductions nevertheless from reasonable premises. They are beacons which would guide degenerate reason to a true goal and therefore "I believe." I am not asked to believe, however, in direct ratio to the degree in which reason labels my beliefs both foolish and false as Tertullian may, in the heat of controversy, have remarked.

As a rationalist Augustine was concerned, as he said, with securing knowledge of God and knowledge of his own soul. In Plato he found satisfactory proof of the existence of God. God was, according to Plato, the student will remember, the Highest Good. He was the standard by reason of which all truth was known. We are conscious fundamentally of our intellectual activity. We know that we think. In the process of thinking thoughts arise in us. We ascribe meanings to objects and to ideas. Whence come these meanings? Augustine, as a Platonist, maintains that we arrive at truth by reason of the fact that material objects cause to rise in our minds the Ideas which are there latently as emanations from the Divine essence. In objects of sense the Ideas are only crudely realized due to the resistance of plastic matter. Objects of sense suggest the Ideas to the mind. Every Idea, however, existed, prior to its realization in a sense object, in the mind of the Eternal God. Therefore, by intellectual activity, we can come closer

to certitude, we can know God. Knowledge of God and of His attributes is dependent in a last analysis upon reason. We can know that there is a God though we may not know Him fully.

In his proof of the immortality of the soul, Augustine again follows the lines of Platonic thought. The Athenian philosopher had held that truth and reason are eternal. They exist in God but they likewise exist in man. Man is distinguished from the brute in that he can reason. True reason is imperishable. It must follow that since it lives within man it must live in that which is itself imperishable—the soul. The soul is therefore life itself. To maintain that eternal life does not live forever is to say that the soul is not the soul.

Augustine's philosophy established in a provisional way the reasonability of Christianity in so far as the doctrines of the Man of Galilee were dependent upon the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. A further question, however, troubled Augustine. That question identified itself with the necessity of revelation. He was not demanding that the specific manner in which God revealed Himself to man through Christ be made amenable to man's reason. God is free will and so could choose what way he would. But why was the necessity for revelation felt even though the particular manner of revelation was of itself not of necessity? God had given reason to man. Could not man through reason know God? He had proved with Plato that God could be known through reason. The inner light of God in man is illumined by the resemblance of objects of sense to eternal truth. In most concerns of life, while our Ideas never but approximate the worth of pure Ideas since

objects of sense can only crudely correspond to such Ideas, no real harm is done. If our reason had not been obscured by the sin of Adam we undoubtedly would recognize Truth Eternal in all its essential grandeur by the close correspondence of the inner light to the Highest Good. The original sin of Adam has been transmitted, Augustine held, to each one of us by reason of the unbroken continuity of mankind. So we are confronted by a double difficulty.

Matter by its nature will not permit the full realization of the Idea and in addition reason has been obscured by sin. Man's senses must be brought in contact with the Word made flesh. Reason alone while it could grant us a knowledge of God could not deliver, by virtue of the obscuration it had suffered through sin, a full knowledge of the Father of the Light Eternal which illumines every man that comes into the world. Reason's use is approved but its limitations are recognized. Fullness of knowledge came through the senses from the Word in human form. God Himself, the Source of Light, made Himself manifest to man through Christ. Revelation in some form was necessary in order that man might through the perfection of humanity, as in Christ, have rise in his mind a superior knowledge of God, a knowledge which reason unaided by revelation had failed to produce. Knowledge of revelation supplemented by reason would cause man not only to know God but to love Him with a love that would exceed the love of all earthly things.

Upon the thought of the love of God, St. Augustine rested his ethical principles of life. The highest good man can attain is to come to an eternal contemplation of God. This he will accomplish in the life to come. For

the regulation of his life upon earth he should be guided by the Divine Law, the essence of which is love. The love of God above all things, does not preclude man from the natural love of himself and his neighbor. In these considerations he will find the standard of life, a standard made up of charity, prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice. He should regulate his life under the guidance which these virtues shed upon the inner light of reason. He can judge of the validity of life and of its direction either toward or away from his eternal destiny in accordance with the degree with which he consistently makes charity the basic foundation of his conduct toward his fellow-men.

St. Augustine was the greatest of the Church Fathers. While Patristic philosophy may be said to have extended in the East under the Greek Fathers throughout the seventh century, with Augustine it came to an end in Europe. The philosophy of the Fathers is noteworthy in its effort to define upon an intellectual basis the dogma of the Church. It reaches its highest pinnacle of accomplishment in Augustine. At best, however, it is fragmentary and lacks the completion of a thoroughly systematized school of thought. That such should be the case is wholly logical. Another outcome would have been out of keeping with the history of the world during the first five centuries of the Christian era. Pagan life in degenerate state was a force with which Christianity had to reckon. Out of paganism came conflict with Christianity. Against the teachings of manifested paganism as well as against those evidences of paganism cloaked within the Church—the many heretical systems of thought—the Apologists directed their energies. Christianity in its early years was interested primarily

in fastening a holy ideal of life upon a rebellious Europe to take the place of the ideal, both unholy and unnatural, which paganism had left. The Church was saved by the Fathers from subscribing to the false doctrines of Gnosticism and Manicheism. In addition to this accomplishment, through Augustine, there was handed to posterity a clear statement of the problem connected with reason and revelation. Reason and revelation were clearly outlined by the great African Father as distinct and at the same time as consistent sources of truth. Was his reconciliation of them complete? Scholastic philosophy found their reconciliation not in Plato or even in Plato Christianized by Augustine but rather in the pagan Aristotle. The discussion of the philosophy of the Schoolmen brings us into the later Christian period. We shall leave the Patristic period by repeating the thought that to the intellectual leaders, the philosophers of this early age, the Church owes its provisional rationalization of dogma from which Scholasticism initiated the study which culminated in the highest exemplification of Christian speculation.

LATER CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

Scholasticism

Long before the death of St. Augustine, civilized Europe was trembling before the menace of the Teutonic barbarian tribes of the north. Rome, though some remnants of her strength of former days remained, realized her essential weaknesses. Paganism had sapped her energies. Slavery had grown to be a strong national institution. Christianity with its non-militant note did not meet force with force but conquered rather by weakness, by passive resistance. Christianity, it is true, had waxed strong. It had taken over the form of the organization of the Imperial City but the note it sounded was not the militant note that had echoed and re-echoed throughout Rome in the days of her pagan glories.

Those glories had been endangered by many centuries of decay from within and in addition were now threatened by the German tribes upon whom the restraining hand of Rome was ceasing to be the factor it had once been. In 410 the blow was struck. Rome was attacked by the Visigoths who before continuing their triumphal ingress into the territories of Roman power sacked the city and captured the sister of the Emperor. They finally took up a permanent residence in territory which prior to their capture had been the Roman provinces in Spain and southern Gaul. Other tribes followed. Rome could offer only an empty show of resistance. In fact Imperial Rome fell again before barbarian marauders when the Vandals and the Suevi due to the pressure of the Huns against them crossed

from northern Africa into Italy. This second sacking of the city took place in the year 455.

It is difficult for us in these modern times to realize the consternation the barbarian onslaughts of the fifth century caused in men's hearts and minds. Many people believed that civilization was at an end. Those who lived along the line of hostilities during the World War can to some extent realize the character of the feelings entertained by the people in Rome during the fifth century. It seemed that the death-knell of civilization had been sounded. For eight hundred years Rome had wielded undisputed sway and now she had been driven to her knees by the brute strength of the barbarian.

There was, however, within Rome a force which had been weak but was now strong. Strong not in a military sense but strong in its convictions and in the execution of its principles in the personal life of man. The Church represented the only force to which the barbarian would yield. She represented his immortal soul. She held out to him the democracy of free peoples in this world and the hope of eternal life in the world to come. He listened to the appeal. It happened that as Greece in a much earlier period had captured by her art and her philosophy her captor Rome, so now, in this instance, the simplicity and meekness of the appeal which Christianity made turned the barbarian from an antagonist to a seeker after light and comfort.

If we review the historical situation of the period we shall see how logical the developments of the next four hundred years were and yet we can not but marvel at the fact that Christianity was able to preserve both itself and pagan thought. The Church had patterned its organization after the governmental form of Rome.

Through it she offered a coherence, a system which the barbarian people lacked and yet one they must necessarily obtain if they would preserve their integrities and take up their permanent abodes in the lands they had conquered. Secondly, she offered knowledge. Her leaders were sought by the rulers of the barbarians as secretaries and ministers because they knew the facts of the world into which the barbarian had intruded. Often they paid by death for the responsibilities they incurred. The Church, however, through its educated representatives gained positions of power and influence at barbarian courts. Thirdly, she offered the barbarian not only a condition of government which would respect rights and enforce duties but she offered, through the reward of eternal life, a rational explanation of existence.

Though the Church, in time, brought enlightenment to Europe she did not accomplish it without long years of tedious trial. There was little respect for learning in Europe during the sixth, seventh and eighth centuries. Physical force was of far greater power than education. In fact the only education that gained prominence was an education in the use of force. And yet the Church throughout all this period of unrest of warlike people engaged in warlike activities, preserved her strength and her integrity. In fact, upon the foundation of Teutonic barbarism she did more than rebuild the intellectual life of the pagan world. She directed the growth of a new era of intellectual activity and moral betterment. The barbarian rulers were quick to see the opportunity the Church through its organization afforded them. Chief among these rulers not only in personal accomplishments but in power of appreciation of the value of the learning resident within the sanctuary of the Church, for the

Church by reason of its monastic life had preserved many pagan accomplishments in the world of letters, was Charlemagne. He called upon the Church to help in the reconstruction of Europe by the foundation and management of schools. As part of the manifest interest of Charlemagne, Alcuin, a gifted teacher of the Cathedral School at York, came to the court of the Frankish king in 782.

Alcuin epitomized in his personality and his serious attitude toward intellectual accomplishment the life in Ireland and portions of England. That life was in sharp contrast with the manner of living in the continental areas of the then known world. As a result of the undisturbed life she had been permitted to lead Ireland, in particular, cherished and developed by her monastic institutions the learning to which she had been introduced by the early missionaries from Lerins and Saint Victor about 425. Saint Patrick, who had been in all probability educated at the old Roman school in the provincial city of Tours, was one of those brilliant scholars who introduced not only Christianity but the learning of pagan Greece and Rome into Ireland. The learning had been sought by the Irish people and Ireland became noted for its enthusiasm in the cause of Christian religion and of pagan culture. Those portions of England which had not felt the heavy hand of the barbaric conqueror likewise flourished as centers of learning. One of these centers was York from which town Alcuin came to Charlemagne's court.

As a direct outgrowth of the interest in education of the most famous of the Carolingian rulers, Charlemagne, came Scholasticism. It arose because of the necessity of the new situation though it traced its be-

ginning to the Platonic teachings of St. Augustine and to the logic of Aristotle as contained in the writings of the last of the Greek Fathers, St. John of Damascus. It had its roots deep in the Teutonic mind of the new European peoples and it was maintained by the brilliant men who came from the "New Ionia" as products of an older culture which had never been permitted to die.

THE SCHOOLMEN

Alcuin, who had founded the Palace School at Charlemagne's court, was essentially a teacher. As a teacher and as a founder of cathedral and monastic schools he contributed indirectly to the development of Scholasticism. He provided the conditions favorable to intellectual activity. In philosophy he contented himself with a close adherence to Augustinian ideas.

Rhabanus Maurus, who died in 856, was an outstanding advocate of the new schools which were being established in Europe. He studied for six years under Alcuin at Tours and produced a compendium of knowledge in twenty-two books. His relation to Scholasticism is similar to that of Alcuin. He was an encyclopedist rather than a philosopher. He aimed not toward original thought, as did the true Scholastics, but rather toward making a complete synthesis, a résumé, of beliefs held and to be made the basis of teaching in the schools.

The work accomplished by these two scholars is representative of the activities of one group of Schoolmen. The period produced many men of excellent worth such as Fredigis, Isidore of Seville and the Venerable Bede, in addition to the two to whom attention

has been specifically directed, whose talents were employed in the organization and administration of schools as well as in literary endeavors. In their school work they belong both to the history of education and to the history of philosophy. In philosophy they are of importance primarily because by reason of their interest in schools the conditions for individual study, particularly study of the new learning which ultimately gathering force burst into the Renaissance, were made possible. They were not in their literary activities original thinkers and so are to be differentiated from those other Schoolmen, among whom John Scotus Erigena of Ireland is the first example, who directed their thoughts toward methods and problems of a new type. The men to whom might be applied the title Conservative Schoolmen were Encyclopedists in the realm of philosophy. They served to make the transition between Patristic philosophy and the new method of philosophical inquiry. Those who departed from traditional Christian philosophy and who pursued an original, at least original to mediæval Europe, method of inquiry might be called the Radical Schoolmen. These are the true representatives of Scholasticism. They were radical in the sense that they initiated a new system of thought and so definitely severed connection with the reasoning that had prevailed throughout the period of Christian philosophy. They were radical, therefore, in the methods employed for the establishment of truth. They were not radical as to results nor in an intentional rejection of established truth. The methods they employed were basically Aristotelian rather than Platonic.

In our consideration of Scholasticism we shall view it under three major divisions. These are:

First Period—Growth

From John Scotus Erigena to Alexander of Hales (800-1200)

Second Period—Maturity

From Alexander of Hales to Ockam (1200-1300)

Third Period—Decline

From Ockam to the Fall of Constantinople (1300-1453).

THE GROWTH OF SCHOLASTICISM

John Scotus Erigena is properly regarded as the first of the Schoolmen who indicated the path which was to be followed by Scholastic philosophy. His philosophy was derived from the thought of the Pseudo-Dionysius and from Plotinus. It was essentially Neo-Platonic philosophy. The newness of Erigena's philosophy consists therefore not in its content but in the method used for the establishment of truth.

Among the radical departures suggested by Erigena were the following:

1. The identification of philosophy with theology,
2. The application of dialectic to philosophy as means to be used to secure the goal of all true philosophical search—truth.

   In dialectic he recognizes four processes. These are:

   a. division
   b. definition

c. demonstration
d. analysis.

All Scholastic philosophy traces out a course originally charted, though not in detail, by Erigena. Scholasticism throughout its history labored in establishing a basis upon which reason and revelation were to be united. Erigena attempted this by an identification of philosophy with religion. He held, for example, that it was thoroughly logical to use either the Fathers or the Scriptures as means of proof of philosophical thought. The later Schoolmen did not follow him in this. They held that revealed truth and the science of philosophy, though both means of certainty, must run their separate courses. Though both are valid they are necessarily independently valid. There will be no contradiction between revelation and science since both arrive at the same goal, truth, simply by the use of different avenues of approach. One can not be made identical with the other, neither can one be made a means of proof of the other. Therefore Scholasticism, while recognizing the essential values resident in religious as well as in philosophical truths, thinks of the truths as identical but as to the means for the establishment of truths it regards the paths traced by the two studies as separate and distinct. While thoroughly in accord they are never identical. Though interested in each other they are absolutely independent of each other. Scholasticism traces its interest in philosophy to the contention of Erigena that religion was a source of proof in that science. The Schoolmen disagreed with his answer though they cherished the issue he had raised. They were essentially religious disputants.

The introduction of dialectic or logic as a means of approaching truth was a note in Erigena's philosophy which was consistently sounded throughout the whole length of Scholastic thought. It is a distinctive characteristic of Scholasticism and by its presence in the philosophical studies of Erigena, we gain a strong impression of the influence of the man and his mind upon the progress of Scholastic speculation. When we think of Scholasticism we think of the refinement of dialectic. Logic was the strength of Scholasticism and only in its decline did Scholasticism decline. The growth of the power of Scholastic thought was in the mind of John Scotus Erigena.

This philosopher, however, was not always happy in his results. There is in his work clear cut pantheism. Platonic thought by the emphasis it placed upon the residence of the Idea in the material object led directly to the theory of the immanency of the Idea. This thought was held by Erigena. He was essentially a pantheist, though sincere in his adherence to Catholic dogma. In 1225 his work "De Divisione Naturae" was condemned by the Church.

Pope Sylvester II, more commonly known as Gerbert, was another outstanding exponent of Scholasticism in the days of its infancy. As Erigena during the ninth century gave impetus to the use of the dominant note in Scholastic method, the approach to truth by means of Aristotelian dialectic, so also did Gerbert during the tenth century popularize the same logical approach. He defined philosophy as an understanding of all truths both human and divine. The way to be followed in searching for the essence of all reality is the way the mind works in its logical relationships. This

system he found in Aristotelian logic. He popularized it by the many discussions in which he took an active part and so paved the way for the position in the zenith which dialectic occupied in all philosophical studies and disputes when Scholasticism was triumphant, during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, as a system of speculative thought.

Prior to the triumph of Scholasticism under its great leaders of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, there intervened a period of stormy conflict. The essence of the conflict was inherent in the attitude of Scholasticism toward reason. It exalted reason and hence ran the danger which every movement of progress runs, of having its advocates champion more than the movement ever intended to champion. In reality Scholasticism represents the beginning of true scientific inquiries and as many exponents of science in this twentieth century mentally hail as fact what science in reality considers but as theory, so within Scholasticism was to be found the extremist who might or might not remain true to the principles of faith. Scholasticism by nature of the weapon it was using, finite reason, had within it the possibility of danger for individual adherents. That danger was the same as confronts the scientist in any field of experimentation today. There is great danger that the outstanding product of research will be excessive pride of intellect. Such was the nature of Scholasticism. It was a game for gifted minds. The most gifted minds of the Middle Ages recognized both the dangers and the opportunities. They demanded to know that they might believe but they likewise stressed the necessity of believing so that they might approach knowledge. "Credo ut intelligam" and "Intelligo ut credam" were

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Averroës
1126-1198

After an old lithograph by Vigneron

companion and inseparable thoughts of the true Scholastic.

Still there was always the danger that reason alone to the neglect of faith would entice too engagingly and on the other hand there was the possibility that keen minds might neglect research thinking that it were far better to believe, to enter into a knowledge of God through contemplation, through mysticism, than to try to do so through reason. The mystic would restrict reason to too limited an area; the rationalist would give reason freedom to enter all areas. These two constituted the Scylla and Charybdis of Scholasticism and between the two she found it necessary to steer a course that would be bold, not timid, yet withal be reasonable and not reckless.

The necessity for close discrimination was soon apparent in the popularity that attached itself to the personality and the teachings of Roscelin of Compiègne. Roscelin was born in Brittany and as a youth studied both at Soissons and at Rheims. In 1098 he became canon of Compiègne. He taught at this city and later transferred his teaching activities to Tours. It was in this city that Abelard, his brilliant pupil, attended his lectures. These lectures centered around the problem of the universality of ideas, both generic and specific.

It will be remembered that in Scholasticism to date we have recognized two major problems. These are the problem of how to reconcile philosophy with revelation and the ever present problem of how to use, in most effective manner, the science of Aristotelian logic in the process of searching for truth. To these Roscelin added a third. In reality the problem was not new. It had appeared in the Isagoge of Porphyry as translated by

Boethius. It was a problem resident in the philosophies of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Briefly stated the problem concerns itself with the reality of ideas. It presented for answer the following questions:

Do ideas exist as realities outside the mind? (Plato said they did.)

Do ideas exist merely as mental facts? (Socrates said they did.)

Do ideas exist in sensible objects? (Plato and Aristotle maintained they did.)

In other words the great question which thrust itself upon the minds of the Schoolmen was of momentous importance to faith. Church dogma was concerned essentially in it. Are ideas real or are they simply empty words? Often the exponents of Scholasticism are criticized adversely for their entrance into wordy disputations involving the settlement of inconsequential matters. We have no desire to exonerate some defenders of Scholastic principles from all blame in this respect. At periods in the history of Scholastic thought we find men interested more in the subtleties of the reasoning process than in the solution of matters worthy of the intellect, matters pressing for solution. It must not be thought, however, that the problem of universals was one of these minor problems. It was a highly important issue and great praise is to be accorded the philosophers during the Middle Ages for the attention they paid to it. The denial of the reality of the idea means not only a denial of the power of the human mind to arrive at truth but it also means that there *is* no truth. The distortion of moral notions among many people is due directly to their denial, implicit or explicit, of the universality of ideas.

In connection with the solution of the problem raised concerning universals, Scholasticism offers four attitudes:

1. There is no universality either of concept or objective thing. This attitude maintained that all so-called universals are but names. It was known as *nominalism.* (Sophistry)
2. There is universality of idea but there is no universality of objective things corresponding to idea of mind. This attitude is called *conceptualism.* (Socratic)
3. There is universality. It exists independently of our minds in objective things. This attitude is called *realism.* (Platonic)
4. There is universality. It exists in minds and in objective things. In its fullness it exists in the mind alone. This attitude is called *moderate realism.* (Aristotelian and Scholastic)

Out of these attitudes grew the watchwords of the Middle Ages by reason of which the adherents of the different divisions of Scholastic thought could be distinguished. These were:

Universalia post rem (in human mind)
(Nominalists and Conceptualists)

Universalia ante rem (in mind of God)
(Realists)

Universalia ante rem (in mind of God)
Universalia post rem (in human mind)
Universalia in rē (true essence from God)
(Moderate Realists).

Roscelin's lectures were highly interesting. They captivated the attention and the interest of many of the

younger philosophers of the period. In their content they were novel. Roscelin was a nominalist. The nominalistic position gave opportunity, if its contentions were true, for one to support or not support traditional morality since according to it a universal idea, such as morality, was but a name and had no objective reality except as a sound of the voice. This philosophy, as Manicheism had done hundreds of years before, attracted those who would lead a life of immorality and yet receive for their life the sanction of philosophy. It was essentially a pagan attitude.

Though the disciples of Roscelin were, in many instances, bold, overbearing and immoral, the master was not. Roscelin was an independent thinker, a logical product of Scholasticism. He carried "reason" on his banner. He was a dialectician who would follow the argument wherever it led. From his type Scholasticism gained much, but in the process many people were led into error. Roscelin himself was guilty of heretical views. His nominalistic teachings when applied to the doctrine of the Trinity led directly to false dogma. It should be added, however, that though license in morals was logically defensible by his system of thought, Roscelin won the admiration of the mediæval world for his adherence to faith and to a life governed by the ideals of the true Christian.

Roscelin portrays vividly for us the Scholasticism of the eleventh century. It was an age of dialectic abandon. It was the adolescence of Scholasticism. Every adolescent boy and girl loves to argue. They argue not so much to establish truth as for the love of the argument. The mind is such a facile tool! The youth is interested in its use. In like manner Scholasticism during the

eleventh century was in a period of vigorous youth. It gloried in its power of reasoning. It was mad with dialectic. This is the spirit that Roscelin illustrates. The spirit of revolutionary Scholasticism, as it might properly be called, continues until we meet the great constructive Scholasticism of a later day.

Utterly opposed to Roscelin in his personality, his matter and his method was the great St. Anselm. He was born in 1033 and at the age of sixty became archbishop of Canterbury. After a very active life spent in defending ecclesiastical rights against secular encroachments, the great primate of England died in the year 1109. St. Anselm was a realist. His philosophy was essentially Platonic. He resembled both in his philosophy and his philosophical method St. Augustine after whom he seems to have patterned his life. His reasoning, therefore, was totally at variance with that of Roscelin who basically was Aristotelian in his approach though a pagan sophist in his deductions. Anselm held that ideas exist as universals *ante rem* in the mind of God. He called attention, however, in his discussion of universals to an extremely important psychological distinction which dialectic could never have disclosed. It is to the difference existing between the percept of an individual object and its concept or universal meaning as described by Anselm that moderate realism traced its beginnings. St. Anselm is of further importance in the field of the beginnings of Scholasticism because of the distinction he drew between faith and philosophy. He disagreed with Erigena that they were to be identified but emphasized instead that each should keep to its own sphere. Each following its own problems will find no contradiction in the other. Though mutually exclusive

they are not contradictory. One will arrive by being true to itself at the truth which the other by faith possesses.

Another champion of realism was William of Champeaux. According to Champeaux the only reality is the reality of the universal. Individuals, whether as men or things, are fundamentally identical. Individuals differ only in accidental properties. Nominalism held that the universal idea was but an empty sound. The truth of the situation, according to Champeaux, is that the individual is but an empty sound. It is the presence of the universal resident within the individual man or thing which gives to it its essential reality.

Peter Abelard, who was born at Pallet, near Nantes in Brittany in the year 1079 was the most militant and aggressive figure in the early Scholastic period. He was taught in turn by Roscelin, William of Champeaux and St. Anselm and quarreled with two of the three if not with all three. Abelard in his autobiography is not lenient with himself and describes the serious troubles of his later life as traceable directly to pride, vanity and a belligerent disposition. As a man he violated every trust. As a personality Abelard, no matter how severely we condemn his acts, is an interesting figure in the mediæval monastic life of Europe. He was a man of brilliant intellect and apparently had in addition great charm of manner. It is however in the philosophy of the notorious rebel rather than in his individuality that our interest lies.

In his famous book "Sic et Non" Abelard presents the principal issues of Scholasticism as they affect theological doctrines. He sets forth the divergent views of the Fathers on each major topic as a basis for future dis-

cussion. The method of Abelard was an excellent psychological approach. It did a great deal to clarify objectives and it provided a standard by which discussion could be held to be relevant or irrelevant. As a method of logically following and definitely guiding philosophical discussion Scholasticism approved the innovation of Abelard and it was used exclusively throughout much of the later development of Scholastic thought.

As to the position taken by Abelard with reference to the universal idea it is difficult to give a positive opinion. As he disagreed with the nominalism of Roscelin and the realism of St. Anselm and William of Champeaux it is logical, by process of exclusion to classify him with the conceptualists. He is generally so classified though much of his teaching would seem to indicate that he favored nominalism, but a kind markedly different from that of Roscelin. It is, however, in the emphasis he placed upon reason that Abelard stands out prominently as a radical figure of the Middle Ages. Scholastic doctrine held tenaciously throughout the centuries to the two-fold essentials of mediæval thought: "credo ut intelligam" and "intelligo ut credam." Abelard discarded "credo ut intelligam" and so in a sense is not a true Schoolman. He identified theology with philosophy but his identification is a process by which theology is subordinated to reason. Everything is to be tested according to Abelard by reason and only that is to be believed which reason can demonstrate. In his system of thought Abelard left no place for faith. He believed in an identity of faith with reason as Erigena had held, but upon a different basis. In Erigena's phil-

osophy rationalism is not found to the degree that it is present in the philosophy of Abelard.

The interesting figure of Abelard lent a glamorous coloring to the early twelfth century but it was a color which did not persist. Abelard was a man of great talent. He was a genius in the field of logic. He touched with a brilliancy that was his own many problems of thought. It can not be said, however, that he solved problems or that he left upon philosophical inquiry much evidence of permanent contribution. He approached philosophy as an artist rather than as a profound student engaged in a search for primal truths.

The latter part of the twelfth century was characterized by the prevalence of several different schools of philosophical thought. Among the important schools of the period, each of which we shall consider briefly are the following:

The Platonic School of Realism,

The Pantheistic School,

The Mystic School.

The Platonic School of the period we are discussing was founded by Bernard and Theodoric of Chartres. In this school we have simply a restatement of pure Platonism mingled with Neo-Platonic emendations of the earlier Greek idealism. The school arose as a protest against the nominalism which had been so successfully popularized by Roscelin and Abelard. In addition to the two brothers of Chartres, William of Conches and Gilbert de la Porrée were associated in this effort to revive the Platonic theory of Ideas.

According to the School of Chartres, as it is sometimes called, there are separate classifications of reality.

There is the reality of God, the reality of matter and the reality of ideas. God is supreme reality. In God are Ideas which have existed eternally in His mind as prototypes of objects in the world of sense. The objects of sense were created by God. They are constituted of matter, which God by His power brought into existence from nothing, and the Ideas which have been united with matter to give it form, or the reality of objective existence. The student will see at once in this brief analysis of the thought of the school established by Bernard of Chartres all the essentials of Platonic reasoning.

The Pantheistic School was a very logical outgrowth of the School of Platonic thought at Chartres. Platonism with its emphasis upon the immanency of the Idea leads very directly to the immanency of God, which is pantheism. Bernard of Tours, who lived during the latter part of the twelfth century, was a leader of pantheism, as it expressed itself during the Middle Ages in Neo-Pythagorean form. According to Bernard of Tours the universe was created by a series of emanations from the Arch-Monad. This doctrine of creation the student will recognize to be but a reiteration of an earlier Pythagorean principle. Another follower of panthestic philosophy of this type during the twelfth century was Amaury of Bène, who for a time was a teacher of theology and logic at Paris.

A second form of pantheistic philosophy was prolific during the twelfth century. According to this division of the pantheistic thought of the Middle Ages there are three separate classifications of eternal Being. These are: separate substances, uncreated and without end; soul; and material bodies. In essence these three constitute but one reality, the reality of God. God is there-

fore to be identified with His creatures. Creatures and God are identical. The influence of John Scotus Erigena, the first prominent figure in Scholastic philosophy, will be found reflected in this thought of David of Dinant. Albertus Magnus, who wrote of this philosopher, informs us that David of Dinant inherited his pantheistic heresies from Arabian sources. There was a strong flavor of pantheism in all the Moorish schools of thought. During the latter portion of this first period of Scholastic philosophy and extending into the thirteenth century European civilization came in contact with Arab thought, through the Crusades. As a result of the contact Arabian philosophy trickled into the speculative thought of Europe. One evidence of this is the pantheism of David of Dinant. Though influenced largely by Erigena he was undoubtedly affected by Avicenna, who was a material pantheist of Islam during the eleventh century.

A very interesting result of the feeling that Arabian philosophy was altogether pantheistic, which was not so, was the effect the antagonism felt for the Arabs had upon the popularity of Aristotle during the twelfth century. The Arabs were familiar with both Aristotle's physics and his metaphysics. Europe, through Scholasticism, understood his dialectic. It was wrongly supposed that Arabian pantheism had been derived from Aristotle and as a result ecclesiastical authorities at the Council of Paris in 1210 prohibited the reading of Aristotle's writings and their commentaries. Later study, as we shall see, discovered in Aristotle a champion of theistic thought rather than a defender of pantheism.

Averroës, who was born at Cordova in 1126, was a brilliant light in Arabian thought. He was a popu-

larizer of Aristotelian philosophy. In his philosophy, however, there is traceable the Moorish influence for he reflects a pantheistic bias. The teachings of Averroës and Avicenna had, without doubt, powerful influence upon Dinant in his pantheistic expressions of speculative thought during the closing days of the twelfth century.

The Mystic School grew directly from the teachings of William of Champeaux after his retirement in 1108 to the abbey of St. Victor. The main tenet of mystic teaching was that dialectic was an instrument of evil rather than of good. Much strength was added to the school of mysticism by the condemnation of Abelard, a master dialectician, and by the pernicious influence of pantheism. It is of interest that Platonism by its emphasis upon the residence of the Idea in matter gives rise directly to the theory of the immanency of God, which is pantheism. The same Platonism, however, by its similar emphasis upon the goal of all philosophers, pure contemplation of the Highest Idea, gives rise to a very opposite system of thought, mysticism. From the same mother, sons of opposite nature may be born.

Mysticism stoutly maintained that the study of philosophy was worse than useless unless it led directly to improvement in the spiritual side of Christianity. The Mystic emphasized the need of practical Christian life rather than speculation about the ideals which should govern that life or analysis by the human mind of the growth of ideas with reference to the justification of Christian beliefs. It is in St. Bernard of Clairveux that we recognize implicitly the fundamental structure of mysticism as a school of philosophy. St. Bernard himself was not a philosopher but rather a theologian. He was, however, a man of great authority and he so lent

the weight of his influence to mysticism that by the time of his death, which occurred in 1153, the principle underlying this school of thought had been well recognized and established. The principle is: "Amo ut intelligam". Scholasticism had consistently maintained the two complementary principles of thought. "I believe that I may know", and "I know that I may believe". For these the mystics substituted, "I love that I may believe".

The most prominent Mystic of the period was Hugo of Blankenburg. From 1125 until his death in 1141 he taught at the abbey of St. Victor. Hugo held that the contemplation of invisible essences should be the aim of man's effort since only by such direction of our energies can we attain a knowledge of God. Knowledge of the world can be secured through the eyes of our flesh; knowledge of ourselves and the working of our minds can be secured through the eye of reason; but the knowledge of God is a knowledge that surpasseth all human understanding and we can secure it only by contemplation.

Mysticism, though properly regarded as part of the Scholastic movement of thought, is representative of a reactionary position. It is hostile to speculative inquiry and regards dialectic as a malevolent influence. This is notably evident in the contributions made by Richard of St. Victor, who succeeded Hugo as prior of the abbey, and in Walter of St. Victor, the successor of Richard. The Mystics were fundamentally opposed to the basic notion of Scholasticism: the just right of human reason. As Scholasticism was forced to wage war against those who would demand too much for reason, the Rationilists; so, too, Scholasticism was driven to defend itself against those who would deny reason all opportunity

for freedom. Between the blows struck by the Rationalists and the Mystics the Scholasticism of the twelfth century led a life of storm and stress. The Scholastic of the period, however, was no weakling. He could endure and he could fight. Out of the struggles of the twelfth century grew the glorious triumph of Scholasticism during the thirteenth.

RÉSUMÉ OF PERIOD OF GROWTH

In closing our discussion of the growth of Scholasticism we may well ask as a result of the progress we have indicated in the movement, for what, after all, does it stand. What is Scholasticism? Its development serves to help us answer the question. Scholasticism was initiated by the action of the Carolingian kings as a movement of opposition to the arrested intellectual development of Europe during the period of barbaric power. Throughout its early history it never lost sight of its mission. It stood for the right of human reason. It stood for the right of investigation. It represents the beginning of the scientific mode of inquiry. Throughout all the differences of results attained by its representatives stands the essential sameness in the method of dialectic reasoning. St. Anselm and Abelard, though at opposite poles in so far as the result attained by their processes of thought, are both true representatives of Scholasticism.

The Schoolmen of the period we have just concluded were not only interested in the use of dialectic as a means but they were likewise interested in the union of philosophy and theology as a result. Neither science was to be subordinated to the other. The Scholastics of the first

period did not quite solve the problem but they understood it clearly. Some there were who leaned to St. Augustine, the Christian Plato. Others were not satisfied with the reasoning of the Bishop of Hippo. The speculative efforts of the first Schoolmen took on many different forms as shown by the widely divergent views of the philosophers whose opinions we have made the effort, in brief compass, to reveal. The crystallization of Scholasticism was to be accomplished by the great Schoolman of the thirteenth century who at the close of the period we have concluded had not yet been born.

All the glorious development of the later period was, however, existent in germinal form in the Scholasticism of the twelfth century. The just rights of reason were emblazoned on its banner. It was struggling in the effort to clarify the proper relationship between reason and revelation. It saw the claims of each but it did not see clearly the reconciliation possible. Some there are who, hostile to Scholasticism, pretend to see in it an effort to support the truths of revelation by a subordination of philosophy to theology. If Scholasticism had been merely that then there was no sense to the struggles characteristic of the twelfth and preceding centuries. It was most certainly not that. It was the struggling of the intellectual element in the Christian Church to orient itself. Faith and reason were not mutually exclusive principles to the early Schoolmen and yet they could not justify their seeming contradiction. They were building better than they knew for out of their speculation was growing a highly systematized rationality which was viewed in all its implications by the great Schoolman of the thirteenth century, St. Thomas of Aquin.

It must not be forgotten in the formulation of criticism, favorable or adverse, concerning the progress of Scholasticism in the period of its growth, from the year 800 to the year 1200, that Plato was the most favored of the great pagan philosophers. Upon his thought the Fathers had constructed their philosophy and it was from his inquiries and solutions that Scholasticism proceeded. Aristotle, except in his logic, was unknown. Aristotelian physics and metaphysics, at first through Arabian and Jewish sources, became matters of knowledge to European philosophers during the thirteenth century.

During this century pure Aristotelian thought, devoid of the pantheistic influence which had been improperly grafted upon it by Arabian thinkers, came to light. In the studies that were made at the universities of Bologna, Paris and Oxford the true Stagirite was seen to have no leanings toward pantheism. The translation of the Nicomachean Ethics by Robert, Bishop of Lincoln, in 1250 and the commentaries on Aristotle written by the illustrious Dominicans Albert of Bollstädt and St. Thomas of Aquin revealed knowledge of such shining worth that a strong beacon of guidance was presented by it. All this, Scholasticism of the first period had been denied. In our appreciation of the glories of the thirteenth century we must not forget the limitations under which the preceding centuries had carried on speculative inquiries. The period from 800 to 1200 was a period of growth. The strong struggles of the centuries were evidences of the strength of the life that was pulsating in philosophy. Without its period of more or less rebellious adolescence Scholasticism would never have reached the pinnacles of precision which characterized its glorious maturity. We have traced its growth.

In the next period we shall analyze the beautiful blossom of Scholasticism's ripened thought.

THE MATURITY OF SCHOLASTICISM

The strength of Scholasticism during the thirteenth century is attributable to four distinct influences. These are:

1. The knowledge of Aristotle which Christian Europe secured through Arabian philosophers;
2. The impetus given to scientific studies by the Jewish Aristotelians;
3. The rise of universities, particularly the University of Paris;
4. The foundation of two great religious orders, the Dominicans and the Franciscians.

We have indicated the influence of that pantheistic Aristotelianism which the Arabians brought to the knowledge of Europe. When philosophers were banished from Athens by order of the Emperor Justinian they sought shelter among the Syrians and the Persians. It was from these peoples that the Arabians received their knowledge both of Plato and Aristotle. The Syrians were a Christian people and therefore, while Arabian sources are, it is true, accountable for the influx of Aristotelian thought in the Middle Ages, the Arabs served simply as a connecting link between the Nestorian Christians of the fifth and sixth centuries and the philosophical students of a much later Christian period. Aristotle during his period of residence with the Arabs took on, as we have seen, a strong pantheistic note due to the age-

long tradition of the Moorish schools of thought. The most noted of the Arabian philosophers during the twelfth century was Averroës. He had a strong desire, manifestly evident in his translations, to be true to the philosophy of Aristotle. His own thought, however, was so permeated by the strong opposition among all Islamites to philosophers, whom they regarded as antagonistic to the Koran, that a prejudice is found reflected in his treatment of Aristotle. He presents to us an Aristotle somewhat inclined toward mysticism and strongly identified with pantheism. Only by direct contact with original Greek editions of the works of the Stagirite did Christian Europe come to a genuine appreciation of the worth of the inductive thought processes of the master mind of the great Greek philosopher.

While the Arabians, as we have indicated, contributed to the study by mediæval Europe of Aristotelian thought, the Jewish people in the last analysis had a far more direct bearing upon the results that were achieved. Arabian thought in many instances was introduced into Europe in Hebrew form. When the Christian scholars translated it was from the Hebrew and not directly from Arabian sources. Arabian influence, therefore, limited in the sense that it gave Europe the physics and the metaphysics of Aristotle colored by Oriental mysticism and pantheism, made its contribution through Jewish philosophers.

When the Jews in Moorish Spain came in contact with Arabian thought or Greek thought in Arab guise they welcomed it. From Arabian influences philosophy developed among the Jews and it was this development which affected, to an appreciable degree, the course of philosophy during the Christian period. Chief among

the Jewish philosophers of the period we are considering at this time were Avicebrol, who was born at Malaga in 1020, and Moses Maimonides, who was born at Cordova in 1135 and died at Cairo in 1204.

Avicebrol tried to effect a reconciliation of Neo-Platonism with the religious beliefs and practices of the Jews. His work shows the presence of a consistent stream of Platonic thought. He held firmly to the principle that all things are made up of both matter and form. His inclusive summary, "All things", meant not only corporeal entities but incorporeal substances as well. Matter, according to Avicebrol, is the universal substratum of all finite existence. The early Franciscians in their doctrine that matter is coextensive with finite being paralleled the thought of the illustrious Jewish thinker of the eleventh century.

Moses Maimonides, while not as profound a student as Avicebrol, exerted a far greater influence upon the progress of philosophy during the Christian period. He was an Aristotelian and leaned strongly toward inductive reasoning and scientific inquiry. To him is directly traceable the rise of science among the Jewish people during the thirteenth century and its development during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Historians generally are agreed that the system of Spinoza, which we shall consider in our outline of the Modern Period, was a direct outgrowth of the work of Moses Maimonides. This Jewish philosopher has a strong theological bias. He is not willing to follow Aristotle in his concept of an eternal world except as we consider the world to be a product of that which is eternal, God. The world existed in the mind of God from eternity and in that sense is eternal. Maimonides, in other words,

adheres to Jewish dogma in his acceptance of Aristotelian philosophy. A thought in the philosophy of Maimonides which became a dominant note in later Jewish schools was that concerned with the immortality of the soul. Maimonides taught that a soul is born with us but that our intellects are acquired. The development or non-development of intellect leads to the acquisition or non-acquisition of justice by the soul. The conclusion he reaches, and one that brought him into conflict with Christian philosophy, is that only the souls of the just are immortal.

While Arabian thought and Jewish thought both had marked effects upon the further development of Scholasticism during the thirteenth century, neither one in efficacy approached the importance to the movement that was attained by the establishment of the universities. The rise of universities in Europe provides not only a strong line of demarcation between earlier mediæval history and its glorious middle age but it also separates definitely the period of the more or less wavering growth of Scholasticism from the period of its seasoned maturity. In order to understand fully the significance of the university establishments it will be of advantage to pause for a moment to glance at the history of the situation.

During the centuries immediately following the barbarian inroads, monastic life had developed. By reason of the association of men of scholarly interests the learning of the pagan world was preserved. This we have seen. In like manner during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, owing to the influences of the Crusades, came the rise of a commercial city class of people. As a result of this revival of commerce, there arose municipal govern-

ments and merchant guilds. These associations bore resemblance to the earlier monastic institutions in that they grouped together men of similar tendencies. Chief among these tendencies were a strong interest in learning and an impelling desire for travel. The universities arose by reason both of earlier monastic establishments and of the impetus provided by the new trend of thought.

The monastic movement had resulted in the rise of many prominent schools attached to the great cathedrals. Paris had become a famous center, by reason of its great cathedral school, for the study of the Liberal Arts and of theology. To Paris famous teachers like William of Champeaux and Abelard had been attracted. It was logical, therefore, that as a result of the improved economic conditions and of the contacts made through the Crusades with Eastern peoples, Europe should look to centers already established for the development of thought. In this manner did it come to pass that Paris became the central city for the congregation of students from all parts of the known world for the study of philosophic thought. The University of Paris through grants made by Pope Innocent and by Emperor Philip Augustus became a model of university organization. The history of university development in Europe is most interesting but our interest does not concern itself with historical perspective except to see in the university organization a nucleus of men and thought which has a direct relationship to the perfection of Scholastic reasoning during the thirteenth century. Earlier Scholasticism lacked system. The universities, and in so far as philosophy is concerned the University of Paris most especially, symbolized organization. The University of

Paris helped, by reason of its physical oneness, to perfect the unity of Scholastic thought.

While the universities are connected in direct manner with the unification of the several streams of mediæval thought they are likewise connected with the later production of two opposite currents within Scholasticism itself. These two currents relate themselves to the two great religious orders which came into existence at about the time of the university establishments. In the year 1212 the Gray Friars or Franciscians were founded by St. Francis. The Black Friars or Dominicans were founded in 1216 by St. Dominic. The Gray Friars conceived their purpose to be related directly to preaching and public service. The Dominicans, on the other hand, were established as a teaching order in connection with the new spirit of which the universities were a direct outgrowth. Between them and the new learning, as represented by the universities, the Black Friars felt a strong bond of relationship. Both orders, however, by reason of their purposes necessarily felt an interest and a responsibility in the matter of the proper guidance of philosophic thought. In these two great orders we shall find the seeds of mental alertness which brought Scholasticism to the zenith of its greatness and the seeds likewise of that quibbling and dissension which brought it to the nadir of its decline.

In the year 1228 a student riot occurred at Paris. The city felt that punishment should be inflicted by the withdrawal of privileges from those attendant at the university. In retaliation by the university there was declared a cessatio or suspension of lectures. At the time of the withdrawal of the masters from the city the Dominicans asked the authorities to grant to them a

license to teach at the Convent of St. James. This was granted. When in 1231, at the resumption of lectures at the university, the Dominicans were granted the right to continue their teaching at St. James and to establish another chair at the University of Paris, the Franciscians applied for a similar privilege. Their request was granted and Alexander of Hales was appointed as Franciscian master of theology. In this manner each of the great orders became represented at the university and each developed its characteristic current of Scholastic thought. With the development of philosophical principles by representatives of each order came, as we have indicated, the rise of Scholasticism during the thirteenth century and its decline and decay during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

In the development of Scholastic thought during the thirteenth century we find as influential factors the four streams of tendency upon which we have commented. Out of these apparently contradictory influences grew the unity of Scholastic endeavor. The accomplishments were made possible by the brilliant intellects which made the thirteenth century the glorious period it is in the history of the world's progress. We shall consider all too briefly, by reason of our space limitations, the specific contributions made by the outstanding philosophers of the period.

William of Paris (also known as William of Auvergne) was born about 1190. He died in 1249. This philosopher is important by reason of the fact that he represents a transitional stage between the Scholastic Platonism of the twelfth century and the Aristotelian trend which characterized Scholasticism during the thirteenth century. He aimed at the beginning of his work

to effect a reconciliation between Augustinian thought and the metaphysics of the newly acquired Arabian Aristotle. His studies revealed the strongly pantheistic note which the Arabs had injected into the philosophy of the Stagirite. This he was not willing to accept, neither was he willing to adopt the true Aristotelian principle of the active intellect as the source of knowledge. The superior learning of William of Paris is attested by the many treatises he wrote and by reason of which we know how deeply he had inquired into the teachings of the great pagan—Aristotle. This transitional philosopher standing between the two schools of thought inclines, however, toward Platonic realism, the realism of the Idea, and so favors Augustinian philosophy.

Vincent of Beauvais, a Dominican friar, is another outstanding figure in the early part of the thirteenth century. This philosopher leans unmistakably toward the new Aristotelian thought. He, too, is a representative of the transition. With reference to the problem of universals he believes that the concept is in the thing—Universalia in rē—but he holds that what exists in individuals is a specific type and in addition to it there exists another objective reality which is the general notion formed, he maintains, by an abstraction of thought. The importance of Vincent of Beauvais consists in his deviation from the Platonic realism of William of Champeaux and St. Anselm, both of whom had identified as one the specific type and the general idea. He represents an adumbration of that conceptualism which was the product of the mind of a master philosopher and theologian of the thirteenth century, Alexander of Hales.

Alexander of Hales upon the return of the masters to the University of Paris after the expiration of the

cessatio of 1229 occupied there the chair of theology. This scholarly Franciscian was born at Gloucestershire, England, toward the end of the twelfth century. He died at Paris in 1245. His importance consists in his development of Scholastic method and in his attempt to formulate a complete exposition in detailed order of Catholic doctrine after the physics and metaphysics of Aristotle had become known to the Schoolmen.

Aristotle, prior to 1240, was available only in Arabian commentaries or in Hebrew translations from the Arabian. By reason of the strong note of pantheism which permeated the Arabian commentaries, Aristotle was condemned in 1210 by the provincial Council of Paris. In 1215 the pagan legate, Robert of Courçon, forbade the physics and metaphysics of Aristotle to be used as texts at the University of Paris. We note, however, in 1231 evidence of a changed attitude for in that year Pope Gregory IX ordered that expurgated editions of Aristotle, which would eliminate pantheistic doctrines, be prepared. Shortly thereafter in 1240 Robert of Greathead translated Aristotle's Ethics directly from the Greek. Other translations soon appeared, notably portions of the physics and the metaphysics by Henry of Brabant. Finally in 1260 at the request of Pope Urban IV, William of Moerbeka translated the complete works of Aristotle directly from the original Greek into Latin.

The translations even in the early and incomplete editions made available about 1240 revealed clearly that Aristotelian thought and Scholasticsm were not, as had been supposed, opposed to each other. In fact the translations demonstrated the opposite to be true. The two schools of philosophical inquiry had much in common.

As Plato had been closely connected with Patristic thought so Aristotle, in pure form, was seen to have anticipated much of the speculation which centered around the great controversial topics of Scholasticism. It was a work of reconciliation toward which Alexander of Hales aimed. It was his desire to prepare a Summa, that is, a thorough delineation of Catholic thought, systematically arranged, which would be in keeping with the clear reasoning of Peripateticism.

In this effort to summarize doctrines, Alexander of Hales was not thoroughly successful. He strove to do the impossible. Augustinian Platonism could never be brought into harmony with Aristotelian metaphysics or psychology. Augustinian tendencies were too strong to be swept away, even in one mind unless that mind were the mind of a philosophical genius, and replaced by the new inductive thought of Aristotle. This great task was to be accomplished by the most brilliant man of a most brilliant period, St. Thomas of Aquin. What Alexander of Hales did accomplish, however, was to point the way toward the proper preparation of a Summa and for this direction all of his successors, including the great St. Thomas, stand perpetually indebted to him. Alexander is likewise entitled to the glory of improving upon the "Sic et Non" of Abelard by a thoroughgoing logical analysis through division and definition. To him Scholasticism is indebted for the methodical arrangement of approach to logical analysis and proof. His tripartite attack upon a problem provided for its full revelation and ultimate solution by forcing the mind to consider it from a negative aspect, an opposite aspect and the replies that might be offered to every contingency presented.

John of Fridanza (St. Bonaventure) was a disciple of Alexander of Hales. He was born at Bagnorea in 1221 and died in 1274. This illustrious Franciscian also made the effort to harmonize the Platonic philosophy of the earlier period with the newer Aristotelian thought. These streams of thought were manifestly growing farther apart and in his philosophy we note the strength not so much of reason as of the mystic element. He agreed with his contemporary and friend of the Dominican order, St. Thomas of Aquin, that theology and philosophy must not be identified in the sense that either Erigena or Abelard had identified them, but nevertheless his emphasis is upon the emotional elements in philosophy rather than upon the rational. Though he made earnest effort to reconcile Platonism with Peripateticism his sympathies were more strongly inclined to the contemplative aspects of Plato than to the scientific approaches to truth suggested by Aristotle.

It is, however, in the philosophy of St. Bonaventure that we find definitely outlined those specific elements of Scholastic thought which served to distinguish Franciscian tradition from the tradition of the Dominican division of Scholasticism. This most famous Franciscian philosopher emphasized in his teachings two doctrines which formed the basis of differences in philosophical opinions between him and St. Thomas though they did not serve to militate against the strong friendship between the leaders of the rival schools of thought. These doctrines were:

1. That there is no form without matter;
2. That in the creation of matter there were included in matter principles which enabled

it to co-operate with the Creator in the production of effects.

St. Thomas, as we shall see, taught that in the work of creation matter possessed of potency was acted upon by the efficiency of an agent. He denied, however, that with matter there were created principles which enabled it to co-operate in the production of results. St. Bonaventure in his teaching was in reality advocating the acceptance of Augustinian principles for it was St. Augustine who first argued for the possession by matter of what he termed *rationes seminales*, which in effect are the co-operating principles in matter of which St. Bonaventure writes. The acceptance of this teaching became so identified with the Franciscians that it was later called the Franciscian tradition or the stream of Scholasticism favored by the Gray Friars. Its rejection was in like manner identified with the Dominicans but the great leader of Dominican thought so surpassed all other leaders that in his points of view, not only upon this but other questions, Scholasticism became crystallized and rose to heights of system and clarity that had never before his time been even approximated. It was the ability which St. Thomas of Aquin possessed to synthesize the more or less definitely related streams of the thought of preceeding ages into one harmonious system of philosophical inquiry which made the thirteenth century the glorious period it is in the history of philosophy.

Prior to the accomplishments of St. Thomas there were two other philosophers, one a Francisian the other a Dominican, who deserve special comment. These men were Roger Bacon and Albert the Great. Both were admirers of Aristotle and both were interested particularly in the field of science.

Roger Bacon was an English member of the order of St. Francis. It can not be said, however, that he fairly illustrates all the principles for which the Gray Friars stood. Bacon was a strong individualist and resembles in his personal activities that rebellious spirit of an earlier period, Abelard. He is of interest in the story of the progress of philosophic thought because he typifies the scientific tendencies of the Scholastic spirit. Had he been a man of greater balance of temperament and one of less tendency to acrimonious dispute he would undoubtedly have done much to save Scholasticism from its unfortunate decline and decay. Bacon was a genius in the realm of science. Modern science had its beginnings in his work. Modern science is a direct outgrowth of Scholasticism. The development of modern science could have been hastened considerably if Bacon had been successful in his suggested reforms. He, however, had no respect for authority, grossly insulted those with whom he disagreed and so both by lack of prudence and common sense defeated the rise of the movement in which he was most interested. Scholasticism could have been saved from its useless quibblings of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries if instead of dependence upon authority it had followed the Aristotelian lead of inductive reasonings in the investigation of natural phenomena. Had Bacon been possessed of the tact and the wisdom of St. Thomas he would have conferred upon Scholasticism inestimable benefit. Had Bacon perfected his scientific investigations as St. Thomas perfected his synthesis of philosophic thought, philosophy would in all probability have continued as a steady development of the scientific speculations of the Schoolmen and Mod-

ern Philosophy, with its strongly pagan note, would never have been born.

Albert the Great was a Dominican. He was born in 1193 and died in 1280. In him we have a philosopher who represents the new spirit of Aristotle. He was, however, no slavish adherent to the principles advocated by the Stagirite for the study of science. Though not so much of an innovator in science as was Bacon, he was possessed of the true spirit of scientific inquiry. His importance in the field of philosophy is that he stresses the need of using the method of science in philosophic study. Albert the Great, though not the equal of Bacon in the field of scientific study, in reality accomplished more than his Franciscian contemporary by reason of his faithful and steady pursuit of the goal he tried to win by the personal observation of phenomena. In the field of philosophy proper he lacked the synthesizing power of his pupil, St. Thomas of Aquin, whose genius he recognized when others were still in doubt about it.

ST. THOMAS OF AQUIN

In the fortress at Roccasecca Thomas of Aquin was born in 1225. His family was related to the rulers of his country and to the royal houses of Aragon, Sicily and France as well. His father was Count of Aquino, Belcastio and of Roccasecca at which latter place, as we have said, Thomas was born.

Early in life the future Angelic Doctor manifested a decidedly strong tendency toward the monastic life and the study of both theology and philosophy. His mother, Theodora, felt that owing to family affiliations a bril-

liant future would be open to her son at the several courts to which he had access. She opposed the desire of the quiet but firm Thomas to follow the career of his uncle Sinnebald, who for many years had been abbot of the monastery of Monte Cassino. The resolute purpose of Thomas finally prevailed over the many obstacles placed in his way and in the year 1243 he became a member of the Dominican order.

Thomas of Aquin, though of brilliant intellect, was excessively modest and self-effacing. His ability was undiscovered by many with whom he came in contact. It was fortunate, however, that it happened that the young Dominican was sent to Cologne where Albert the Great was teaching. The scientific leader of Dominican thought discovered in but little time the strength of the mental acumen of his pupil. Thomas remained with Albert the Great from 1244 to 1252. He studied under the patient and scholarly scientist at Cologne, went with him to Paris and returned with him to Cologne in 1248 when the illustrious Dominican was recalled to that center of study.

During these eight years of preparation the mind of the most noted Dominican friar revealed itself in all its power both of analysis and synthesis. So apparent was it that in Thomas the Dominican order possessed a genius that in 1256 he was, by direction of the General of the order, called to Paris to teach. He taught at many important university centers. At Rome, Bologna, Viterbo, Perugia and Naples he attracted numbers of students. In his lectures Thomas developed the two-fold purpose which runs through all his work:

First, to point out clearly the errors of that pantheistic system of thought which had fastened itself

upon the minds of many due to the popularity of the Hebrew-Arabian Aristotle to whom Europe had been introduced;

Secondly, to build up a system of Catholic doctrine from a theological and a philosophical viewpoint as a result of studies of preceding philosophers. The great Thomas aimed to synthesize into one compact Summa all the valid contributions which had been made in pagan and Christian times concerning the essential realities of human life and its destiny. Scholars today, regardless of their religious beliefs, testify as one to the clarity of the mind of Thomas of Aquin and to the profound processes of thought which perfected the crystallization of theology and philosophy evident in his great work, "Summa Theologica".

In his summation of the thoughts of his predecessors St. Thomas drew from many different avenues of endeavor. He culled, in his construction of the proofs of Christian philosophy, evidences from the Scriptures, from the Patristic philosophers, from the great thinkers of the pagan period and from the many followers of the beacon of Scholastic thought which had been evident in Europe from the days of Charlemagne to his own times. In addition to the study of all preceding philosophical efforts he scrutinized with untiring zeal the problems presented by the errors which Jewish and Arabian commentators had deduced from Aristotelian principles. From this material, constituting all knowledge and efforts to arrive at knowledge, with a directness of vision and razor-like precision of thought, he drew essential truth. He laid bare contradictions and inconsistencies, labelled as fragmentary that which was but

fragmentary and perfected not only the goal of attainment but the logic of the mental processes by which truth was revealed. In the work of St. Thomas, in other words, we find a synthetic arrangement of the results attained by his predecessors. He drew freely from these predecessors. His originality consists largely in his ability to synthesize so successfully that the truths attained by the philosophers of preceding periods in the world's history are reconciled in one comprehensive system of thought. The contradictions and the falsities he made manifest in his "Summa Contra Gentiles" and so defended Christian thought against Arabian and Jewish anti-Christian philosophy. The truths he asembled in one body of thought and his collected unity of philosophical and theological speculation constitutes his masterpiece, the "Summa Theologica".

In his philosophical beliefs St. Thomas adheres closely to Peripateticism. He shows the influence which the great pagan thinker, Aristotle, had exercised upon him both directly through study and indirectly by reason of the long training he had received in inductive science through his close association with his fellow Dominican, the celebrated Albert. In striving to appreciate the accomplishments of St. Thomas it is wise to approach the study from his interest in science. By so doing we can grasp how thoroughly he delved to the very heart of reality.

It is a grave error, St. Thomas teaches, to think of science as concerned simply with changing phenomena. It is concerned with change only because in the change we recognize the governing principle which brings the change about. The truths of science, therefore, are the laws upon which changes are based. So science is a

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St. Thomas of Aquin
1225-1274

After a painting in the Church of San Domenico, at Naples

study of the changes effected in objective realities by their causes. It is a knowledge of things not alone but in connection with their causes. The positivist can not stop with a consideration of reality as he finds it, if he be a true student. He must trace effects to causes.

The cause of objective change is truth. Truth is the proper relationship existing between the external object and the human mind. This relationship may be attained in some spheres by human reason since man is a rational being and has been given the ability to ascertain truth by the exercise of mental power. In other spheres truth has been made known to man by revelation. Truth is truth whether it comes to us by virtue of human reason or by divine revelation. The study of science forces upon us a knowledge of the existence of a source of truth for we can not help but see in our study of objective reality the order and adaptation of the many different parts of the universe. Unless we are utterly blind and thoroughly unpossessed of scientific caution we must realize that all the movement we observe in the world of objective reality must be occasioned by a fundamental cause of motion. An unending series of moving agents is beyond possibility. Furthermore, we see in our study of reality that some things are far more perfect than are others. The degrees of perfection manifest to our senses force our intellects to a recognition of that which is All Perfection.

According to the philosophy of St. Thomas, through science we confront essential and basic reality which is synonymous with the existence of God. That God exists is proved by science through the action of human reason. The same God is the source of the truths of science. The source of truth may, however, make the truth manifest

by enabling man to discover it, that is through human reason, or by telling it directly to man, that is by revelation. In philosophy we have the results of man's effort to attain truth by reason. In theology we have the results of the revelation of God Himself to man. The former is human science, the latter is divine science. Both are science in that both are truth. The source of truth can not contradict itself. What is true in philosophy is true in theology. Faith and reason can not by any possibility be contradictory. The source of truth gives knowledge to man through reason. The source of truth also gives knowledge to man through revelation. Some knowledge is beyond the possibility of attainment by man through reason. Of such character are the Incarnation and the Trinity. Other knowledge, such as the existence of God, can be acquired by reason. The source of truth, God, determines in which manner, by reason or by revelation, the truth is to be made known to us. In either case it is truth, since it comes directly or indirectly from the source of all truth, which can neither deceive nor be deceived.

Thus we see in the philosophy of St. Thomas the application of the inductive reasoning of Aristotle to two of the great problems of philosophy: the existence of God and the compatability of reason and revelation. Protestant theologians of the present day accept the Catholic thought of St. Thomas as the most complete statement of the relationship existent between revelation and reason. It is, however, not only to the theologian that the conclusions of St. Thomas are of moment. They are of importance to the philosopher. He breaks down the false barrier which some in the field of science would raise between positivism and metaphysical

thought. He insists upon a continuity of the reasoning process so that we follow the argument wherever it logically leads in our effort to establish truth. As the Greeks would not tolerate an antagonism between mind and matter though they insisted upon a line of demarcation between them so St. Thomas, in similar manner, will not permit an irreconcilable situation to develop in the mind with reference to the two means of knowing truth, reason and revelation, though he does insist upon their separation. They are different, but they are not antagonistic.

In the precise functioning of the mind of the great St. Thomas we see clearly revealed the rights and the shortcomings of both rationalism and mysticism. Rationalism demands too much in the name of human reason. Mysticism will not yield to the mind its just claim to the power to ascertain truth. Between the "too much" of Rationalism and the "too little" of Mysticism stands the perfected philosophy of the illustrious thirteenth century Scholastic. While reason is, in the philosophy of St. Thomas, sharply distinguished from faith, the latter is in reality but a continuation of the former. All through the history of Scholasticism there had been constant effort to stabilize the relationship between reason and faith. The thought of the scholarly Dominican made crystal clear to all men for all time the condition which identifies and at the same time separates these two vital concerns of humanity.

As a derivative of his consideration of scientific truth, St. Thomas shows that the existence of the universal is the essential condition for the existence of science. Science is a knowledge of things through their causes. If there be no universal there can be no science. If the

universal be but a name as the nominalists maintained, then there can be but singular things and of singular things there can be no science. Our thirteenth century leader of speculative thought held that the universal existed *ante rem* in the mind of God; it exists *in rē* as the essence of a thing; and it exists *post rem* in the mind of man as an idea formed by reason of the contact of mind with objective reality.



In his concept of the validity of the universal it will be seen how closely the thought of St. Thomas parallels that of Aristotle. Knowledge, according to the great systematizer of Scholasticism as well as to the Stagirite, comes originally to us through our senses. The mind through its activity injects meaning into the individual thing and at the same time realizes by its abstractive power that what it predicates of the one is true of the many. It thereby approaches a universal concept, the essence of which was in the individual thing. Again the active intellect makes judgments by comparison of concepts and by reasoning compares its judgments and so arrives at truth. In philosophy we arrive at truth through the use of reason and the very weakest argument to be advanced in this human science is the one which is based upon the word of a master. Authority in the divine science of revelation has the force of truth but in human science it is held to be without respect. To prove a philosophical cause by direct appeal to Aristotle is evidence of the essential weakness of the position held. How regrettable it is that the followers of the Angelic Doctor did not appreciate how futile he would have considered their appeal to him as authority for the strength of their positions. If he could have spoken to his defenders in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries he undoubtedly would have cautioned them to use their own reasons and not only his writings as proofs of the tenability of the positions they assumed on controversial questions.

One of the most controversial of questions dating from the very early days of Greek philosophy, for we find it expressed as far back as the Eleatic School of thought, is the problem of self-activity or of life. Life

according to St. Thomas is self-originating motion. All life is the conquest of form over the resistance of matter. The fundamental principle of all self-activity is the soul. All living beings may be classified in accordance with their power to originate activity. Some beings possess the power of self-motion in limited degree, others possess it in greater degree, and still other beings possess this power in conspicuous manner. According to the degree of the perfection of initiative power we can distinguish and classify beings as belonging to the vegetable, the animal and the intellectual order. In like manner we can distinguish members of the different orders as possessed of vegetable, animal and rational souls.

The soul is the life force. It is by virtue of the soul that the body has the power of locomotion. It is by virtue of the soul, too, that man is a rational being. Soul and body are united to form the substantial oneness of man. The soul, the principle of all activity, is united substantially with the body to form man. Neither body nor soul is complete when separated from the other. The soul is immaterial as is proved by those intellectual operations in which it is not bound by material considerations. In its intellectual faculties it may transcend all bodily states. While there is nothing in the intellect except that which, as Aristotle taught, was derived from the senses still the intellect itself is not material. It is incorporeal. If a faculty of soul, intellectual operation, be immaterial then it must follow that the principle of all vital functioning, the soul, is itself immaterial. Whatever is true of the effect must be true of the cause.

St. Thomas proves the immortality of the soul directly from its immateriality. As the soul is immaterial so also is it immortal. Every idea that we acquire,

St. Thomas argues, is in effect a rising of our natures above our material surroundings. Every act of charity, every effort to better the material conditions of others is in substance a betterment in us of our power to overcome inertia. Every such act is a perfection of the life principle which is the soul. Every such act raises us above and separates us from the material conditions of life. But what is death? Death is but the more complete separation of soul from matter as represented by the body. Death therefore has no reference to the soul. By death the soul is made more perfect just as every vital act which makes us superior to the material conditions of life, every effort of the will to overcome the resistance offered by matter, even the matter of our own bodies, adds to the perfection of our soul.

It follows logically from the immateriality of the soul that it is not produced by matter. We have seen that the soul in its operations rises above material conditions. The effects produced by it are immaterial. Matter, therefore, could not have produced the soul. It was created. Plato had held that souls existed prior to their infusion into bodies. This St. Thomas denies. We have seen in the brief analysis of his philosophy which we have presented that the soul without the body is in an unnatural condition since knowledge reaches it normally through the senses of the body. It is therefore logical to maintain that the soul is created at the moment of its infusion into the body. It is this point of view which the great Scholastic presents.

There are many other interesting features of the philosophical system of St. Thomas. In his philosophy we find he adheres to the thought that the world was created from nothing by God. He holds, however, that this

truth is a matter of faith and is not possible of demonstration by human reason. There is nothing contradictory to reason in holding that the earth existed from eternity.

In his moral doctrines St. Thomas maintained that the end of all human activity is the goal which man had believed in since pagan times, happiness. He believes, however, with St. Augustine, that complete happiness means not the satisfaction of a few desires but the satisfaction of all desires which the intellect can conceive. This state of supreme happiness can be supplied only by God. Man, therefore, by the law of his being must seek God since God alone can satisfy him. If only infinite satisfaction will content man and if infinite satisfaction is to be found in that ultimate happiness which the infinite Good alone can grant then it is necessary for man, by reason of being what he is—a rational creature—to seek the infinite Good. By the dictates of his reason man is compelled to seek God. It is only as an irrational act that the abandonment by man of the quest for God can be understood.

It is of interest, in view of many economic and social measures which are held to be decidedly modern, to read the political and social theories of the great Schoolman of the thirteenth century. In the first two books of "De Regimine Principis," which are undoubtedly of St. Thomas's authorship, we read of his belief that all authority in government must keep constantly in the foreground the good to come to the public by reason of the enactment of legislation. In this same work we are told that arbitrary authority is properly held under just control by the will of the people. Government is to be not only for the people but by the people. Again St.

Thomas emphasizes the thought that the aim of the state is moral as well as economic. He stresses the fact that an effective government will strive to educate not a few but the total mass of the population. Moreover the state is bound by moral law to see that poverty, want and starvation are eliminated from its confines. If these recommendations do not serve to indicate that the modern world with all its manifest pride of accomplishment has not quite caught up to the political wisdom of the Angelic Doctor we urge consideration of the thought advanced by our philosopher that it is not the avowed form of a government which matters but the loyalty with which it follows the purposes for which it was originally instituted. It will be found, urges St. Thomas, that the happiness and prosperity of citizens of a country will decline as the government departs from the principles which animated the founders. Let us hope that we shall heed the warning and keep the United States of America always true to the principles of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness which were promised all citizens by the founders of our glorious republic. Let not the domination of wealth, of governmental agencies, or of religious animosities lead us into the condition so definitely described by the brilliant intellect of St. Thomas of Aquin, a condition of country by reason of which citizens suffer not through their own fault but through a loss, among those charged with the duties of political leadership, of appreciation of the genuine purposes for which their government exists.

Consideration of the philosophical synthesis of St. Thomas clarifies our understanding of the major problems that had appeared in speculative thought from the earliest records of ancient Greece to the thirteenth century

of the Christian era. Chief among these problems, the solutions of which the studies of the master Dominican dialectician and philosopher bequeathed in crystallized form as a heritage to all succeeding ages, are the following:

The creation of the world,

The existence of God,

The immortality of the soul,

The true relationship between reason and revelation,

The true doctrine concerning the existence of the universal.

The world may wantonly reject the thought of St. Thomas. In illogical manner this it, to an appreciable extent, has done. The manner of rejection will appear to every rational being illogical until better solutions than those offered by the Angelic Doctor have been presented for the consideration of mankind. Theologians, regardless of creed, have not seriously argued that this has been accomplished. The reasons to which we may ascribe the neglect by many of the essential truths enumerated by the great St. Thomas are directly traceable not so much to ignorance and misunderstanding, at least it was not so in the cases of those closely related by time to the illustrious philosopher, as to human prejudice and pride of intellect. This seed of neglect of the true message of Thomas of Aquin we shall endeavor to trace, in our study of the Modern Period of Philosophy, to its first planting. At this time it will be sufficient to recall to the mind of the student those essential portions of the philosophy of the Franciscian contem-

porary of St. Thomas, John of Fridanza or as he is known in Catholic thought, St. Bonoventure. It was this philosophy, at least in certain of its aspects, that met with decided opposition in the thought of St. Thomas. It was this difference, emphasized and reiterated by the followers respectively of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, that established the strong line of demarcation which came to distinguish the Franciscian from the Dominican stream of Scholastic thought. It was this difference in philosophical explanations between the two most friendly philosophers, in so far as their personal relationships were concerned, which led not only to the bitterness and the strife of a later age but to the absolute neglect of the dominant note in the thought of the philosopher who represents without doubt the highest pinnacle of attainment by the mind of man in its search through reason for finality.

St. Thomas held that the following were true:

1. That there was unity in the substantial form of man;
2. That there could be form without matter as in angelic natures;
3. That there had not been created with matter principles which enabled it to co-operate in the production of results.

These three principles and in particular the third, which constituted a denial of the *rationes seminales* of St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure led to bitter opposition. They divided for a time even Dominicans into Thomists and anti-Thomists. They clouded all other issues and led eventually to what we have called the

establishment of Franciscian and Dominican traditions within Scholasticism.

As a matter of fact there was not one form of Scholasticism during the thirteenth century, but many. It was an age of strongly individualized intellectual activity. It was an age of philosophers rather than of a philosophical system in so far as the experiences of those living through the period were concerned. It is the student who looks back upon the period from a later age, when the turbulence of dissension has ceased to trouble, who sees the system of Scholasticism perfected in the thought of St. Thomas. The full measure of his attainments and his accomplishments were not, however, appreciated by all his contemporaries. The two diagrams which follow may serve to illustrate what St. Thomas actually brought to pass and what his immediate followers brought to pass by neglect of the essentials of his



Figure I



Figure II

methods if not of his thought. It was the misdirected effort of his followers which led, at least in part, to that decline of Scholasticism which we shall next discuss.

Figure I illustrates the reconciliation of revelation and reason by St. Thomas.

Figure II illustrates the error of the followers of St. Thomas in defending their positions in philosophy by reference to authority. It also emphasizes the fact that human reason continued its efforts though unfortunately deprived of the guidance of Thomistic thought.

JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

In the year of the death of St. Thomas, 1274, John Duns Scotus was born in England. Early in life he entered the order of the Gray Friars and grew, by reason of his power of mind, to be the most noted representative of the Franciscian tradition to which we have made reference. This tradition assumed, by reason of the fact that the Dominicans were beginning even at this early period to suffer an arrested development due to their dependence upon St. Thomas and upon his "Summa Theologica" as a final arbiter of discussion, in opposition to the organization of Thomism, a strongly anti-Thomistic flavor. In effect we see the beginning of that condition by which the master becomes not only the basis of dispute but likewise the basis of settlement.

Scotus taught that the will is superior to the intellect. St. Thomas had held the opposite view. St. Thomas is an intellectualist. Scotus is a voluntarist. We can not know God through reason, the Franciscian maintained, but we can love Him. Through love we

shall attain happiness for actions are good not because they are reasonable but because God has commanded them to be done. Scotus is the antithesis of all for which St. Thomas stands. The proof of many problems which the Angelic Doctor rested upon human reason such as the omnipotence of God and the immortality of the soul, Scotus, the Franciscian, posits upon revelation.

It is, however, more in his method than in his conclusions that Scotus presents the greatest contrast to St. Thomas. He was a man of the keenest intellect. Unfortunately, however, his penetration of mind seemed naturally more directed to the subtleties and refinements of the thought process than to the establishment of basic truth. He did not possess that power of grasping all the implications of a problem and at the same time never losing sight of the more important elements in it as did St. Thomas. He was a sincere and keen thinker but he had not the breadth of the great Dominican. On the other hand it is not fair to see in him a controversialist who is more interested in discomfiting his opponent than in establishing truth. Yet from the very fineness of the web of thought he spun, his followers were led into a path of argument for argument's sake rather than for the sake of truth.

THE DECLINE OF SCHOLASTICISM

During the fourteenth and the fifteenth century, Scholasticism suffered a steady but none the less definite decline. The decline is attributable to two causes. The first was resident within Scholasticism itself. It was a direct outgrowth of the development among the dialec-

ticians of the period—they can not in fairness be called philosophers—of an emphasis upon the subtleties of thought. The process of dialectic reasoning was employed as a game in which one might demonstrate superior skill and so win by worsting his opponent. The game of the age was dialectic as bridge and golf may be regarded as distinctive games of this. The plays were all made by reference to the authorities of the period, St. Thomas or John Duns Scotus, as you might elect according to the school to which you belonged or according to your temperament or the needs of the occasion. Subtlety was added to subtlety and the effort seemed to be to discover how difficult the argument could be made by excessively refined discriminations and by the addition of difficulties of terminology. The second reason for the decline of Scholasticism was directly attributable to the new influences, particularly the influences of scientific accomplishments, for which Scholasticism apparently had no message. The Dominicans and the Franciscians who had actually initiated, through their great leaders, the beginning of the new era of science were now led by those who were unable to appreciate the value of that which was in process of development. They devoted themselves to matters of little or no importance and offered nothing in the way of guidance to the progress of the new era of which they were a part although they did not realize it. The beacons which the great leaders of the past, notably St. Thomas, offered for their direction they did not use. The modern world unfortunately traced its babyhood and early childhood with little or no help from them and so it went astray. If the leaders of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in the field of philosophy had had the

ability to follow the method of St. Thomas in all probability the philosophy of the world today would be one in which reason and revelation would be in harmony and not in the antagonistic position they in error have assumed in the mind of the average man in this twentieth century whose dominant philosophy seems to be that of the pagan world.

We shall consider briefly a few of the representatives of Scholasticism in the days of its decay. We have seen the struggles attendant upon its growth. We have dwelt at length upon the work accomplished by its brilliant leaders of the thirteenth century. It would not be worth while to turn our thought to consideration in detail of those who brought upon it the discredit of thinking men, made others of scientific bent impatient with its results and still give to adverse critics, malicious or uninformed, the opportunity to associate in men's minds quibbling and inconsequential and tiresome detail with Scholasticism. We shall be content to explain briefly the thought of one who rose above his contempararies though he did not approach the heights attained by earlier Scholastic thinkers. We shall also point out the manner in which impetus was given during this period to the spread of Averroism and Mysticism by reason of the insufficiency of the intellectual diet which Scholasticism, in its decline, offered to man.

WILLIAM OF OCKAM

The Doctor Invincible, William of Ockam, is without doubt the outstanding figure in the days of the decline of Scholasticism. He was born at Surrey, Eng-

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John Duns Scotus
1274-1308
From an etching of 1584

land, in 1280 and died at Munich in 1349. Between 1320 and 1323 he taught at the University of Paris. Later he took an active part in the struggle against the temporal power of the papacy and spent the later years of his life as a refugee at the court of Louis of Bavaria.

Ockam in his philosophy revives the position of the nominalists. He holds that the principles of right and wrong depend not upon necessity, as discoverable by reason, but rather upon the will of God. In this concept as well as in his denial of the power of reason to prove the existence of God or the immortality of the soul he shows the influence of Scotus under whom he had probably studied at Paris. The importance of Ockam rests fundamentally upon his advocacy of many of the principles for which John Duns Scotus had stood. In his advocacy of nominalism, however, he presents a re-action against the thorough-going realism of the Scotists.

Ockam was motivated by a desire to simplify Scholasticism. His effort was directly related to the artificial intricacies which were coming to characterize Scholastic thought. There was, therefore, merit in his aim. In the accomplishments of his purpose of simplification he succeeded, however, in eliminating all philosophy. In the final analysis he robs reason of its just rights and ascribes all truth to revelation. If we were to take from his philosophy that which is its essential portion, faith, there would be left little but the anti-Christian philosophy of pure nominalism.

The philosophy of Ockam became popular. In fact, Ockamism, as it was known, rivaled the traditions of the Thomists and the Scotists. Ockam became an authority, as was St. Thomas and John Duns Scotus, for the settlement of disputes. Among those of the

period who either followed or opposed his essential thought of nominalistic Christianity supported by faith were Gregory of Rimini, John Buridan, Peter D'Ailly, Albert of Saxony, Thomas of Strasburg and Dominic of Flanders. The two last mentioned were realists and combated Ockamism in defense of their patron, John Duns Scotus.

In addition to the endless disputes which in the name of philosophy typified the Scholastic thought of the fourteenth and the fifteenth century were two streams of speculation which, though they were by no means new, acquired the strength of youth during the declining days of Scholasticism. In fact, their strength was an acquisition from and a protest against the futile and inane efforts of a decadent Scholasticism. These were Averroism and Mysticism.

AVERROISM

As the influence of Aristotle grew in the thirteenth century, Christian commentators prepared translations of his work from the original Greek. This movement we have noted. The Arabian translations with their pantheistic emphasis were seen to have misrepresented the thought of the Stagirite. In defense of their position and as a weapon against Christianity, Jewish and Arabian thinkers argued for an Aristotelianism based upon their original interpretation of the famous Greek philosopher. The thought of the Averroists concerned itself mainly with fatalism and a denial of the immortality of the soul. They held what seemingly was a compromise but in reality struck at the very roots of

Scholastic thought. This principle, the basic principle of the Averroists, was that what is true in theology does not necessarily have to be true in philosophy.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries there arose an Averroism which in addition to the basic principle to which we have just called attention stressed the pantheism which had been consistently present in all Arabian presentations of Aristotelian thought. The leaders of this Averroistic thought during the period under consideration were John of Gand, John de Mirecourt and Guido of Medonta.

MYSTICISM

It is not difficult to understand the development of mystic thought during the period when Scholasticism, by endless effort and wordy discussion, was bewildering the average man. Many there were who felt that the Scholastic in his effort to establish a victory was often losing sight of essential truth. Thomas à Kempis said that it is far better to feel contrition than to prove your definition of it to be correct. The mystic yearned to draw close to God and thought by despising philosophy he would accomplish his result.

St. Thomas had indicated that the mystic in this contention, which was not new, was limiting human reason and just as unfair to it and to man as Rationalism was. The man of pious tendencies was, however, discouraged with the work of the Schoolmen and sought finality in contemplation. What he should have realized is that mysticism by despising philosophy loses the ability to distinguish truth from error. The mystic is not

acting as a rational being should who would rise intelligently to the defense of the principles in which he believes. If he does not employ reason into his practices may grow contradictions, may grow and flourish the seeds of the plant of denial of all that he cherishes. This actually is what did happen in the Mystic School of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In this period we find it necessary to separate orthodox mysticism from the heterodox variety. Both divisions of mysticism were guilty of essential error in that they based their conclusions not upon a deep study of philosophy but rather upon the objective evidences presented to them by the decadent Scholasticism of the period.

The orthodox mystics held that by reason of contemplation man came to a better knowledge and love of God than he could possibly achieve through reason. The principle of Hugh of St. Victor, "Amo ut intelligam," was the fundamental tenet of mysticism. Among the orthodox mystics of the time we are considering were John Ruysbroek, Gerhard Groot and the author of the "Imitation of Christ", Thomas à Kempis.

The heterodox mystics owed their origin to the thought of Johann Eckhardt who was a member of the order of Black Friars, as the Dominicans were called, and who taught at the convent of his order in Cologne. Eckhardt held that in the process of contemplation the distinction between Creator and creature disappears. Man is deified, becomes one with God, and so reaches genuine happiness. In the thought of this pious mystic was the seed of error as the Archbishop of Cologne contended in his institution of proceedings against the Dominican friar. The charges brought against Eckhardt were sustained by Rome and in 1329 several portions

of his works were condemned. Others of the period who were influenced by the thought of Eckhardt were Henry Suso, John Tauler, Valentine Weigel and John Reuchlin. The Averroists, whom we have previously discussed, seized upon mysticism as a means of expression and an Arabian pantheism under the leadership of those whom we have mentioned in connection with Averroism crept into mysticism. This pantheistic emphasis intensified the errors of heterodox mysticism and definitely eliminated it from consideration as an expression of Christian practice or belief.

THE MODERN PERIOD

INTRODUCTION

In our consideration of the progress of philosophy during modern times we shall recognize, for purposes of better understanding, four major divisions of the period. These are:

First division, from the fall of Constantinople in 1453 to the birth of René Descartes in 1596;

Second division, from the rise of the influence of Descartes to the birth of Immanuel Kant in 1724;

Third division, from the time of Kant to that of Pope Leo XIII;

Fourth division, from the primacy of Leo XIII to the present day.

We wish at this point to emphasize, even at the expense of being unnecessarily repetitious, a thought we expressed in introducing our consideration of the philosophy of the Christian period. In that connection we stressed the opinion that there are no really abrupt changes in either thought or practice, so far as the general constitution of society is concerned, between one period of time and another. Periods are made by those who consider a particular time from the aspect of another day. Those living through a period are at best but vaguely conscious of the changes being recorded in the life about them. The changes themselves in so far as their deeper causes and results are concerned are but gradual outgrowths of a preceding age. One age grows from another as today follows yesterday. The flower of accomplishment in one generation will be found in blossom form in a preceding period, and the seeds of its beginnings can be traced to a still more remote time. Progress is a matter of steady development, and contri-

butions are made by each age to its successor. There is no halt. Progress is ceaseless endeavor. There is, due to the applications of human reason, progress in all lines of activity inclusive of philosophy. This thought is not always so definite in our minds as it should be. We like to think dramatically. We are inclined to regard as abrupt that change which was but logical, steady and gradual.

The modern period is often presented by historians as though it represented in its beginnings a sharp deviation from what is usually termed mediævalism. As the Christian period grew from pagan times so modernity is related, as child is to parent, to the Middle Ages. The Middle Ages contributed to the development of modern ideas through those characteristics which it itself had developed and through its preservation of what it had acquired from pagan sources.

In the early part of the modern period of philosophy, that is until approximately the beginning of the seventeenth century, there are discoverable five main tendencies. These are:

First, a strong impulse toward scientific investigation;

Second, a strong emphasis upon life and the material opportunities it presents;

Third, a revival of pagan philosophy in its many different forms;

Fourth, a continuance of the decline we have previously noted in the quality of Scholastic leadership and thought, though outstanding exceptions to the general rule present themselves;

Fifth, a revolt against the authority of the Catholic Church.

In each of the periods in which we plan to trace the progress of philosophy during modern times, we shall note the existence of the tendencies we have enumerated. We shall view them briefly but directly in our introduction to each period of thought. We shall note their appearances both implicitly and explicitly in the philosophies of the different thinkers whom we shall present. Though one period of time shades into another and lines of demarcation between ages are more or less artificial, still the emphasis of one century may be markedly different from that of another. The condition colors the tendencies we have noted. They were all expressed in the early modern era, and they continued to be voiced throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. All the tendencies mentioned are active in this twentieth century in which we live. The emphasis during all periods was, however, not equally placed upon all the tendencies fundamentally characteristic of the entire modern period. Man's thought seems to delight in extremes. The middle course, in which lies truth, may be deserted because it *is* the middle course. It may appear to be without the glamorous attraction which mental activity seems to find in extremes. So in different ages we shall expect to discover one tendency overexpressed to the temporary suppression, though not the annihilation, of another.

FIRST DIVISION OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

The thirteenth century marks the beginning in Italy of the Renaissance movement. In its first manifestations the Renaissance was an attempt to reinstate the lives of the Greeks and the Romans. The Broad Humanism of the thirteenth century was an outgrowth of the experiences of man during the crusades by reason of his contact with Eastern civilizations. In a more or less blind way he felt that pagan civilization would afford a solution of the many ills by which he was troubled. Still it was impossible for man to attempt to live as the Greeks and the Romans had lived unless he first secured information concerning the life in which he was interested.

It is in the work of Petrarch (1303-1374) and Boccaccio (1313-1375) that we find evidences of the spirit of literary research. Petrarch has been called the "first modern scholar". In him we find not only an interest in literary activity, but also a strong interest in life itself. He "discovered" (the use of the word in this connection though common is questionable) original manuscripts which had been preserved by the monks at Liège and at Verona throughout the Middle Ages. Boccaccio, whom Petrarch first met in 1350, made known to the wealthy and artistic people of Florence, then the foremost city of the world in literary effort, the work of his scholarly friend. He engendered in many the passion which he himself felt for the work of making known to the world the literature of the pagan period. How well and how zealously the monastic life of the improperly called "dark ages" had done its work of preservation of pagan thought, is shown by the many remote places at which copies of pagan literature were found.

Important "discoveries" were made at monasteries in Naples, Milan, Lodi, Vercelli, Paris, Cluny, Langres, Cologne, Mainz and at several places in Switzerland.

The "discoveries" themselves are not important. In a genuine sense there was no discovery as the monks in their tiresome toil of copying in the days before the art of printing was known had never completely lost knowledge of pagan thought. The spirit which prompted the searches and the enthusiasm which manifested itself in the reading of pagan literature are, however, very important. They indicate the appreciation of literary craftsmanship. They indicate, too, a broad interest in life itself as distinct from that unwarranted narrowness of viewpoint which decadent Scholasticism was fostering. This breadth of viewpoint was a healthy sign; it was in keeping with all the humanitarian impulses which we found reflected in the work of St. Thomas of Aquin. True it ran to extremes, as every movement of protest does, and so led to the re-establishment of many of the philosophies of pagan times whose errors we have already noted. Chief among the philosophies of the ancients which gained fresh vigor was that of Plato. To the false Idealism of Plato is directly traceable much of the distorted thought which culminated unfortunately in philosophical systems identified with the Protestant Reformation and with the several different forms of Protestantism. Had the clear thought of St. Thomas been appreciated, had the Scholastics of the days of the Renaissance been competent to show the logical relationship between Scholasticism and the new world that was opening before men's eyes, Christendom might never have been so unfortunately separated as it is. With notable exceptions the Schoolmen of the period were incompetent.

They assumed an attitude of antagonism toward the new learning, particularly as it manifested itself in scientific endeavor. In this they were false to their trust and plainly indicated that they were not really conversant with the philosophical studies of the Angelic Doctor whom they affected to regard as their master. Their attitude served to establish a breach between the new learning and Scholasticism. The erroneous opinion among many well-intentioned people today, that the Catholic Church is hostile to science, is a direct resultant of the harm done by decadent Scholasticism. The Catholic Church is open-minded to all scientific researches. Every theory which science proposes, from the theories relative to the existence of planets in addition to those we know to the theory of evolution, will be studied without prejudice in an effort to establish truth. The Church realizes as every thinking man and woman must realize that science and revelation can not possibly contradict each other. Both human reason and Divine revelation constitute means of knowing truth given to man by the Source of all truth,—God. Revelation welcomes the truths of science as every true scientist welcomes, as beacons of help, the truths established by revelation.

The Church, however, insists that every theory remain a theory until it has been proved to be a fact or law. The point of view is in thorough accord with the true spirit of science. It is amazing with what facility of mind and with what felicity of expression many so-called scientists of our day can recognize an identity between theory and fact where none in reality exists. When some apparently well-intentioned men and women of this twentieth century speak of the theory of evolution, they reveal unconsciously that for them the true

meaning of words holds little of consequence. What in words they call theory, in essence they regard as fact. Loose reasoning of this kind does harm to science. The Church regards science so highly that she refuses to stand by and see it abused by its enthusiastic though illogical advocates. She insists upon carefulness in the establishment of facts and carefulness also in the use of language by means of which scientific thought is conveyed.

It was in the field of science that the modern world emphasized its difference from the immediate past. In 1456, owing to the inventions made first by Gutenberg and later by Schoeffer and Faust in the use of movable type, the first complete book, a bible, was printed. In this period intense interest was manifested in geography owing to the voyages and discoveries of Bartholomew Diaz, Vasco da Gama, Columbus and Magellan. So intense was the interest that when in 1507 Waldenseemüller announced the publication of his new book "An Introduction to Geography", he and his contemporaries were surprised at the strength of the demand for copies. The spread of the spirit of scientific inquiry is clearly shown by the many advances made both in method and accomplishment during the period we are considering. In 1543 Nicholas Copernicus denied the accuracy of the Ptolemaic concept of the universe and set forth the explanation of the operations of heavenly bodies which we now know to be true. In 1577 Tycho Brahe of Denmark made very accurate observations concerning the nature and movements of comets.

We have made an effort to indicate the many different and conflicting elements which entered into the production of the modern world and of modern thought. All men rejoice in the accomplishments that character-

ized the period. All men regret the differences which, by short-sightedness, were permitted to lead to antagonistic attitudes between philosophy and natural science. We have indicated the unfortunate contribution made to misunderstanding by decadent Scholasticism. In all fairness it must be said that the scientists of the period were in many instances unnecessarily militant. They went out of their way to create discord. They did not try, in all cases, to persuade or to educate their opponents. They chose rather to abuse, dictate, ridicule and threaten. Mutual understanding in the period was unfortunately impossible. We have inherited the rancors prominent in the life of early modern times. There are still to be found, unfortunately, in some instances disagreements, unnecessary and unintelligent, among philosophy, religion and science. There is indubitable evidence, however, that a better day is dawning when to each of the three great forces, philosophy, religion and science, will be given its just rights and privileges. When that day dawns it will be but the echoing of a condition which prevailed in the thirteenth century when Scholasticism was in the zenith.

The period from 1453 to the birth of René Descartes represents, in philosophy, a transition from the attitude of the Scholasticism of the fourteenth century to the modern manner of thought. It is inclusive of many different phases of philosophic inquiry. We shall treat very briefly of what we regard as the four main phases of philosophic speculation in the period. These are:

First, the restoration of pagan philosophies;

Second, the reflection by philosophy of the scientific accomplishments of the period;

Third, the Scholasticism of the sixteenth century;

Fourth, the peculiarities of early modern mysticism.

We shall likewise endeavor to set forth the thought of some distinguished representatives of each phase of philosophic activity.

RESTORATION OF PAGAN PHILOSOPHIES

An indelible impression one receives from the study of tendencies in philosophy during the early part of modern times is the direct effort that was made to restore the philosophies of the pagan period. The reasons for the movement are not difficult to discover. Men's minds had been sent travelling back over the centuries to ancient Rome and Athens by reason of the popularization of the literary works that had been created in the halcyon days of pagan splendor. There was during the age, as we have indicated, a more or less wild spirit of enthusiasm for the learning and the literature of ancient peoples and in particular for what had been thought and done by the Athenians. The men of the times were not looking forward to the restoration of the life of ancient Greece, as those of the earlier Renaissance period had done, but they were desirous of knowing the accomplishments of the ancients. Their eagerness to know explains the avidity with which they flocked to hear Demetrius Chalcondyles who between 1471 and 1491 was professor of Greek at Florence. That he was an Athenian was enough to stir men's souls and to make them feel that by contact with him they would absorb the culture of the golden epoch of antiquity. We see this spirit reflected

in the admiration of one of his pupils, Gian Antonio Campano, who enthusiastically wrote:

"It seems to me that in him (Demetrius Chalcondyles) is figured all the wisdom, the civility and the elegance of those so famous and illustrious ancients. When you merely see him you imagine you are looking at Plato and when you hear him speak this feeling is intensified."

The interest in Greek learning spread like wildfire throughout Italy. Cosimo de Medici, who died in 1464, spent vast sums that he had acquired from his banking interests in Florence, in the collection of rare manuscripts for the famous Medicean library which he had founded in 1444. Pope Nicholas V, who was an enthusiast for the new learning, assembled at Rome a great many scholars. Through their researches, Pope Nicholas made Rome a university centre. Due to the personal leadership of the Pope the foundation of the now famous Vatican Library was laid in 1450. The interest in Greek literature was not confined to Italy. It spread rapidly to other countries, notably to Spain and Germany.

As a resultant of the contacts with pagan thought came the interest in pagan philosophies. This interest was intensified by the insufficiency, in the main, of the Scholastic effort of the period on the one hand, and on the other by the progress that was being made in science. From these currents of activity came the enthusiasm for the philosophic inquiries of the ancient world. That the zeal manifested was often greater than the judgment shown by many in their adoption of pagan thought is understandable from the vantage point of observation we at this distant period have. To appreciate the movement of modern philosophy as a whole, to understand the

vagaries it manifests at different periods and in the reflections of different men, particularly men of early modern times, we must enter into the life of the world during the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries. These were centuries of stimulation. A civilization different from, and superior to, any that *had been* seemed within grasp. It is not essentially difficult for one who understands the period to sympathize with the viewpoint of those philosophers of the age who wished to approach the solution of philosophical problems from the point at which they had been left by pagan thought, and not from the basis of authority. It was the issue of the scientific problem of approach which Scholasticism should have solved and in which it scarcely interested itself. It was this problem which led to the reinstatement of pagan philosophy in several different forms but particularly in Platonism, Neo-Platonism and Pythagoreanism. From these were derived the pantheism and the mysticism so widely prevalent in the early modern period.

It was these two tendencies which drove philosophy away from the true Christian ideal toward paganism. It was a degenerate Scholasticism which permitted it to remain separated until relatively recent times. It was most unfortunate that by reason of the philosophical errors of the period came the division of Christendom into Catholic and Protestant branches. We shall now consider a few of the philosophers of early modern times in whose thought processes the errors of pagan speculation were resident.

BERNARDINO TELESIO

Bernardino Telesio was born at Cosenza, near Naples, in 1508. He was, even from his early student days at Padua, a violent opponent of the Aristotelianism of the Schoolmen. Telesio maintained that syllogistic methods were unequal to the acquisition of truth. He rejected likewise the thought of dependence upon authority and urged the institution of a search for truth by the application of the senses. Basically, therefore, he was voicing opposition to the narrow Scholasticism of the age rather than to Aristotle whose thought he was, up to this point, but re-echoing.

All movements of protest, however, by their very nature perhaps, result in extreme positions. This characterization is true in so far as the philosophy of Telesio is concerned. His rejection of the syllogistic method led him to a denial of the validity of the reasoning power of the mind. He asserted his complete reliance, in all avenues of truth seeking, upon the senses. Not only is all knowledge sensation but the soul itself is but material substance made known to us by feeling. Everything that exists is but matter, and objective changes are caused by the action upon matter of two forces. These forces are heat and cold.

In the philosophy of Telesio we note a strong naturalistic element. To this fundamental pagan base there were added by later philosophers the pantheistic elements resident in Neo-Platonism. This combination of pagan elements produced what has been called the Naturalistic School of Italy. Its founder Telesio died in 1588 but before his death he saw in two followers the perfection of his thought. In Giordano Bruno and in Tommaso

Campanella, the Naturalistic School became clear-cut pagan pantheism.

GIORDANO BRUNO

Giordano Bruno was born at Nola, near Naples, in 1548. Early in life he became a Dominican. The subtleties enjoyed by the Schoolmen of the period disgusted him and intensified his interest in science, particularly in the ideas of Copernicus concerning the solar system. He was, in all probability, the first philosopher to adopt the notion of a heliocentric system. By reason of his sympathetic attitude toward the scientific accomplishments of his age, Bruno could be classed with those philosophers whom we shall consider in connection with the reflection in philosophy of the progress of science. Giordano Bruno, however, was essentially a philosopher and not a scientist. His philosophy was in accord with the naturalism and pantheism of Telesio, whose speculative system of thought we have outlined.

Pantheistic thought so influenced Bruno that he left not only the Dominican order but the Church as well. After wandering throughout Europe and identifying himself for a brief period with Protestantism he returned to Italy in 1592. In 1600 he was put to death by order of the Inquisition.

Bruno's philosophy is pure pantheism. He held that the physical universe was infinite. The earth instead of being the center was but one planet out of many. This, of course, was the scientific contribution of Copernicus. Upon this thought Bruno constructed his philosophy. Since there could not possibly be two infinites, God and

the universe were one. God, therefore, according to Bruno is the soul of the world. He is the immanent cause of all reality. In this thought we have the Neo-Platonic concept of God and in it, too, we have a denial of the doctrine of the real presence of Christ in the consecrated host. God though present is not so by reason of miracle but naturally so as He is similarly present in every flower, every stone and every animal creature.

In addition to the acceptance of the pagan Neo-Platonism of Plotinus, Bruno drew freely from Pythagorean sources. The problem of "becoming" with which the Pythagoreans struggled is strongly evidenced in the philosophy of Bruno. He sees in Pythagoreanism an explanation of the law governing the steady unfolding of the universe which for him is the work of creation. Creation is but the expansion of the life principle, the soul of the world,—God; while death is its contraction. The fundamental thought of Bruno is not new. We have met it in the School of Heraclitus, in Pythagoreanism, and in other pagan philosophies of atomistic tendencies. We shall meet the same thought again; for Bruno contributed directly to the philosophies of many moderns, notably those of Leibniz and Hegel. It is paganism. It is pantheism. Both paganism and pantheism die hard.

TOMMASO CAMPANELLA

Tommaso Campanella was born at Stilo, in the province of Calabria, Italy, in 1568. This philosopher, who, like Bruno, was a member of the order of St. Dominic, resembled Bruno in his adherence to the philosophy

of Telesio. He differed from Bruno in that he remained faithful to Catholicism and to the vows of his order throughout life.

Campanella was a youthful prodigy. As a boy of thirteen he showed remarkable ability both as poet and prose writer. At the age of twenty he wrote his first philosophical work. It consisted in a defense of the Naturalistic system of Telesio. Campanella showed definite tendencies resulting from the favorable impressions he had received from scientific inquiries. He also displayed the effects made upon him by the narrow formalism of most of the Scholastic effort of his time. He evidenced, too, the influences to which he had been subjected by his study of Greek philosophical systems particularly the influences of Scepticism in all its manifestations.

In reality, Campanella, who had an encyclopedic knowledge of all prior philosophy, deliberately chose Scepticism as a point of departure for the construction of a new philosophical system. Though a man of brilliant intellect, Campanella had neither the patience nor the thoroughness to work out a complete system of thought. He aimed, in the selection of Scepticism as a provisional philosophy, to try to determine the nature of knowledge. He formulates the principle that all knowledge proceeds either from the senses or from reasoning. It arises within us by reason of direct contact with objective reality or by reason of speculation.

How though, asks Campanella, am I to distinguish that which is outside of me from that which is within me. In my knowledge how am I to be sure that I am not ascribing objectivity to that which is but subjective?

How am I to reach certitude? The test of certainty, according to Campanella, is the inner sense.

There is within each individual an inner sense which assures him of his own existence. This sense informs me with so direct a touch that it is I who feel, who know, who will, who act, that I can not for a moment doubt the accuracy of the information. The inner sense likewise informs me that there are things I can not do. It informs me immediately both of my powers and my limitations. I am limited not only by myself but also by things outside myself. I know directly, therefore, through my limitations, objective reality. I know not only that it exists but that it is the cause of its perception by me.

What is existence, asks Campanella again, either of the human being or of sense realities. Existence means, he answers, simply a procedure from a principle and a final return to it. It is in this concept that his philosophy reveals its essential pantheism and its note of Pythagoreanism. Campanella held that everything that is, by reason of its existence, proves itself to be possessed of three main characteristics:

First, an ability to exist;

Second, an essence or the realization of an Idea which existed as knowledge prior to the existence of the thing;

Third, a tendency or desire for self-activity which is but the effort to attain some entity better than itself.

From these considerations we see that Campanella in his philosophy argued for the existence of three forces or principles: power, knowledge and will. These three

constitute the meaning of all reality. These three in unified form constitute complete harmony or God. God is all power, all knowledge and all will or love. In all things, more as they are near God, less as they are farther away, appear these three principles. All things, therefore, have God within them and all things tend naturally toward the absolute Being from whom they have proceeded. Everything that *is* is religious in the sense that everything that *is* tends toward God. All things must so tend since all things are but emanations from the Divine Substance. The pagan pantheism of Campanella is evident.

THE REFLECTION OF SCIENCE BY PHILOSOPHY

We have spoken of the scientific interests of the modern world in this early period and of the effects produced upon philosophical thought. The studies of Copernicus and of Brahe we have mentioned and we have indicated their relevancy to the pantheistic thought of the Naturalistic School. The interest in the world as the home of man not only induced man to seek a philosophy which would be attuned to scientific endeavor and accomplishment but one also related to government and the civil conditions which man as a social being necessarily should consider. Out of these viewpoints grew the scientific and politico-philosophical theories which appear in the work of the men we shall now present.

In the preceding sections we have emphasized the thought that Scholasticism missed, in this early modern period, a golden opportunity. It could have vigorously protested against the common assumption that the new world presented by science had no philosophy upon

which it could depend; no philosophy that was in any sense modern. It is regrettable that Scholasticism did not effectively present the thought of St. Thomas of Aquin. He was not only in accord with the method the world sought in science but he was so far ahead of the age in many respects, notably in the field of political philosophy, that only now in this twentieth century are we beginning to realize some of the reforms which he advocated. St. Thomas, however, was to a notable degree neglected.

Though the Schoolmen were in the main, (we shall offer in a later division some noteworthy exceptions), oblivious to the opportunities presented to show how closely related were the events of the modern world and true Scholasticism, for one accomplishment credit must be extended to them. By their close reasoning, their subtleties if you will, they had marked out clearly the laws of logic. They had in addition developed a valuable terminology. It is true that they ran to extremes in spinning arguments and in establishing almost unending terminologies. The emphasis which they placed upon the accuracy of thought, however, was of direct help to science. The help afforded by Scholasticism in these respects is not always appreciated. It should be, for without the logic of Scholasticism, science could not have made the progress it did. The science of the twentieth century could be improved, at least by the literary efforts of some scientists, if greater attention were paid to logical thought processes and to terminology. Even in this narrow relationship the modern world has something to learn from Scholasticism which in its broad aspects was always potentially capable of keeping abreast of every modern advance. It is still an active philosophy.

It is a philosophy toward which the very modern world of today is turning for help in the resolution of its doubts and the solution of its difficulties.

FRANCIS BACON

Francis Bacon was born in London in the year 1561. His life was identified with the legal profession and with the political activities of the English government. In 1618 he was granted the title of Baron Verulam and at the same time was made lord chancellor. His political life was not altogether happy. Charges of corruption were brought against him to which he entered a plea of guilty. The plea was accepted by the Court and upon Bacon, now Viscount St. Albans, was imposed an exceedingly heavy fine. In addition he was removed from office. His death occurred in 1626.

As a philosopher, Bacon's chief claim to fame consists in his rejection of the syllogistic method of Scholasticism and his substitution for it of what is usually referred to as the method of science or experimentation. It is, however, a gross exaggeration of Bacon's work to regard him, as is sometimes done, as the father of modern science. Experimentation had originated many centuries before the time of Bacon. We have seen it emphasized by Aristotle, by our present philosopher's namesake, the Franciscan monk, Roger Bacon, and by the master of Scholasticism, Thomas of Aquin. Bacon was but a product of the scientific aspect of the whole Renaissance movement. In fact he represents but the English reaction to the trend of the times.

In his thought he protests the decadent note of emphasis upon authority in the Scholasticism of the period, and insists upon a process of induction which will investigate a great number of individual instances before announcing a conclusion. He urged that mankind discard the traditional manner of seeking truth. The thought of mankind was obscured according to Bacon by what he called the idols, or false appearances of reality. There are, said Bacon, four barriers of falsehood which stand in the way of effort to remove error. These are:

Idols of the tribe or errors common to all men owing to the false functioning of the human mind;

Idols of the den or the individual peculiarities of human beings by reason of which some men receive one impression from objective reality while others receive a diametrically opposite impression;

Idols of the market place or errors ascribable to the inability of language to convey more than symbols roughly approximating what we have in mind;

Idols of the theatre or false opinions which men harbor owing largely to tradition and ineffective schooling.

Bacon believed that with these errors removed, and with mankind definitely deciding to make an altogether fresh start on the road to knowledge, true induction would direct man toward finality: the end of all true philosophical inquiry. What Bacon failed to realize was the part played by deduction in all true scientific investigation. Man before starting upon a quest makes

a tentative assumption or hypothesis. The very testing of this hypothesis is deduction. Deduction, therefore, can not be ignored. The method of science is not pure induction but is in reality a deductive-inductive-deductive process.

Bacon represents a logical outcome of the conditions of the period. His is a vigorous protest against the untrue Scholasticism of the age. Like every other movement of protest it went too far. He would distinguish philosophy from faith and in so doing thought he was in opposition to Scholasticism whereas in reality he was but re-echoing without knowing he was doing so, the exact thought of St. Thomas of Aquin. However, in his philosophy, he is nominalistic and therefore in reality is denying the validity of the supernatural. Essentially rank materialism is resident within his philosophy. Though he disguised it effectively, perhaps even to himself, nevertheless it is in reality present. Bacon's friend, Thomas Hobbes, thought along the lines of Bacon's speculation and in his work materialism is manifest.

THOMAS HOBBES

Thomas Hobbes, the son of a clergyman, was born at Westport, England, in 1588. He proved himself to be a genuine student in his college work at Oxford. Subsequent to his graduation from Oxford he went to France where he met and established a close friendship with René Descartes. This philosopher and the political troubles of England had marked effects upon the speculative thought of Thomas Hobbes. These effects are readily recognized in "Leviathan," a book which is regarded as his principal work. He died in 1679.

It is sometimes said that Hobbes was primarily interested in the immediately practical aspects of philosophy. This is not quite true. In fact his political interests, owing in all probability to his close friendship with the Stuarts, obscured for many the essentials of his philosophical thought. It is true that he was politically minded but in no sense is he to be regarded as a narrow practical thinker. The thought of Hobbes by reason of which he justified his political views is deep and basic. It is essentially pagan. In it are the seeds of error to which are traceable the false pragmatic philosophy of the present day and that political thought which brought about the World War and upon which is justified that absolutism of government which is apparent in the civic activities of the present time. In other words, Hobbes is not to be dismissed as a practical political thinker. He is a dangerous philosopher and the error of his thought should be emphasized.

The thought of Hobbes is not, however, new. We have met it all before in pagan times. He defines philosophy satisfactorily as "reasoned knowledge from effects to causes and from causes to effects." In this definition he is superior to Bacon because, as is evident, he provides for both induction and deduction and not for induction alone, as did Bacon. Why then, the student may ask is Hobbes to be condemned. He is to be condemned because of the limited meaning he attaches to the word knowledge.

According to Hobbes there is no knowledge except that which has been produced by sensation. Sensation is but an excitation of the organism produced by movement outside or inside our bodies. While Hobbes does

not deny the existence of the material world it is a very logical outcome of his thought to deny it, as some of his followers later did. The point that Hobbes insists upon is that all knowledge is subjective due simply to our feeling of the activity of the brain and that such activity has been caused by motion. Essential truth is our interpretation of cerebral activity. It is subjective, personal and individual. It is evident that this seventeenth century philosopher is a true follower of the pagan Protagoras. In this philosophy are all the fallacies against which those other brilliant pagans, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, contended.

If all our knowledge be merely subjective, then the objectivity of phenomena is just a trick which the senses are playing upon us. The light, the color, the sound to which I ascribe external existence, that is existence apart from the effects produced upon my nervous system, are but illusions. Even in his own philosophical thought Hobbes is not thorough, since he never reaches a complete denial of the existence of matter; and yet such denial is logically resident within his speculation. Knowledge of objective reality is, however, dependent upon the nervous structure of each individual's body. What we call personality or soul is just brain activity. If the activity be pleasurable, then the activity is good; if the activity is disagreeable, then it is bad. Good and bad are but relative terms and all activity is labelled good or bad in accordance with the pleasurable or painful sensations such activity produces in our physical bodies. There are no absolutes such as morality, friendship, charity. These are but names,—empty sounds. There is in fact nothing that is more than physical. We ourselves are but nervous organizations. We deceive ourselves

when we think we differ, except in a more complete means of conveying ideas, from the brutes. We are but animals. We have no soul. There is nothing in existence but matter. As the brute is governed by the necessities of life, so is man. He has no more freedom of will than has the wild animal. His actions are determined by his loves, hates, fears and hopes and these in turn are conditioned by his imagination and his passions. Reason alone, said Hobbes, would not affect man's activities. Man will subscribe to no moral code which does not offer some physical attraction to him.

In the materialistic thought of this English philosopher of the modern period we can readily discover the effect of pagan influence, particularly that of Protagoras and Democritus. We can appreciate, too, that Hobbes is responsible in no small degree for the strength of the pagan note in the philosophical systems current today in his own country and in America. He is responsible too for many false political notions which the life of the world encourages in our generation and which, if persisted in, will rob man eventually of his natural rights.

While Hobbes, by reason of his friendship with the Stuarts and with Lord Cavendish, had an especially strong interest in politics, it is wrong to dismiss him as a man primarily interested in politics and to whom philosophy was of but secondary importance. He is essentially a philosopher. His political philosophy is a logical deduction from his fundamental thought. As man is devoid of free will, and does whatever he does by reason of necessity; so also in the State there can be no liberty and might must always make right. Man has no natural rights. Whatever privileges he has, come to him from organized society, from government. In return for the security

and peace he enjoys, for the protection of his private property, he owes absolute and unconditioned obedience to the State. Without the State there could be no peace, no individual rights, no individual property. All would be conflict. The law of the brute world would prevail in anarchistic manner. Necessity will always govern. Instead of the necessity of individual guardianship there has been developed the necessity of State guardianship. It is necessity, however, and to it man must bow. Whatever the State ordains, therefore, is good. It is the law and it must be obeyed. There is no room for private opinion, for individual judgment.

The thought that the State is absolute and can demand at all times unconditioned and implicit obedience from its citizens in all matters had much to do with the prevalence of Kaiserism in Germany prior to the World War. It is the principle upon which the dictatorships in other European countries are today founded. Italy through Mussolini portrays it in vivid form. Its effect upon the thought processes of many in our country is evidenced in every discussion of prohibition, birth control and the federal control of education. We shall meet the same thought in the work of later philosophers. The speculations of Hobbes are essentially pernicious and represent the source of much modern error in philosophy proper and its political applications.

Scholasticism of the Sixteenth Century

We have emphasized in preceding sections the decadence of Scholastic thought during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The same emphasis upon proof by resort to authority and the same subtleness of reasoning upon topics decidedly trivial in content are evident in the Scholastic thought of the sixteenth century. During this century, however, we meet in the work of several Schoolmen, a superior appreciation of the functions of human reason and of the proper relationship between philosophy and theology, between reason and faith. In the minds of these better than average representatives of sixteenth century Scholasticism we can see a distrust of the petty conflicts conducted in the name of philosophy by their contemporaries and a reliance upon the original sources of Scholastic thought. Many commentaries appeared during these times upon the original works of Thomas of Aquin and of John Duns Scotus.

The impetus to an attempted revival of pure Scholastic thought was the result of the opposition to constituted ecclesiastical authority by such men as Luther (1483-1546), Zwingli (1484-1531), Melancthon (1497-1560), and Calvin (1500-1564). The Protestant Reformation, though usually considered to be the result of the activities of the leaders of thought enumerated above, in their opposition to abuses which had crept into Church practices, was in reality a logical consequence of the decline and decay of the true spirit of Scholasticism. Modern philosophy with its pagan emphasis and Protestantism are traceable to the same



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Thomas Hobbes

1588-1679

essential source. Both are systems of protest. In so far as the movement extended to objections to the Scholasticism of the period it was not only valid but exceedingly commendatory. Identified with the thought of protest against the excessive resort to authority in decadent Scholastic reasoning was the strong note of the whole Renaissance movement. The Renaissance among the people of Italy, had displayed itself in literary endeavor. In the North among a more stolid, a less light-hearted people, it took on a serious aspect: the evaluation of life's activities in terms of religious thought and practice.

We have, therefore, in the religious reform movement of the sixteenth century three contributing forces. We have a serious minded northern Teutonic people affected by a Renaissance literary movement inherited from a Latin people whose effort was to apply the thought of the pagan Greeks to the modern world. The sober Teutons had no desire to reinstate the worldly concerns of the pagan period. The effect of the Renaissance in Germany, Switzerland and Scotland was to create discontent and opposition to ecclesiastical authority and thought in all their forms. The basic element, however, is the reliance upon human reason. Such reliance was admirable and would have had the complete approbation of the most clear minded thinker of all Scholasticism, St. Thomas of Aquin. When, though, individual reason is made the basis of religious judgments, as Martin Luther, the most outstanding leader of the Protestant Reformation, advocated, then we can not grant to the movement approval, for we see in it the pagan philosophic thought of Protagoras. It is not the opinion of the individual man which makes truth, truth. Such a stand is sophistry. It is not even the social sanction

which the opinion of a group may grant which makes morality more than an empty sound. The truths of morality are unchangeable and undying. They are what they are because man knows by reason that they represent the end for which he is in existence. You can not make evil, good; nor good, evil, by legislation. For instance, you can not give moral sanction by law to contraception by mechanical or chemical means because by so doing you frustrate the essential purposes of the sexual organs in man and woman. No matter what legislatures may or may not do, contraception by use of artificial agencies is basically evil. Man knows it to be evil because as a rational human being he knows the meaning of the act of copulation.

Yet such doctrines as birth control by artificial means, pagan in their essence, are traceable to the philosophy of the leaders of the Protestant Reformation. Martin Luther held that broad distinction should be made between reason, which he defined as a function of the flesh, and faith, which he called a function of the spirit. Thomas of Aquin had likewise stressed the necessary separation between faith and reason. There was, therefore, nothing really new nor different in the division upon which Luther insisted. There was, however, a real difference, a genuine departure in the Augustinian monk's contention that the sole source of truth in religion is individual interpretation of Scripture. Justification of life, Luther held, was to be found in faith and in faith alone. The principle of the Catholic Church that an individual could by self-denial, by a rejection of the joys of life, build up for himself merit that would be of value to him in this world and in the next, Luther held to be invalid. God, said Luther, is

not pleased by the act of a man who will renounce family joys to lead a celibate life. There is but one essential to salvation, maintained Luther, and that essential is faith. The individual, therefore, should search the Scriptures, clarify his individual beliefs and so attain by faith the grace of God by which cometh salvation. Acts of charity are of no avail to man. Merit is unattainable. The grace of God will bring eternal reward but such grace will come to man only as he is possessed of faith. It will be seen that in Protestantism there is neglect of reason and a despair of its ability to attain truth. From such doctrine there were derived the Protestant philosophies of a later period with their stress upon the thought that *man must believe, he can not know.*

Even today in the minds of many misinformed people is the thought that the Catholic Church insists upon blind faith and despises the efficiency of human reason to attain truth. It is amazing that such an opinion should prevail for it is Protestantism, not Catholicism, which stresses this thought. Its prevalence is related directly to decadent Scholasticism with its false doctrine that the settlement of disputes is to be made by reference to authority and not to reason. Luther agreed but asked that the authority be the authority of Scripture and not that of a Schoolman. Both were wrong. There were several representatives of Scholasticism who felt the presence of essential error in both contentions and urged that original search be made to discover the actual thought of the great masters of Scholasticism: Thomas of Aquin and John Duns Scotus. Among the most noted of these were the Jesuit teachers, Pedro Da Fonseca and Francisco Suárez.

The Society of Jesus (or the Jesuits, as members of the order were in derision first called) was established through the activities of Saint Ignatius Loyola in 1540. The thought in the mind of the founder was to associate a group of men to aid in the conversion to Christianity of the Mohammedan people. It was only at the urgent solicitation of the Pope and of the German authorities that the order directed its efforts against the spread of Protestantism. Out of this effort came the zeal and research evidenced by Jesuit leaders in their study of both philosophy and theology. Two of the outstanding leaders in this movement were the men we have mentioned.

Pedro Da Fonseca was born at Cortizada, Portugal, in 1528. He died at Lisbon in 1599. Fonseca was both a philosopher and theologian. He was a prolific writer upon philosophical subjects and was so conversant with all systems of philosophy, pagan and Christian, orthodox and heretical, that he is often referred to as the "Portuguese Aristotle."

Francisco Suárez was born at Granada in 1548 and died at Lisbon in 1617. He, like Fonseca, was a close student of both philosophy and theology. Suárez was the more brilliant of the two. He was exceedingly original in his study and founded within Scholasticism a Neo-Thomistic school. One of the outstanding principles of this school was an application of the Thomistic doctrine that one and the same truth can be approached by the separate avenues of science and of faith, to the religious misunderstandings of the period in which Suárez lived. As a result of his efforts and the efforts of the many other Jesuits at Coimbra, Rome and throughout

the missionary field, the course of Protestantism was not only halted but many people were brought back to the Church.

Out of the religious difficulties, however, came a very close identification of philosophy with theology. Philosophy from the sixteenth century to the Neo-Scholastic revival in the nineteenth century, for which Pope Leo XIII was responsible, remained outside the Church. Within the Church it became identified with theology. This was a most unfortunate result since by reason of it the progress of philosophy, and progress it did for nothing stands still, not even thought, was a Protestant progress. It was a progress built upon the basic notion that human reason can not ascertain truth, and justification by faith is the only explanation to be arrived at in any analysis of the ultimate solution of man's existence and his relationship to a Final Cause, or God. We have seen the beginnings of this philosophy in the thought of Thomas Hobbes and we shall see its further and fuller expression in our consideration of the philosophers we shall select in our study of what we have termed the Second Division of Modern Philosophy.

Before we start our study of the progress of philosophic thought during the seventeenth century it will be of advantage to view rapidly another development of speculative thought in the period we are about to leave. This development is known as Protestant Mysticism.

Protestant mysticism arose, as did mysticism within the Catholic Church, as a movement of dissatisfaction with Scholasticism. The mysticism of leading Protestant disciples of this school of thought is a resultant of decadent Scholasticism and of the heretical teaching of Master Eckhardt, the Dominican. This brand of mysticism had much in common with Averroism. It was pantheistic and maintained that in the act of ecstatic contemplation of God the creature became deified.

The most noted Protestant mystic of the period was Jakob Böhm. He was born at Altseidenberg in 1575 and died in 1624 at Görlitz, Prussia. Böhm or Behmen, as he is sometimes called, devoted no time to the study of philosophy. He believed it was useless to do so. God the Holy Ghost, the source of wisdom, would reveal to man matters which could never be learned by the application of human reason. Prayer would yield greater fruit than study. God is in the world and man through ecstacy can become identified with Him. Böhm in his book "Aurora" relates three such visions or transports in which, as God, in a single glance he arrived at the innermost secrets of reality.

There is no doubt that Böhm was a most sincere, pious man of vigorous spirituality. There is throughout his work an intensity of purpose to be united with God. There is in his thought much poetry, much that is highly emotional and purely figurative. His thought is the craft of mysticism launched without a rudder. The Protestant principle of private judgment is set to work upon the Scriptures and to this is added the strong

Arabian note of pantheistic thinking. Böhm's thought is illustrative of the working of a highly sensitive and religious spirit which has discarded the balance wheel of reason. It is interesting as showing to what extremes man went when human reason was removed by him as a guide to truth.

SECOND DIVISION OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

In this period we shall study the progress of philosophy from the rise of the influence of René Descartes to the birth of Immanuel Kant in 1724. It is a brief period totalling altogether about one hundred and twenty-five years. In this relatively short space of time there were perfected some of the most notable examples of modern thought. It is an age of positivism in philosophy and during it positivistic thought is shown in its three avenues respectively of scepticism, criticism and dogmatism.

The philosophy of the period receives no guidance from the Catholic Church. Scholasticism had ceased to function as a philosophic system and had retired within the Church where it was inseparably connected with theology. The speculative thought of the seventeenth century lacked the beacon light of Scholasticism in the purity of its expression by Thomas of Aquin and by reason of its deprivation travelled the circuitous route with its alleys and by-ways over which pagan thought had traced its more or less blinded way. The student will recognize in many of the philosophical systems of the period a reiteration of earlier thought. Yet even such philosophies represent progress, for real progress is sometimes made more secure by a prior misdirection.

René Descartes

René Descartes was born at La Haye, in Touraine, in 1596. He was educated in early youth at the Jesuit College of La Flèche. In 1612 he went to Paris. Later he served as a soldier in the armies of Prince Maurice of Holland and subsequently he joined as a volunteer the forces of the Elector of Bavaria. While in winter quarters on the Danube in 1620 he tells us he experienced the turning point in his student career. He conceived the idea that all the problems of philosophy could be solved by an application to them of the methods of mathematics. He believed that the secrets of nature would reveal themselves to man through mathematics. All of his philosophy is based upon this notion and upon it he wrote his three most important books: "Discourse upon Method," "Meditations of First Philosophy" and "The Principles of Philosophy." In 1650 he died at Stockholm, Sweden, to which country he had gone in the preceding year at the invitation of Queen Christina. The homage that was paid Descartes by influential men and women of the seventeenth century is evidence of the great popularity his philosophical thought enjoyed. His invitation to visit Sweden is indicative of the wide appeal his writings had made.

Descartes to be properly understood should be viewed as a mathematician. He is primarily a mathematician interested in philosophy and not a philosopher interested in mathematics. To philosophy he applies mathematical principles of method. These principles demand that in our effort to discover knowledge we proceed from axio-

matic truths, intuitions he calls them, by deduction, to logical conclusions.

The first effort of the thought of Descartes is to arrive at intuitional truth. His process of arrival is to start from what he called radical or methodic doubt. "I shall doubt everything," was the thought of Descartes, "not because I wish to remain in doubt but because I wish to know." Scholasticism had held to the two complementary principles—"I believe that I may know" and "I know that I may believe." The Mystics of St. Victor had said "I love that I may know." In the same spirit Descartes said "I doubt that I may know." There was method in his doubt. He will believe just as soon as his doubt is resolved as it will be resolved, he contends, by a radical departure from traditional thought.

Well then, Descartes reasoned, we shall attack the problem of knowledge from a very fundamental base. He does so by doubting his own existence. I doubt that I have hands, eyes, legs. I may not have hands, eyes, or legs, said Descartes, but *I know* I have thought for to doubt is to think. Therefore, as a thinker at least, I exist. I exist and I think.

Within me rises the thought that God exists. I doubt it but the truth that God exists in infinite perfection flashes across my mind. Where could such a thought come from? I am both finite and imperfect. I know I achieve my knowledge little by little, yet I can conceive an infinite, perfect God. How can the finite and imperfect think the infinite and perfect? I alone could not have produced the idea. It must have come directly to me from that which is both infinite and perfect, God. Therefore, God Exists. God, however, does not exist

because I think Him. I think Him, I have an idea of Him, because He exists. If He did not exist I could have no idea corresponding to Him.

So far Descartes had demonstrated, to his own satisfaction, that he exists and that God exists. How do I know, though, that I exist as more than spirit, said Descartes. How do I distinguish the "not-me" from the "me"? How do I know that there is a world of external reality? We shall doubt its existence. As soon as we do, though, said Descartes, we can not but feel intuitively that we are wrong. God has given to us the idea of Himself. He is infinitely perfect. The world reflects Him as we do. Would He then permit us to be deceived? The thought is inconceivable. Therefore, the world of external realities exists. God exists, I exist and the world exists. These are axiomatic truths from which I can proceed without further doubt of the ability of mind to ascertain the truth. Scepticism, therefore, maintained Descartes, is an illogical philosophical system.

In the further elaboration of his speculative system Descartes held that we have proved in our establishment of God's existence the reliability not only of reason but also of the senses. The test of certainty is God who will not permit me to be deceived. My senses necessarily, therefore, make accurate reports. Yet they are but reports. My knowledge is all subjective, as Socrates had held, for mind is thoroughly immaterial. It can not have extension within it. Material substances in like manner exclude all thought, all non-extension. Extension is a necessary characteristic of matter. If mind can not have extension within it, of course, then, it constantly excludes matter. Mind can not, therefore, by any pos-

sibility know matter. The two substances, mind and matter, are mutually exclusive.

In this thought Descartes laid the foundation for the struggle which has characterized practically all modern philosophy from his day to this. The question,—"How can mind know matter?" is one which every non-Catholic philosopher in the modern world has tried unsuccessfully to answer. There *is* only one answer. That is the answer given years ago by Aristotle, accepted by Thomas of Aquin, and which is being emphatically but courteously voiced by the Neo-Scholastic philosophy of today. The non-Catholic world is not ready to accept the explanation but it is steadily approaching it and in the approach lies the hope of the future and the re-union of Christendom.

In the dualism which Descartes set up between soul and body, mind and matter, lies the essential error of modern Idealism. It is the essential error of Protestantism for Idealism is the philosophy of Protestantism. This we shall see in our consideration of the philosophers of this and the later periods. Descartes himself could not be made to see its invalidity. Though he remained staunchly Catholic in his practices it was a source of constant sorrow to him that his life-long friends of the Society of Jesus at La Flèche rejected his thought. The genuineness of the anti-Catholic note in the speculations of René Descartes was made manifest in the development of his thought by Pascal, Geulincx, Malebranche and Spinoza. "A bad tree does not bring forth good fruit," neither will a bad philosophical system bring forth good philosophy except by the road of contradiction. Jansenism, Ontologism, Occasionalism and Naturalism were

all implicit in the reasoning of Descartes. They were made explicit in the speculations of those philosophers who took their beginnings from his conclusions. We shall consider briefly each of the philosophers we have mentioned as representing schools of thought derived from principles established by Descartes.

THE JANSENISM OF PASCAL

Blaise Pascal was born in 1623 at Clermont in France. He died at the early age of thirty-nine. Like Descartes he may be considered as a mathematician interested in philosophy, for in the field of pure mathematics and physics he made several highly important advances. In the field of philosophy, however, he manifested plainly the influence which the thought of Descartes had exercised over him.

As a direct resultant of the Cartesian principle of the mutually exclusive dualism of mind and objective reality came the thought of Pascal that it is our heart that is conscious of God and not our reason. Faith is God making Himself manifest to our hearts. Through the heart we learn those truths which reason can never attain. Pascal deprecated all philosophizing. He spoke of philosophy as a science which was definitely opposed to the fundamentals of common sense and of human nature. We see at a glance the strong pressure of the mystic element in his fragmentary philosophical work called "Thoughts". We note, too, the presence of scepticism. Pascal decried the use of reason as a reliable source

of truth but used it and relied upon it as offering proof of its own unreliability.

The strange and scattered tendencies of the brilliant young thinker, Pascal, found their most complete expression in his acceptance of the principles laid down by the Jansenists of Port-Royal in their disputes with the Jesuits. The Jansenists were a group who held to the program outlined by Cornelius Jansen, Bishop of Ypres, in his "Augustinus". In this book, published in 1640, two years after his death, Bishop Jansen maintained that man's will was not free and that its utter passivity had been brought about by the original sin of our first parents. Man, therefore, acts indifferently, so far as the morality of the situation is concerned, to both good and evil. He neither resists nor chooses but simply cooperates with whatever influence, from heaven or earth, happens at the moment to dominate him.

Pascal's acceptance of so heretical a thought is evidence, it seems to me, of the force exerted upon his thinking by the influence of René Descartes. Since all knowledge is subjective, then the intuitions of the heart are of greater validity than the results that reason may offer in its useless effort to ascertain the unascertainable. Faith, not reason, should be depended upon to guide us to truth. If we wish to know those essential realities which reason vainly seeks, let us ask ourselves not what we know but how do we feel. Our emotional reactions constitute an excellent guide to knowledge and conduct. In these fallacies of Pascal we see the results of Cartesian thought in its logical outcome as the pure subjectivism of reality and of truth in the moral order.

ST. VINCENT DE PAUL'S OPPOSITION TO JANSENISM

It is interesting to note that one of the most active opponents of Jansenism was a contemporary of Pascal, Vincent de Paul. St. Vincent was born at Pouy, Gascony, France, in 1580. He died at Paris in 1660, two years prior to the death of Pascal. While the life interests of the saint lay outside the study of philosophy, his knowledge of the science acquired by reason of his university career at Toulouse and at Rome enabled him to detect the essential errors of Jansenism. His adherence to the Church intensified his opposition to the sect within it which had attracted Pascal.

When the "Augustinus" of Bishop Jansen was published in 1640, Vincent de Paul left no doubt as to his opinions concerning Jansenism. He saw clearly the dangers involved in the heretical teachings of the Port-Royalists and thereby revealed an analytic mind superior to that of the brilliant but unstable Pascal. He directed his influence, which, by reason of the regard Anne of Austria entertained for him, had now become great, against the false philosophy of the Jansenists. Against their teachings he induced eighty-five bishops to write to Pope Innocent X. He likewise induced Anne of Austria to appeal to the Pope.

As a result of the activities of St. Vincent de Paul the errors resident in Jansenism were condemned in 1655. Though the saint's opposition to Jansenistic teachings gives evidence of his strong adherence to the Faith it likewise gives evidence of his ability to detect philosophical

error. St. Vincent had no leanings toward mysticism. His work for the poor kept him in touch with the practicalities of life. It is by reason of his ability to detect philosophical error that he merits consideration in any serious study of the progress of philosophic thought. St. Vincent saw that practical errors of action would result from philosophical theoretical errors. He resolved that the beacons to guide would be beacons of truth and not of error. It was with this in mind that he combated Jansenism so vigorously. It is the same attitude that is needed in this twentieth century and it is this need which explains the necessity of outlining in detail the progress of philosophy. We need to know and to know why we know so that we may be, as was St. Vincent, secure in Faith.

The work that St. Vincent de Paul did for the poor led other men of missionary zeal to associate themselves with him. The movement grew until in time there developed the Congregation of the Mission, the members of which are more commonly referred to as Vincentians. These zealous priests have not only continued the work of St. Vincent in the material and moral care of the poor but they have, in addition, carried down to our times his interest in the practical applications of philosophy. The interest which the Vincentians have always demonstrated in educating young men for the priesthood gives evidence of their adherence not only to the Faith but likewise to the philosophic interests of their guide and counsellor, St. Vincent de Paul.

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Benedict Spinoza

1632-1677

Ontologism and Occasionalism

We have defined Ontology as philosophy in its search for a primal cause. Ontologism is that form of philosophy which maintains that the very first act of our intelligence is a revelation to us of the First Cause or God. We have no knowledge till we have ideas. Ideas can not come to us from sensible reality. They are in our minds because the source of all ideas, God, is in our minds. The exaggerated dualism of mind and matter, stressed by Descartes, leads us back over the long road of the centuries to the philosophy of Plato, the pagan. Platonism will lead in this case to pantheism as it did in every other period in which we have traced its presence. The Pantheism of Spinoza, the Jew, is but the explicit expression of the thought implicitly resident in the philosophy of Descartes, the Catholic. This we shall see. For the present it will suffice to see the strongly pagan note sounded by the Ontologists.

This same note we detect in a form of thought closely allied to Ontologism and known as Occasionalism. According to the Occasionalist, God is not only the object of our thought but He is the absolute and only cause of any change we may apparently notice in the world of objective reality. Matter can not possibly act upon matter, neither can it act upon mind nor mind upon it. Water does not freeze *because* of decreased temperature, neither will burning substances *produce* heat. God is the cause and the only *cause* there could possibly be. Our senses deceive us when they would have us believe there *is* ice, heat or the color of the flame. God simply uses

matter as an opportunity or an "occasion" for causing to arise in our minds the idea which is itself God. This partly mystical, partly pantheistic, partly pure Platonic philosophy is Occasionalism. Ontologism and Occasionalism are in reality but two aspects of the one school of thought. Two outstanding representatives of this thought are Arnold Geulincx and Nicholas Malebranche.

Arnold Geulincx was born at Antwerp in 1625. Originally he was professor of philosophy at the Catholic University of Louvain. In his philosophical thought was the essential note of Protestantism. We see the logical development of the philosophy of the pious Catholic Descartes acting as a driving force upon another equally serious and equally pious man urging him into the errors of Calvinism. Geulincx joined the Calvinists and became in 1665 professor of philosophy at the Protestant University of Leyden. He died at Leyden in 1669.

Nicholas Malebranche was born in 1638 at Paris. He died in 1715. Throughout life Malebranche was a devoted and loyal priest of the Oratory of Jesus. In his philosophy he was a disciple of Descartes. He sought to reconcile the apparent contradictions in the exaggerated dualistic positions of mind and matter, as elaborated by his master, in the ontologistic position of which he was the foremost representative. In his thought as in that of Geulincx, there were the pagan evidences of idealism and of pantheism. The religious fervor and the faith of Malebranche held him throughout life in a half-way position between Geulincx and Spinoza. He is an unsatisfactory philosopher in that he never developed to their logical conclusions the essentials of his thought nor denied the basic invalidity of the position he assumed. Malebranche's conception of faith as a kind

of knowledge, in the Thomas of Aquin sense, served as a check upon the pantheistic aspect of his thought.

Both Geulincx and Malebranche believed that what an individual knew, he knew by reason of the presence of God in him. The activity of an individual in like manner is caused not by his consciousness but by the direct intervention of God who by command makes matter the occasion for the production of effects, of ideas, of knowledge in him. Therefore, man should retire into himself since it is both God who knows and God who does. Man by himself and of himself can know nothing and do nothing. Man is true to himself when he recognizes that it is of supreme importance to love God and to thank Him for His kindly provision by reason of which humanity can know Him and through Him, objective reality. In this thought there is the strong flavor of mysticism. In it, too, is the essence of the characteristically Protestant philosophy manifesting itself at times in a denial of free-will as in Puritanism or in the principles of predestination as found in Presbyterianism. The abandonment of Scholasticism rather than its application to the new conditions of the modern world is fundamentally responsible for the errors prevalent in the basic idealistic thought of which Ontologism and Occasionalism are but derivatives. The imaginary chasm which Descartes created between mind and matter led not only to these false systems of thought but to the completely pagan philosophy of Naturalism of which Spinoza was the leading spirit.

The Naturalism of Spinoza

Benedict Spinoza was born in Holland in 1632. He was the son of Jewish parents who had fled from Portugal to the Netherlands to escape religious persecution. He attended the Jewish Academy at Amsterdam but at the age of twenty-four his religious views brought him into so direct a conflict with the authorities of his faith that he was denied the right to participate in the services of the Synagogue. He was a man of extreme humility and definitely made a choice of poverty rather than of the comfortable circumstances which could have been his, at least later in life, if he had accepted a professorship which was offered him at the University of Heidelberg. Spinoza died in most humble circumstance in 1667. No matter what may be our opinion of the philosophy of Spinoza, we must acknowledge that he offers a positive denial to those who, in the unfortunate racial and religious animosities which characterize present day civilization, think of the individual Jew as motivated in all his actions by but one thought, that of the accumulation of worldly wealth.

Spinoza's philosophical system of thought is that of Naturalism. He arrived at his conclusions after the manner in part of Descartes. He had a natively strong interest in mathematics. To think of Spinoza, however, as a mathematician interested in philosophy is to lose the meaning of the spirit that animated him in his search for truth. He was interested in philosophy as a means of better living. He subscribed to that portion of the belief of those old Greeks, Protagoras and Socrates, which

emphasized the practical bearing of philosophy upon life. We can grasp the zeal of Spinoza if we think of him as a cultured, religious, high-spirited but excessively meek and humble Jew, persecuted not only by the Christians but by his own people as well, shunned by all except a few personal friends, as a leper might be shunned, who seeks consolation in philosophy. The ethical import of philosophy is of greatest consequence to the Jewish thinker of Amsterdam.

What is the ethical import? What does life mean? Why is there so much strife, bitterness, unrest in the world? Is there any knowledge which man might gain which would assure him a more spiritual, a more moral mode of living? All of these questions Spinoza asked. More fundamentally he inquired: Is there a God? What is His nature? Is personal immortality a reality? Or is man harassing himself by thought of a future which is not to be? These questions Spinoza would have answered not as a test of the validity of human reason, not because of a native interest in speculative thought, but as a means of arriving at that which he considered to be the most important reality of existence: the art of living correctly.

Spinoza was attracted to Descartes by reason of the latter's mathematical approach to philosophy and definitely made of the Cartesian definition of substance a point of departure for answer to his fundamental inquiry—"Is there a God?" Descartes had defined substance as that which requires as a condition of existence nothing beyond itself. Spinoza maintained that there was but one such reality and that reality was all inclusive. Everything that is, thought as well as extension,

is divine, because everything that is, is God. God is all matter. God is all humanity. God is all will. God is all law. There are no changes in the world. Everything that has ever happened, has taken place in accordance with law since it necessarily has taken place in God. We as individuals are eternal in the sense that we shall always be in God but we are not immortal, if by immortality is meant the existence of a spiritual substance apart and distinct from the spiritual substance of God.

What we may then ask is the relationship between the basic philosophy of Spinoza and those practical questions he raised as an expression of the life of man. It is possible to discover in the serious and lofty thought of the intensely religious Jew a note of mystic fervor. He would negative all the material gains of life to be at peace with God. It is possible to discover in his philosophy the pantheism that we have noted in all followers of Cartesianism. In Spinoza's thought, however, there is more than pantheism. Not only is God in all things, He is all things. The universe is but a living union of a collective being and from the nature of this collective being, who is God, there is derived all the law which governs the operation of all that is. Everything is God. God is all inclusive. We are God. Beyond us, as individuals, there is no God.

The path that Spinoza travelled led through pantheism to atheism. Our appreciation of his earnestness and of his honesty of purpose must not blind us to the essential error resident in his philosophy. The same pagan atheism was however implicit in Malebranche. Spinoza, moreover, but gave expression to what was logically present from the beginning in the philosophy of Descartes. It was Descartes in his rejection of the

moderate realism of Scholasticism who prepared the way for the reinstitution of pagan thought in modern dress. It is difficult, though, to let the case rest with a vote of censure directed against Descartes. He was oppressed by much of the futile reasoning of Scholasticism in the days when to many, even in Catholic ranks, it represented a grievous waste of time and energy. To Malebranche, Spinoza was but a "miserable atheist," but all the atheism of Spinoza was after all but the avowal of the spirit of atheism resident in Malebranche's own work and in the work of Descartes and all his other followers. The same spirit is manifest in the many forms of pagan thought evident in this twentieth century. These, too, we can account for in the main by presenting for consideration as contributing causes both the decadence of Scholasticism and the dualism of Descartes.

ANTAGONISMS OF CARTESIANISM

René Descartes in his emphasis upon the mutually exclusive dualism of mind and matter laid the foundation for two opposite currents of thought. Followers of Descartes in their effort to arrive at the harmony of unity tried to form a bridge across the chasm the master had instituted. In this effort they were driven either toward the oneness of Idealism or the oneness of Monism. All is spiritual or all is material; either concept, man was asked to accept. We have viewed the essential Platonic Idealism resident in Jansenism, Ontologism and Occasionalism. We have seen this same Platonic Idealism proceed through a pantheistic road to the complete natur-

alism of Spinoza. The incomplete positivistic tendency of current English and American thought is as equally and as clearly traceable to Descartes as is the also incomplete Idealism that characterizes much religious belief in the modern world. The Cartesian dualism of mind and matter, soul and body, is at its roots Platonic and from Platonism, Idealism and Materialism can be logically deduced. Whether a Cartesian is a Materialist or an Idealist depends upon his individual peculiarities and the racial tendencies which animate him. No other explanation seems adequate to an understanding of how a Locke and a Leibniz could be both hatched from the egg of Cartesianism. Hatched they were, however, and we can explain the contradiction as due to the fact that in one flowed the strong current of what is erroneously called "English common sense" and in the other the scientific stream of the modern world and in an especial manner of modern Germany.

JOHN LOCKE

The father of modern empirical psychology, John Locke, was born in 1632 at Wrington, near Bristol, England. During the days of his student life at Oxford, which he entered in 1652, Locke became intensely interested in Cartesian thought. Decartes appealed to him as a protester against Scholasticism which was still, in its narrowest form, the dominant philosophy in Locke's time at Oxford. The influence of the dualistic thought of Descartes remained with Locke throughout life though

he came to regard himself, as others likewise did, to be the antithesis of all that René Descartes represented.

As a matter of fact Locke's philosophy can be best understood if we regard it as a superficial attempt to mark the limits of philosophical inquiry. Locke's chief interest was in psychology and education. The aim he established was threefold. It included:

First, an effort to discover how the mind of man acquires ideas;

Second, an effort to demostrate how man could be assured of the certainity of his ideas;

Third, an effort to outline in exact degree what the human mind can accomplish and what it can not accomplish.

His philosophy is a resultant of his attack upon the problem of how the minds of men act in the process of learning. From this study came much of value to the science of psychology though in the main it was a repetition of the thought both Aristotle and Saint Thomas had previously advanced. Modern science with its revelation of the functionings of the human nervous system permitted the development of empirical psychology. Locke by his emphasis upon the activity of the senses gave impetus to its development and so he is properly regarded as the father of modern psychological thought. The basic contention of Locke was that nothing could be in the intellect which was not first in the senses. This was but a reiteration of Thomistic doctrine if we add as Leibniz did—"except the intellect itself."

Locke, however, was not thoroughgoing in his philosophy. Since to him the mind was but an empty tablet upon which experience, or the contact of our senses with

material objects, wrote a record, the only record the mind could have would be a record of particular things. Not only are there no innate ideas but there are no general ideas except as we, by reason of our language abilities, devise words to sum up the results of our contacts with objective reality. This thought, the student will recognize, as a repetition of the nominalism of Roscelin and his disciples. Locke, in the field of philosophy, is a nominalist. Particular material objects constitute reality. He is a realist in the modern sense of materialism. He is a non-realist in the Platonic sense of Idealism. Though Locke does not deny the power of intellect to reason and so arrive at true judgments concerning material existences, it is only of material matters that certainty can be predicated. Of spiritual affairs the pinnacle of thought must necessarily be agnostic. I can say at best concerning the nature of God and my own soul that "I do not know." Philosophy, in other words, must remain positivistic.

From the thought of Locke came not only the positivistic tendency in all modern English philosophy; but to it also as a source of inspiration, if not of thought, can be traced the pragmatic note in modern speculation. Against this charge it may be urged that Locke protested the validity of social sanction. In so doing, however, he led directly to the revolt against religious authority as represented by the deists or freethinkers of his own later life and of more than fifty years after his death which occurred in 1704. The conservatism of English thought held in check the germ of radicalism inherent in Locke's thought and insisted upon the practical group sanction explicit in the thought of that other English nominalist, Thomas Hobbes.

England prides herself upon her ability somehow or other "to muddle through." In philosophy she has always "muddled through." If to be practical means not to think clearly, then English philosophy is a practical philosophy. In her positivism she has never followed the arguments proposed by speculative inquiries to their logical conclusions. Her philosophers seem always to be satisfied, by their refusal to take metaphysical journeys, to state a problem rather than to solve it. Time will reveal the truth and in the meantime England will "muddle through." This is not good philosophy and it does not seem to be good common sense.

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born at Leipsig. His life was all that Spinoza's was not. He was wealthy and associated constantly with men of scholarly interests, of position and of power. During the major part of his life, that is from 1676 till 1716, in which year he died, he lived at Hanover as court councillor. Leibniz, in common with other great Cartesians, possessed outstanding ability in the field of mathematics. It is to him that we owe differential calculus. In the field of science he was likewise eminent.

From these considerations we might expect to find in him a counterpart of Locke. In reality he, in his philosophical study, is antithetical to Locke; Leibniz leaned toward Idealism as strongly as Locke favored Materialism. The English philosopher insisted that nothing was

in the intellect except that which was first in the senses. The German with all his knowledge of the scientific progress of his age refused to believe that everything was matter. He added to Locke's thought the notion that the intellect itself was a psychical entity which could not be neglected.

As Locke attempted to bridge the imaginary dualistic chasm of Descartes by reducing the idea of general notion to a mere sound of the voice, so Leibniz would bridge the chasm by a system of parallelism. To Leibniz all reality is the reality of ideas. The constituency or fundamental principle of everything from the smallest particle of dust to man, is its soul. There is nothing without soul. What we grasp of material objects which affect our senses are their souls. The soul of every object, even of an object of inorganic creation, is a likeness of the Arch-Monad or God. God is the only uncreated monad. Everything else has been created by Him. In the process of creation God endowed human beings with consciousness by reason of which we can come to a knowledge of ourselves which in the last analysis is a knowledge of our innate ideas. These same ideas were injected into matter at the time of creation by God. Each division of matter received the idea appropriate to it. From matter we apparently derive through our senses notions of mass extension. Such notions are but sense illusions. Everything is idea.

From matter we receive ideas because the worlds of spirituality, subjective and objective, have been so harmonized by the Arch-Monad that they keep ever in the same relationship. The innate ideas of my mind and the innate ideas in all that is "not me" were set in motion at the time of creation so that throughout eternity they will always be identical. They are like two faces upon a

clock, always showing the same time. They are like two musical instruments tuned by the Creator so that they will always be in harmony.

The philosophy of Leibniz is called the doctrine of pre-established harmony. It annihilates matter and reduces everything to the purity of ideas. Leibniz was a serious student of the philosophic thought both of pagan and Christian times. He struggled to unify Plato, Aristotle, Scholasticism and modern philosophical tendencies. By so doing he hoped to break down the barriers between religions and so promote the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God. He was deeply religious and in this respect reminds us strongly of Spinoza. In all things else, however, Leibniz is the representative of tendencies opposite to those favored by the Jew of Amsterdam.

To Leibniz the world is the best possible of worlds. Man should rejoice in it. Man should love his fellow man and have faith in God. That God exists is proved by Leibniz, in keeping with his theory of an Idealistic pre-established harmony, by the fact that an idea of God arises in our minds. We see here the influence which Descartes had exerted upon him. Since God exists and is necessary to our existence we shall not perish. Not only man but everything that is, will live eternally; but man, by apperception or consciousness, will know that he possesses eternal life. Immortality is the gift of God to man.

There is a highly moral tone to the philosophy of Leibniz. We recognize in it the thoughts of Plato and Plotinus. We delight in its poetic fancy and rejoice in its high idealism as contrasted with the agnostic materialism of Locke. Yet we feel that it is poetry and not philos-

ophy. We feel it is the cry of the spirit of a rational creature against the sordid materialism which was coming into existence as a result of too much reliance upon positivism. We realize though that in its reaction against experience the philosophy of Leibniz was sounding a false note. Its weakness lies in its unreality. The rationalistic Leibniz could, without much difficulty it would seem, have become either a pantheist or a mystic.

GEORGE BERKELEY

George Berkeley was born of English parents, at Dysert Castle, Kilkenny County, Ireland in 1685. He studied at Trinity College, Dublin, not only the philosophy of Locke but also that of Descartes and Malebranche. Later in life, in 1743, he was made a bishop of the Episcopal Church at Cork. He died at Oxford, to which university he had been called as professor of philosophy, in 1753.

Berkeley sympathized with the teachings of Locke but felt that the English philosopher had not carried his thought to its logical conclusion. Locke, it will be remembered, had held that our knowledge of reality extends only to ideas. If the only knowledge we have, contended Berkeley, consists of ideas why stop mid-way. Why is it not logical to assume that reality consists in the functioning of the human mind? According to Berkeley, everything that is, is but idea and depends for its existence upon man.

In his idealism, Berkeley, in so far as language at first glance explains it, merely restates the position assumed by Leibniz. It is true he has much in common with the German philosopher. Berkeley's thought however extends further than did the thought of Leibniz. The philosopher of Leipzig never entirely negatived the dualism voiced by Descartes in so far as a complete denial of the appeal made to our senses by matter is concerned. In his thought of pre-established harmony, Leibniz made mind and matter run at even pace in parallel courses. This thought while it made a strong appeal to Berkeley, did not completely satisfy him in bridging the Cartesian gulf between mind and matter since it held, as Berkeley conceived it, more or less inconsistently and illogically to the actual existence of material forces, (the forces in which the monads had their residences), if not to genuine material substances. Such thought, to Berkeley, was but the fog of unreality created by language. He recommended that the Gordian knot be cut. Cut it he did by his thought that all that is, is but idea. The material world does not exist. The picture on the wall of the room in which I sit exists as an object just as long as I perceive it. If I leave the room or fall asleep it ceases to exist. Its existence depends upon its perception. When it is not perceived it does not exist. This is idealism in most extravagant form.

The philosophy of Berkeley is the philosophy of immaterialism. Mind alone exists. That to which I give the name substance or matter is but a phenomenon created by mind. To exist is to be perceived. If I am perceived by human mind, I exist. In perception we have proof of God's existence. The common sense of idealism is far stronger than the common sense of materi-

alism. To be an atheist is not to be human, since we "see" God as truly as we see our friends. We perceive Him as we perceive them. He has existence where existence is only to be had—in our minds.

DAVID HUME

David Hume was born in the city of Edinburgh, Scotland, in 1711. He spent considerable part of his life in close connection with the activities of the ambassadorial and court life of England. Though much of his time was given to the problems of embassies at the courts of Vienna, Turin and Versailles he continued a constant interest in history and philosophical study. In 1769 after having occupied the office of under-secretary of state in the Foreign office he returned to Edinburgh. He died there in 1776. Hume was the author of many books on historical, religious and philosophical subjects.

The philosophy of David Hume is a logical derivative of the speculative thought of the Anglican bishop, George Berkeley. The latter in his contention that the evidences of material objects are but phenomena of mind and depend for their existences upon perception left the door open for the complete phenomenalism of Hume.

According to Hume the mind is whatever it perceives. Berkeley had said that *to be* is to be perceived. Perception, therefore, is equivalent to consciousness. I can not properly maintain, however, that I perceive. Perception *is* the Ego. The mind consists of its perceptions which constitute its consciousness. There is in me nothing sub-

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Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

1646-1716

stantial which I can call mind. There is in me no abiding personality. I am my ideas. Ideas and I are one. Both are phenomena. This exceedingly strange philosophy is known as Pan-phenomenalism.

An intregal part of Hume's philosophy is his denial of the relationship between cause and effect. Events do not occur, claims Hume, by reason of necessary relationships. We have been accustomed to see things happen so many times in one way that we emphasize the order of events and neglect the times in which there have been deviations. Habit has established itself and to what is but the phenomena of habit we have applied the thought of causality. There is but a series of "nows" and "thens", but no governing principle which makes the "now" produce the "then." There may also, however, be a series of "heres" and "theres," of likenesses and differences, of apparent causes and effects. Actually the only causality, however, is a relationship of some nature between ideas. All is but phenomenon. There is much of contradiction in the complete subjectivism of Hume. Common sense, which is still a strong factor in philosophy, rebels against it. So far as the past is concerned we may think of causality as the mere associations of sensible impressions. When however Hume asserts that there is within us no abiding personality by reason of which we can abstract a necessary principle of causation from the data the senses present to us, the human mind, voicing itself as a separate entity, rebels.

It is this rebellion against the Pan-phenomenalism or the Scepticism of Hume, as he himself preferred to call it, that will largely occupy our thought in the study of later philosophical systems. In Hume, Cartesianism reached its lowest point. The exaggerated dualism of René Des-

cartes produced many queer philosophies but the queerest of all, it seems to me, is the Pan-phenomenalism of David Hume. It is idealism running riot. Essentially, it reduces everything to nothingness as completely as the pagan, Georgias, had done.

THIRD DIVISION OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

In this period we shall devote our attention almost wholly to the influence exerted upon modern philosophical thought, directly or indirectly, by Immanuel Kant. Kant regarded himself as the Copernicus of the field of thought relationships. Though we refuse absolutely to assent to the conclusions at which he arrived, we can not deny that he introduced a thoroughly new point of view in the study of philosophy. This point of view, however, was a manifestation of the continued and still more fundamental influence of the errors initiated by René Descartes. It is to Kant, though, that the modern world traces, as to the immediate source, its widely divergent views as expressed practically by its idealism, scepticism, positivism, agnosticism, materialism and even its atheism.

It was against the tendencies of the age that Pope Leo XIII in 1879 issued his famous Encyclical "Æterni Patris", calling for a thorough study of Scholasticism in the purity of its form as expressed by Saint Thomas of Aquin. The importance of the impetus given to Neo-Scholasticism has not always, it seems to me, been appreciated in so far as it represents a vigorous protest against the all prevalent Kantian thought of the nineteenth century. While Kant's own efforts were related to the eighteenth century his influence was dominant throughout the nineteenth. The period we are about to consider might appropriately be called the Age of Kant. The speculative and practical tendencies of the period are found resident in his energetic and profound thought.

IMMANUEL KANT

Immanuel Kant was born at Königsberg, Prussia, in 1724. It is extremely interesting to note that his grandparents had emigrated to Germany from Scotland, the fatherland of David Hume, from whose philosophical inquiries Kant's thought took its beginnings. He studied at the University of Königsberg and later taught there in all positions from that of tutor to professor, to which post he was appointed in 1770. He lectured at the university until 1797. In 1804 he died.

The life of Immanuel Kant was devoted to philosophical study. By reason of the simplicity of his life and his interest in intellectual pleasures, he has often been compared with the Athenian sages of pagan times. He was a man of robust health and of exceedingly cheerful temperament. Though German philosophy derived from him a dour note, there was nothing of cynicism or scepticism in the man himself. He loved companionships and rejoiced in life particularly in the opportunities it afforded him to establish contacts with the beauties of nature. It is helpful to our understanding of his thought to obtain this personal touch with the man. The note of contradiction and harshness in his thought is a product not of emotional instability but of reason. The point I wish to make is that whatever of severity seems to remain with us after a close study of Kant's thought is a product of philosophical reasoning and not of the temperament of the philosopher.

Kant himself explains his interest in philosophy as a result of his dissatisfaction with the thought of Hume.

He rebelled against the Pan-phenomenalism of the Scottish thinker and endeavored to put speculative thought upon a rational basis. He rebelled, too, against the intuitive knowledge basis of the Cartesian system and considers the postulate of Descartes, "I think, therefore I am" as a most illogical and false assumption of knowledge.

If philosophy is to justify itself as knowledge, claims Kant, it must justify itself by an analysis of the functioning of the human mind. It must become critical. It must ask and answer the fundamental questions, "How do we learn?" "How do we arrive at a point where we can say that we know what we claim to know?" Before we outline a system of speculative thought our reasons must demand consideration of the material out of which we have constructed the system. It is by reason of this emphasis that Kant has been likened to Socrates and it is by reason of it, too, that he was fond of comparing himself with Copernicus. Kant's philosophy is that of Criticism. It discriminates between the sensationalism of Locke and the intellectualism of Leibniz. It not only goes beyond both but it also makes the effort to reach a point whereby the extremes of intellectualism and sensationalism will be unified in a superior view granted by the superior height to which superior reason has enabled us to ascend. That is what Kant calls Transcendentalism. Before we can transcend we must inquire both as to what we know and how we know it. What constitutes knowledge? is the basic question from which Kant's philosophy takes its rise.

The symbol of knowledge is an idea. It is not, however, knowledge. The idea "man" according to Kant

is not knowledge. We have no knowledge until we have formulated a proposition. All knowledge is judgment but some judgments do not supply us with knowledge. They simply give expression to what is connoted by the idea. If I say that a material object has length, breadth and thickness I have simply given expression to what was originally resident in the idea "material object." I have added no knowledge. If, however, I say that the earth is round I have added knowledge. Rotundity is not necessarily connected with the idea "earth." It took long years of study and exploration to enable us to make the judgment that the earth is round. More recent discoveries force us to substitute for *round* the thought expressed by *"not exactly round."* In other words knowledge comes to us in the form of judgments.

Judgments, however, add knowledge only when they are synthetic, that is, when they enrich and extend knowledge. Moreover, if a synthetic judgment is made solely as the result of experience, we can have no guarantee of its validity. In this contention Kant agreed with Hume that no matter how many individual cases of apparent cause and effect we offer we do not establish any more than a "now" and a "then." The validity of a judgment is attested by the fact that it rests on a rational basis. The fact that it is *a priori* and not simply *a posteriori* is what makes a judgment necessary or scientific. Only scientific synthetic judgments constitute knowledge. Knowledge in other words, consists of *a priori synthetic judgments.* Such judgments are made possible by the functioning of the senses, the sensationalism of Locke; and the functioning of the intellect, the intellectualism of Leibniz. In these basic assumptions Kant but restates the thought of Scholasticism.

All of Kant's philosophical thought emanates from his fundamental attitude toward the constituency of knowledge. His method is logical throughout though his conclusions are not sound. He divides the whole field of inquiry concerning the validity of knowledge into three parts. These are:

1. The Critique of Pure Reason;
2. The Critique of Practical Reason;
3. The Critique of Judgment.

Critique of Pure Reason

In his method of approach to the solution of the problem of knowledge and its development he starts with the transcendental criticism of pure reason. In his Critique of Pure Reason he thinks of reason as made up of what he calls the transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental logic. Transcendental logic he subdivides into what he nominates the transcendental analytic and the transcendental dialectic.

Transcendental aesthetic reason includes in Kant's philosophy those forms of intuitive knowledge by reason of which the individual is able to interpret the material presented to the mind by the senses. They are the *a priori* conditions of mind by reason of which it knows objective reality. There are two such forms—space and time. These two, according to Kant, do not become the property of mind by reason of its contact with reality. They are native endowments of mind. From experience we derive the materials of knowledge but from the origi-

nal intuitions of reason, space and time, we derive knowledge itself. Experiences give us individual cases but truth is absolute and independent of separate instances. The necessity of the *a priori* element in knowledge as distinct from experience is shown in mathematics. The truths of number in arithmetic and of space in geometry are necessary, self-evident truths. They are axiomatic because they are derived not from experience but from pure reason. They are *a priori* intuitions.

In the division of pure reason which he styles transcendental logic Kant considers both those intuitional forms by means of which we judge and the arrangement of judgments under a series of general concepts or as he expresses it, in Platonic language, Ideas. The first he calls the transcendental analytic. To the second form he applies the name transcendental dialectic.

Transcendental analysis consists in outlining those innate intuitions in accordance with which we judge. To Hume cause and effect were related in our minds simply by reason of the number of times facts and events have been associated. By reason of experience a habit of thinking has been established. This habit of thinking in Hume's thought should receive no approval from philosophy. To Kant causal relationships are not the outgrowth of experience. They are means by which the mind is natively equipped to know. They are *a priori* intuitions by means of which we arrive at knowledge through interpretations of experience. They are not the results of experience. To these forms of mind by reason of which we make judgments, Kant applied the name categories.

In his analysis of the functionings of mind Kant recognized twelve categories or forms of mind according

to which we judge. These are:

1. Universal judgments—All men will die;
2. Particular judgments—Some men are tall;
3. Singular judgments—John is tall;
4. Affirmative judgments—Man is mortal;
5. Negative judgments—Animals are not rational;
6. Limiting judgments—Souls of men are immortal;
7. Categorical judgments—God is merciful;
8. Hypothetical judgments—If God be merciful, he desires not the death of the sinner;
9. Disjunctive judgments—Either the North or the South won the Civil War;
10. Problematical judgments—Mars is, perhaps, the home of a race of people;
11. Assertory judgments—The earth is a planet;
12. Apodictic judgments—God must be omnipotent.

Every one of these forms of judgment expresses a relationship. These relationships are innate in the human mind. They are the means by which we extend, enlarge and enrich our present store of knowledge. They represent fundamentally our cognitive power. It is power resident natively within us, however, and not an acquisition from without. The phenomenon is made by the mind. It is not a product of contact with experience.

Kant, in his interpretation of space and time as intuitive forms of reason, necessarily contended that objective reality in itself, apart from the mind which gave it space

and time relationships, had no existence. Though we see material things, as we do, we never view them as they are. We are always adding to what Kant called the thing-in-itself a space or time relationship derived from the mind. Therefore we can never know objective reality. The phenomenon is made not by material objects but by thinking subjects. In other words I can never know the material world. It will always elude me. Beyond the limits of intuitive reason the material world has no existence.

In his analysis of the transcendental logical relationships of mind Kant leans even more completely toward subjective idealism. As space and time are but forms through which we interpret material presented to our senses; as the categories of mind are pure intuitive forms by means of which we judge; so, in like manner, God and our own souls, are but forms by which we regulate conflicting points of view. So far as pure reason is concerned it is impossible to prove the existence of either, apart from our own consciousness. In this division of his philosophy Kant reaches the unsatisfactory conclusion of agnosticism. His thought, however, did not end here. It is in his later work that he regards himself more definitely as the Copernicus of mental science. His Critique of Practical Reason supplies philosophy with the thought of moral consciousness as a compelling force of ethical conduct and with the unitary concept of mind by reason of which he who proved himself a sceptic by the use of pure reason, proves himself, in contradictory fashion, a believer by practical reason.

Critque of Practical Reason

As a result of his analysis of the functioning of mind, after the manner of what he calls pure reason, the Sage of Königsberg arrives at agnosticism. From his intellect man can not know objective reality, his own soul, nor God. Through his will, however, man is able to recognize the truth of his beliefs. In the philosophy of Kant practical reason occupies the dominant position. By practical reason he means the supremacy of the moral law. Through the force of the moral law man secures a metaphysical capacity which he can never approximate through pure reason nor the manifestations of intellectual ability. The intellect supplies us with forms but these forms can not advance us in knowledge beyond subjective idealism. The will, however, is free and not bound by the limitations which act as compelling forces upon the intellect in its efforts to establish relationships.

The fact that the will is free is forced upon us by our moral consciousness. Moral consciousness is self-evident. It is not based upon what we as individuals secure from obedience to it either in the form of happiness, or pleasure, or self-approbation or even self-perfection. It is compelling in its own right. To its compelling aspect Kant applies the term *categorical imperative.* We know without instruction what we ought to do. The "oughtness" of the thought compels recognition of its possibility. That which I recognize as something I *ought* to do, I also recognize as something I *can do.* The doctrine of the freedom of will is a fundamental postulate of Kant's Critique of Practical Reason.

Moral consciousness forces belief in God. The imperative nature of moral law, so evident to me, makes impossible a denial of the existence of God. The moral law within me showing me what I *ought* to do and compelling me to recognize what I *can* do, constrains me to believe in a God who is the summation of all the worthiness toward which my moral consciousness beckons me.

In like manner the immortality of soul which was impossible of proof from the standpoint of pure reason becomes crystal clear to Kant through practical reason. The moral laws tells me clearly what I ought to do. My will rebels. Life is a constant struggle toward perfection. We are always in pursuit of holiness. We never can hope to attain satisfactory relationship between our will to transgress and the order of the moral law to obey except in eternity. I have, therefore, forced upon my consciousness through practical reason the realization of the immortality of my soul.

The practical reason of Kant offers a denial to the results attained by pure reason. His effort in his analysis of intellectual activity was to show that philosophy throughout the ages had followed the wrong path. Truth was not to be revealed through the intellect but rather through the will or moral consciousness. As the Copernican theory revolutionized science, so likewise, Kant believed the moral law and not reason was the point of departure from which to approach the solution of philosophical problems.

Critique of Judgment

Pure reason seeks the truth. Absolute truth it can not find. Practical reason seeks the good. While it can

not attain perfect goodness it has made manifest to it, as the worth of goodness, essential truth as an embodiment of the realization of three perfections. These are:

1. Freedom of the will,
2. Immortality of soul,
3. Existence of God.

Between truth and goodness, intellect and will, Kant interposes what he calls the aesthetical and teleological sense of judgment. He calls it judgment because it establishes a relationship between two things, truth and goodness, which in and of themselves have nothing in common. Judgment in the Kantian sense means the beautiful and purposive. By reason of his nature man appreciates in the thunder storm, in the starry heavens of which Kant himself was so fond, the element of sublimity which the brute misses entirely. This element of beauty and of purpose forces him to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable. He sees the beauty by reason of his mind, and in seeing the beauty and sublimity of design, he sees his mind.

The three critiques all tend to one reality. The reality is mind. It is the mind which gives meaning to reality; it is the mind which reveals the moral law; it is the mind which unites truth and goodness in the beauty of the sublime pattern of freedom in the service of the Ideal or God. The mind is placed by Kant in the center of all reality and all reality rotates around it. This unitary concept of mind seemed to Kant his greatest contribution to philosophy and it is for this reason he rejoiced in the thought that posterity would regard him as the Copernicus of philosophy.

There is no question of the remarkable influence which Kant has exercised on philosophical thought. His influence was dominant throughout the nineteenth century. From his philosophy Fichte, Schelling and Hegel derived the critical thoughts and tendencies by which they influenced their own age and succeeding periods. It is not only philosophy which felt the effect of the serious thought of Immanuel Kant. The sage of Königsberg, though he never travelled beyond his native province, exerted an influence upon religious and literary thought that has been felt from his day to this. That his influence is waning there is little doubt. The twentieth century, slowly recovering from the effects of a World War which drove civilization for a time into the depths of hate and despair, shows evident signs of dissatisfaction with a philosophy which would rationalize Christianity upon the basis of eternal morality among mankind. It cries for a more objective God than Kant offers and a proof of individual immortality devoid of the inconsistency of a philosophy which speaks of the perpetuity of an ego which could, according to the same philosophy, have never existed in time and for which, in consequence, a a predication of before or after is impossible. The twentieth century is groping its way toward a philosophy which will show the logical continuity of mind and matter, reason and faith, reinstate the common sense of Aristotle and Thomas of Aquin and eradicate from man's mind the imaginary and exaggerated dualism which has reflected itself in all philosophical inquiry since the time of Descartes. Throughout the nineteenth century Kant's influence was paramount and we shall now turn to a consideration of a few philosophers

who derived their inspiration and the current of their thought from him.

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE

In 1762 Johann Gottlieb Fichte was born at Rammeneau in Upper Lusatia. In 1794 he received appointment as professor of philosophy at Jena. He remained here until 1799 when he was accused of atheism and as a result of the charges was forced to resign. When the University of Berlin was founded in 1809 he was appointed to a professorship. He continued in this position until 1814, in which year he died.

Kant in his philosophy established three entities: the idea, the thing-in-itself and the thinker. Fichte's purposive effort was to reduce this trinity to a single formula of understanding. This he accomplished in the speculative thought of the earlier years of his life by his notion of self-activity or the universal Ego. By self-activity Fichte meant that identification which the Ego establishes with an object or an idea by reason of which the object or idea not only limits the Ego, but arouses in it the sense of duty as the object or idea is made thereby necessary to the self-expression of the Ego. The principle of self-activity or the Ego universally present in man posits the non-Ego or the object or idea with which it identifies itself by reason of duty. Duty is as much a component part of it as is the urge for self-expression. In fact, the urge for self-expression is, properly understood and adequately restrained, identical with duty. The Ego posits the non-Ego in order that the theoretical

may become the practical, in order that the Ego may impose limitations upon itself. These limitations enable the Ego to set before itself a problem which it must necessarily exert itself to solve and by the struggles attendant upon solution afford itself opportunity to develop.

In this monistic thought of Fichte we have the essence of his theoretical and practical philosophy. It is essentially a thorough-going system of subjective idealism. In theory it is Pan-egoism and so is suggestive of the unitary concept of mind as developed by Kant. In practice, in its concept of duty by reason of which the Ego must posit itself as non-Ego, it is likewise strongly reminiscent of Kant's categorical imperative.

Fichte gave to Kantian philosophy a systematism that it had not received from its founder. He also in his emphasis upon the parts both Church and State should play in giving individuals opportunity to develop, helped the progress of national reconstruction in Germany. According to Fichte's thought the State should safeguard rights of individuals by enforcing compliance of all citizens with duties. The Church too should make men realize their obligations in the moral order. In this manner ethical convictions will be strengthened among men and development will ensue in the inner spiritual life of the individual through his recognition of the principle that what he *ought* to do he *can* do. It is not necessary to point out the application which Fichte here makes of Kantian principles.

While still a very young man, Fichte developed a strong interest in the philosophy of Spinoza and in the Platonic concepts of the early Christian period. Uniting

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Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling

1775-1854

this interest with his earlier concept of the Ego as universal self-activity he derives a form of pantheism closely allied to, if not identical with, atheism. In this later philosophy he recognized the Ego, universal self-activity, activity common to all mankind, as an image of Absolute Activity or God. It was the development of this form of Neo-Platonism which brought upon him the troubles he encountered at Jena and clouded his life and the lives of those dependent upon him. By reason of the difficulties experienced between 1799 and 1809, Fichte died at the comparatively early age of fifty-two.

FRIEDRICH SCHELLING

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling was born in 1775 at Leonberg in Würtemberg. He received his master's degree from the University of Tübingen when he was but seventeen years of age. Throughout 1796 and 1797 he studied mathematics and the natural sciences at Leipsig. The strong interest in philosophy which he had manifested at Tübingen remained with him and in 1798 he was appointed professor of philosophy at Jena. It was here he met Fichte and it was here, too, that his friendship with Hegel developed. Later he taught at Würtzberg. From 1806 till 1820 he was Secretary of the Munich Academy of Plastic Arts. Between 1820 and 1854, in which year he died, Schelling served as professor of philosophy in the Universities of Erlangen, Munich, and Berlin.

Friedrich Schelling may be said to have advanced at least four different philosophical systems of thought. In only one of these systems, that of Transcendental

Idealism, does he appear consistent. The influence of Kant was basic to his thought but he illustrates by his writing four distinct varieties of speculation. These are:

1. The subjective idealism of Fichte,
2. The pantheism of Spinoza,
3. The absolutism of Plotinus,
4. The mysticism of Böhm.

These four philosophies represent four periods in Schelling's life. They portray, however, not the effort of a strong mind to arrive at truth but rather the feebleness of a brilliant individual in resisting the influences which bore down upon him. Schelling's philosophies, therefore, while deserving of serious study by reason of the many adherents they secured and the effects they produced, are unsatisfactory by reason of the temperamental brilliancy of the man they reveal.

In what we might call his first period, Schelling adheres to the principles of Fichte. Between 1797 and 1800 he revealed a deviation from Fichte in his contention that the Ego did not actually produce the non-Ego. The objective reality in a sense was the creator of the Ego since it was impossible for the Ego to exist without it. Fichte had held that the objective world was produced by the Ego. He, therefore, in his philosophy was a subjective idealist. It was to the contradictions within subjective idealism that Schelling objected. He offered an emendation to Fichte's philosophy by means of which he advanced the theory that both the Ego and the non-Ego, or nature, were to be thought of as derived from a higher principle which is neither Ego nor nature but which is productive of both. This principle is called the Absolute.

Schelling's theory of the Absolute is identical with Spinozistic thought. While Schelling does not use the terms of Spinoza, his philosophy is not to be distinguished from that of the Jew of Amsterdam. In Schelling's philosophy we have the expression of the Absolute or God as thought, the Ego; and extension, the non-Ego. This phase of the German philosopher's thought may be called his second period.

From this Spinozistic period, the transition to the thought of Neo-Platonism was direct. Under the influence of the thought of Spinoza, Schelling identified the world of objective reality with the Absolute. Now as a change he simply separates the two, makes the Absolute independent of the world and so accounts satisfactorily, to himself, for the existence of evil. Evil, however, is not to be considered as an emanation from God. It is rather a production of the same force which produced God Himself. It is *primitive will,* as Schelling termed it, striving for individual and personal existence. The "will to be" precedes and supersedes all intelligence and conscious effort. It is the life force which produces evil exactly as it produces God. The voluntarism of Schelling's third period explains the mysticism of his fourth.

The influence of Jakob Böhm upon Schelling is clearly traceable. It began about 1809 and characterized all the later thought of the unstable German thinker. In it we find, it seems, the real Schelling. Essentially he was not a philosopher if we consider philosophy related to profound thought. He was a highly imaginative person and brought his imagination to bear upon the most difficult philosophical problems. There is no doubt of his ability and of his influence; but his influence

throughout life, if we can detect one common element in his many shiftings of position, consists in its mystical interpretation of reality. Even in his earlier years we can not help but recognize the avidity with which he seized upon the Kantian notion of the beautiful. In art Schelling felt that the antithesis between the real and the ideal disappeared. The beautiful serves to unite and explain both subjective idealism and the objective world. The mystical doctrines of his later years have much in common with the aesthetic philosophy of his early life. Schelling was by nature a romantic spirit and there is much of romance in his philosophy. The development of the spirit of nationality throughout Germany during the period of Schelling's life did much to influence his thought; and his thought, as well as that of his contemporaries, did much, too, to fashion the period.

GEORG HEGEL

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born at Stuttgart in 1770. At the theological seminary at Tübingen, which he entered in 1788, he devoted himself to a study of Kantianism. His closest friend at Tübingen was Schelling. In 1801 he entered the University of Jena and it was here that the warm but fleeting friendship between the two young philosophers developed. In 1816 he received appointment as professor of philosophy at Heidelberg. Later he was sent to the University of Berlin where he taught until his death in 1831.

Hegel's philosophy and his nature were both antithetical to Schelling's. Schelling approached philosophy

from the artistic standpoint while Hegel approached it from the rational. Both of these philosophers in early life were united in their opposition to the Egoism of Fichte though Schelling, for a time at least, can be considered as a true disciple of Fichte. The unified position assumed by the close friends, Schelling and Hegel, ceased to possess unity in a very short while. Fichte, it will be remembered, had held that the thing-in-itself is the Ego which by unconscious effort produces the phenomenal world. The world had been posited by the Ego for a purpose though the purpose was not intelligent to itself. That purpose was to enable the Ego to have something to overcome in the process of realizing itself. Schelling's objection to this position we have recorded; and against it we have voiced the same antagonism that his friend, Hegel, advanced; namely, that it was meaningless by reason of the fact that it was too abstract and too highly imaginative.

Hegel's contention was that philosophy must rid itself of all artistic elements and approach the solution of problems of thought from a rational viewpoint. In this thought we have the essence of his philosophy. To it basically, if properly interpreted, we have no objection. St. Thomas of Aquin himself insisted upon the employment of reason. He, however, admitted of faith which asks for consideration of those matters which though beyond reason are not contradictory to it. We have emphasized in earlier sections the parallelism of reason and faith upon which St. Thomas insisted. Hegel, however, understands that in philosophy " the rational alone is real." To this thought he repeatedly reverts as to basic principle. With it we are in sharp disagreement.

Reality is not confined to rationality. The anti-Christian position assumed by Hegel's thought was well illustrated by his followers, notably by Bruno Bauer (1809-1882), and by the socialist Karl Marx (1818-1883). In these exponents of Hegelianism we find the reason for the encouragement given to Neo-Scholasticism by Pope Leo XIII, to which we shall refer in a later division of this book.

In his principle that the "rational alone is real" Hegel found his explanation of reality. According to him the common source both of Ego and of objective reality or nature is not somewhere beyond reality; it is immanent in it. Mind and nature are but separate phases of the activity of the Absolute. According to Schelling things arise out of the Absolute which, since things proceed from it, must necessarily be conceived as outside of objective reality. In Hegel's thought, however, the Absolute is not the cause of activity; it *is* activity. Man, therefore, by reason of activity comes in contact with the Absolute and can know it. In the speculation of Hegel as it concerns the Absolute, or God, there is a different note from that struck either by Neo-Platonism or the pantheism of Spinoza. According to Hegel, God has no infinite attributes but is simply the evolutionary process of the world; or the realization of activity which is capable of being understood in all its manifestations, by man. Since "only that is real which is rational" God becomes but the product of human reason. This concept of God makes Hegel at heart an atheist and explains the anti-Christian trend of thought which characterized many of his disciples.

The influence which Hegel exerted and still exerts upon philosophical thought is wide-spread. His notion

of the Absolute as *the process of development* rather than as a *source,* looks backward toward the pagan school of Heraclitus and forward to the modern pagan concept which identifies spirit and matter as manifestations of the life force of the world realizing itself *for* itself *through* itself. The philosophy of Hegel paved the way for evolution and for that identity between mind and matter which we find in the thin realism of the "world stuff" theory of Bertrand Russell. The *development* concept of the Absolute as rationalized by Hegel contributed largely to the strength of the reaction against modernism so well illustrated today by the strength of the Neo-Scholastic revival to which we have previously made reference. Hegel's philosophy, unfortunately, however, had also much to do with building up in the world a concept that "might makes right". It is no exaggeration to trace the World War and the condition Europe presents even today, as an armed camp, to the rational philosophy of Georg Hegel.

In the applications of philosophy to social conditions Hegel contended that the State exists for the realization of an idea and to the realization of that idea all private interests must be sacrificed. The purpose for which the State exists is that concerned with the realization of possible economic development. The State must not be conceived as existing for the purpose of granting to individuals life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Individuals exist for the State. Family and individual benefits must yield to State interests. They will always yield in war for war is not only justifiable, but it is the only means by which political progress can be achieved. War is the Absolute in process of develop-

ment. Ideas clash in the clash of swords and the roar of cannons. War is good and to be approved; for, while families and individuals suffer, right always conquers. The nation that survives is the nation that should survive. It, for the time being at least, constitutes the chosen people and by it progress comes.

In this practical social thought of Hegel we note how closely he approximates the thought of Thomas Hobbes, the Englishman. We note, too, how Hegel prepared the path not only for Friedrich Nietzsche but also for the autocratic concept of government so common in Europe and even in our own America today. We note, too, with amazement, how inferior the social philosophy of Hegel is to that lofty concept of the purpose of government outlined by the brilliant thirteenth century Scholastic whom many misinformed people, in this century of material progress, regard as behind the times.

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

Arthur Schopenhauer was born at Danzig in 1788. He studied at the University of Göttingen from 1809 till 1811 when he went to Berlin. In 1813 he received his doctor's degree from the University of Jena. He was associated with the University of Berlin from 1820 till 1831. During this period he attempted to combat the influence of Hegel but with little success. His temperament was not the kind that encourages sociability. He was inclined toward melancholy and passionate outbursts of anger when opposed. Due to his moody personality we can trace his complete abandonment of academic life at the University of Berlin. He gave up

the effort to teach philosophy and to associate in harmony with his colleagues in 1831 and spent the remainder of his life in retirement at Frankfort-on-the-Main. He died in 1860.

Though Schopenhauer retired from active university life at the comparatively early age of forty-three, he did not abandon his philosophical career. He was a close student of philosophical thought from early youth until the year of his death. At Göttingen he had been introduced to Kant by the Sceptic G. E. Schultze. At Berlin the subjective idealism of Fichte, though he denied it even to himself, left an unmistakable impression upon him and intensified his study of Kant from whom Fichte had derived his thought. To Kant, therefore, through Schultze and Fichte, he owes his cardinal principle, namely, that it is the will which constitutes the Absolute.

Schultze the Sceptic in his work "Ænesidemus" had said, "We can have no absolutely certain and universally valid knowledge, in philosophy, either of the existence or non-existence of things-in-themselves and their properties, or of the limits of human knowledge." Fichte on the other hand had made knowledge of objective reality dependent upon subjective idealism. Between the scepticism of Schultze and the subjectivism of Fichte, Schopenhauer found reality. He found it, some believe, because he wished to find a weapon to use against Hegel. Hegel's concept that "The rational alone is real" was of particular annoyance to Schopenhauer. He had strong sympathy with the idea of primitive will as conceived by Schelling and the *process of development* notion of the Absolute which Hegel advanced. He could not agree with the intellectual element which both philosophies contained and was especially bitter, as personally bitter

as Schopenhauer could be, against the rational concept of Hegel. Hegel in his concept of the Absolute is fundamentally an intellectualist. Basically and unalterably Schopenhauer maintained voluntarism.

The Absolute of Schopenhauer is Will. It is not, however, personal will, neither is it intelligent. It is blind unreasoning impulse striving to resist extinction. It is the *will-to-live.* The struggle for life exists not only in man but in all nature. It is will which gives to man and animals weapons of offense and defense. It gives protective coloration to beasts. It gives them claws with which to fight exactly as it gives birds wings with which to escape. It gives man intellect to conceal his desires from his enemy so that he may accomplish his purposes. Life is perpetual contention. In this thought Schopenhauer paved the path for the Spencerian theory of "the survival of the fittest." Man has been able to conquer other animals simply because of a blind impulse resident in him, impelling him to use his mind.

To understand Schopenhauer's philosophy it is necessary to know the man Schopenhauer. His philosophy was personal throughout. Arthur Schopenhauer conceived of life as futile struggle. Life was an attempt to secure that which could not be secured—happiness. Man is miserable because he deserves to be. Life is but an inferno more real than the liveliest imagination could conceive. True, there are a few conditions under which a relative peace can be attained. Each man must attain such contentment for himself. The race, in its struggle for existence, will never develop beyond misery, is Schopenhauer's thought.

Man should make the most of the situation by trying to tolerate it or rather, to forget it. The true ideal

is the Oriental concept of quiescence. In this thought we see the influence of Platonic and Buddhistic contemplation upon the Teutonic Schopenhauer. While undoubtedly a great deal of the pessimistic strain in Schopenhauer was a matter of personal equation, some of it is but a reflection of the thought of an age which was growing weary of the unreality of subjective idealism. The voluntarism of our present philosopher would urge man through his intellect to so order his life that by absorption in art, by sympathy with the sufferings of his fellow men and by the suppression of the desire to live, he would personally become indifferent to his own preservation, that of the human race and of all things else.

In his philosophy, Schopenhauer insists upon the importance of the irrational. His voluntarism, pessimism and passive resistance theory of deliverance from the struggle of the will-to-be, were never woven by our philosopher into a completed system. In refusing to systematize Schopenhauer was entirely logical as everything to him was irrational, even philosophical systems. Philosophers were the most irrational of human creatures and he hated them as he hated himself.

EDUARD VON HARTMAN

Eduard von Hartman, who was born at Berlin in 1842, made the effort to reconcile the voluntarism of Schopenhauer with the evolutionary idealism of Hegel. This philosopher thinks of will not so much as irrational as it is instinctive. It acts intelligently and knows what it is doing but it is at the same time thoroughly unconscious of the purposes it is achieving. The will, in other words, is guided in the evolutionary process of development by the Idea.

In the thought of Hartman the evolutionary process implies not only a beginning but an end. There will, therefore, be a termination to the struggle for existence exactly as there was a beginning of it. However, the process is guided by Idea and we have no assurance that the redemption from strife, implied by a termination of the struggle of the will-to-be, will be lasting. The functioning of the Idea may re-arouse the latent will and a new hell may take the place of the present one in which we live.

The philosophy of Schopenhauer's chief disciple is only seemingly different from that of the master. It is essentially pessimism. To Hartman as to Schopenhauer the life of the world and individual life as well are both forces of evil. All the advantage that man has over the brute, by reason of his rationality, is the ability to appreciate more keenly how ineffably miserable he really is. In this central thought both master and disciple agree. It is this thought of pessimism which serves to unite them.

It is this same pessimism against which our present civilization is rebelling. Since the time of Hartman's

death in 1906 the movement toward a better understanding of life and life's activities, which movement started long before his death, has made steady progress. Its progress and its promise for the future we shall recount hereafter.

DARWINISM

It is appropriate that we close this third division of the period of modern philosophy by reference to the work accomplished in the field of natural science by Charles Darwin. The student will recall the manner in which the discoveries of Copernicus affected the progress of philosophic thought. The Copernician theory served to popularize the empirical viewpoint in philosophy. It did not introduce this attitude toward philosophic study, for both Aristotle and St. Thomas of Aquin had insisted upon a first hand investigation of nature and upon the classification of ascertained phenomena so that both physical and biological sciences could be constructed.

In the same manner the discoveries of Charles Darwin may be said to have served to create a changed attitude in philosophy. The change, however, is not a genuine one. There is no more room today for antagonism between natural science and philosophy than there was in the days of Aristotle or in those of St. Thomas of Aquin. The antagonism which developed between the newer and older methods of thinking in the fifteenth century was regrettable, and should not be permitted to develop in our day. There is no inherent contradiction

among the truths of natural science, philosophy and theology since truth is given to man directly or through the co-operative power of his own active intellect, by the intelligent source of all truth,—God.

Toward the latter part of the nineteenth century, disciples of Charles Darwin read into his accomplishments meanings which he himself refused to inject. They philosophized on the basis of his scientific endeavors, substituted in their minds the *fact* of evolution for what in reality was but a *theory* and so combined the thought of natural selection with Hegelianism or with the pessimistic materialism of Schopenhauer as best served their purposes. It may seem strange that we regard Schopenhauer as materialistic though he is placed at the end of representatives of subjective idealism which had its beginnings in Kantian principles. It would be difficult, however, to prove that the blind will-to-be of Schopenhauer is more than materialistic monism. The thought of Schopenhauer denies all finality exactly as materialism does. It represents a struggle to live. Darwin's investigations seemed to many to point the same way. Philosophical speculation, taking its cue from the basis of natural selection which Darwin emphasized, pointed to the culmination of speculative thought, by way of Hegel or of Schopenhauer, in materialistic monism. It was this principle which for a time captivated speculative inquiry and from which in the present generation we are but emerging.

The doctrine of natural selection captivated not only speculative thought but popular opinion as well. The worth of the point of view established was overshadowed for a time, and in a sense still is, by unintelligent zeal and overstatement. There is an obligation resting upon

those who would use Darwin as their base of philosophic thought, to understand exactly for what the great naturalist stood and to what extent the deductions made in the field of philosophy from his scientific activities are basically unsound or sound. It is likewise necessary to appreciate the emphasis placed upon empirical science since Darwin's day. As we shall not permit ourselves to be led astray by forceful theories, neither can we admit a newness to the empirical point of view. That the empirical point of view was necessary in philosophy was plainly indicated, as we have said, by both Aristotle and St. Thomas of Aquin. As a matter of fact it was being stressed in unmistakable terms throughout the years of Darwin's life, by Msgr. Pecci who years afterwards, as Pope Leo XIII, gave the impetus to the revival of Neo-Scholasticism.

We might rightfully ask, therefore, what was accomplished by Darwin in the field of natural science? and what can philosophy learn from the methods he employed as well as from the results he attained?

Darwin's work supplies us with a vivid picture of the method of science. From 1831 until 1836 he made, in connection with his famous voyage on the "Beagle", close observations of the fauna of South America. Later by the work of Malthus and probably that of Hegel and Schopenhauer, whose speculative thought was finding place in England, he was led to continue his work upon the implications of the comparisons he was making between the existent plant life he had studied and pre-existent forms of which there was record. This study led to his noteworthy book, the "Origin of Species", which was published in 1859.

In this work Darwin presented his conclusions concerning the development of plant and animal life under four major topics. These are:

1. Observations which he had made as a result of artificial selections he had instituted;
2. Relationships he had discovered between extinct forms and those existent;
3. Geographical distributions of animal life;
4. Embryological development of animals.

As a result of his studies he outlined his theory of evolution, and in 1871 published his "Descent of Man" in which he applied his evolutionary hypothesis to the origin of human life.

From the work of Darwin there quickly developed the thought that in it there was substantiation for the rational will-to-be of Hegel or the irrational instinctive will-to-live of Schopenhauer. There was in it, too, confirmation, according to many, of the materialistic monism with which the pessimistic Schopenhauer had been identified. Darwin by his thought that morality was but a product of the struggle for existence gave strength to the school of Evolutionary Ethics which, applying the practical philosophies of Hobbes and of Hegel, thought of benefits to be derived by the group rather than of merits to be attained by the individual. It is, however, most important to note that Charles Darwin protested vigorously any interpretation of his work which would seemingly serve to show that he had, by direction or indirection, ever claimed to have unraveled the mystery of the origin of life. Throughout his whole scientific endeavor he insisted that the primal cause of variation in plant, animal or human life he had never reached.



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Arthur Schopenhauer

1788-1860

The theory of evolution was according to Darwin but theory. While he believed the theory explained the evolution of species and the development of man, physically, intellectually and morally, he at the same time protested that it in no wise offered an explanation of the origin of life. Darwin left room for the Creator. His theory did not obliterate God, though many of his disciples uniting their thought with that of the school of German philosophy current during the period, would have us believe so.

The scientific accomplishments of Darwin emphasized the need for strengthening anew the empirical foundations of philosophy. The results he obtained by observations proved the worth of the scientific method. They strengthened the position of those who were asking for a revival of the study of pure Scholasticism. Darwinism undoubtedly had much to do with the issuance of the Encyclical "Æterni Patris" in 1879 by Pope Leo XIII. This famous call for a return to the study of Thomistic thought from the scientific viewpoint of the world of today in reality closes this third division of modern philosophy and inaugurates its present or contemporary phase.

THE FOURTH DIVISION OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

The period of philosophic thought we are about to consider includes but a brief span of fifty years. In it we shall find the several different phases of materialistic thought in which German transcendentalism finally expressed itself. It is an age which may be viewed as permeated by a recrudescence of pagan thought. Kantianism expressed itself not only as subjective idealism but as voluntarism as well. From the *will-to-be* of Hegel through the *will-to-live* of Schopenhauer it was easy to degenerate through the false basis of "the survival of the fittest" of Spencer to the *will-to-conquer* of Nietzsche. From Friedrich Nietzsche came the spirit of the World War with its horrible thought that the will-to-power is productive of the superman.

Humanity disputed this philosophy on the battlefields of Europe. From the terrible struggle between the years 1914 and 1918 came renewed belief in God. It is exceedingly difficult for us living through the period to detect the progress being made in true philosophic study. Material progress is so evident that often we are led to believe with the crowd that ours is a materialistic age. Nothing, it would seem, could be further from truth. The twentieth century has strong faith in the Creator of the universe. It is dissatisfied with Transcendentalism in all its varied forms. It yearns for the philosophy of *common sense* which will show the

true relationship between faith and reason. It has been surfeited with the vain efforts of philosophers to bridge the imaginary chasm devised by René Descartes between mind and matter. It desires food for its soul. Where shall it be found?

Long before the World War threatened the very foundations of civilization, while Europe was making of itself an armed camp to test the will-to-power, Msgr. Pecci as Bishop of Perugia was demanding a return to the sane doctrines in philosophy of St. Thomas of Aquin. He was calling for study of Scholasticism as a means of superior adjustment. He did not desire to reinstate Thomistic thought exactly as it had been in the thirteenth century. He asked for a study of it in the light of modern civilization and modern science. Later, as Pope, he repeated his effort and by reason of his position received the attention he could not secure as Msgr. Pecci. He accomplished much through his ability to inspire others and one of those whom he inspired, Cardinal Mercier, was the hope not only of Belgium but also of the world in the terrible crisis of ideals in 1914.

The crisis, however, was inevitable. The philosophy of Kant with its fundamental Scepticism had prepared the way too well. Since the war Spiritualism has gained renewed vigor and Materialism is slowly passing. So great has the progress of Neo-Scholastic thought been in the past sixteen years that this period to which we apply the simple distinction of being regarded as a fourth division of modern philosophy will in time be regarded, it seems to me, as a Neo-Christian period. The year 1879, in which year the Pope called for a philosophical revival, will mark the end of Neo-Paganism and the ascendancy of Neo-Thomistic thought. The glory of

Leo XIII, the real master mind of the nineteenth century, will shine throughout the twentieth and for many centuries after as a noon-day sun upon the field of philosophy.

We shall consider, in our discussion of this final division of our study, first those philosophical tendencies which survive in our day as products fundamentally of Cartesian or pagan thought. Briefly thereafter we shall indicate the path that Neo-Scholasticism is tracing in these modern times. It is regrettable that the limitations of this book necessarily preclude giving to Neo-Scholasticism, by space allotment, the emphasis it deserves. In the years that lie immediately ahead of us it will advance to a dominating position in the realm of philosophical inquiry. It is to be hoped that, as a result of Neo-Scholastic influence, Thomistic thought will be so powerful as to unite all men in one fold as true reasoners.

RESULTS OF CARTESIANISM

From the philosophy of Descartes there proceeded that subjective idealism whose progress we have traced among the German thinkers where it arose. The influence of transcendental philosophy was, however, not confined to Germany. It found its way into Italy, Great Britain and America. In each of these countries it is at the present time a vital force. The influence of Descartes, however, can not be confined to essentially Kantian principles. To the French author of the principle of *methodic doubt* can be ascribed the other essentially non-Christian philosophies present in contem-

porary thought. These philosophies, such as positivism. pragmatism, realism, and instrumentalism, are all "sickled o'er with the pale cast" of pagan thought. We shall indicate with extreme brevity positions assumed by leaders in each division of contemporary speculation to which we have alluded.

POSTIVISM

Herbert Spencer, who died in 1903, was a true representative of positivism. He derived his philosophy directly from Kantian thought as it combined itself with evolutionary theories contributed by many sciences, notably by biology, through the studies of Darwin. It was Spencer who first used the expression "the survival of the fittest" to describe his conception of the biologist's notion of natural selection. Spencer's doctrine of "the survival of the fittest" is but a repetition of the philosophy of Schopenhauer. It reinforces the will-to-live by the organic development idea of natural selection and so leads directly to the will-to-power or the pragmatic thought of Nietzsche.

Spencer conceived life to be "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external conditions". It is a process in which the individual not only conforms to his environment but forces that environment to conform to him and his needs. It is a superior adjustment of the individual that Spencer has in mind. Out of this superior adjustment grows the moral sense. Morality is, therefore, but a part of the evolutionary process. Our norms of morality are the result not of the action of God nor of innate ideas nor of the binding force of the

categorical imperative. Norms of conduct, our characters themselves, are but the products of necessity. Utility establishes ethical relationships. In this thought Spencer departs from the moral consciousness of Kant and makes out a clear case for positivistic philosophy and ethics.

Philosophy, ethics, morality itself changes as conditions change. Everything is relative. Ultimate reality can never be known. We can but approximate such knowledge. God therefore is unknowable. To think God exists as we conceive Him to exist is to Spencer but blasphemy. If humanity is to arrive at a knowledge of God it must do so by acknowledging that ultimate religious ideas and ultimate philosophical ideas can never be attained by man. The highest position man can reach by the aid of human reason is to realize that the only sensible philosophy is agnosticism. Man can never learn truth. The supreme effort of man's mind should be to try to rise to an understanding of the objective reality with which he comes in daily contact so that he may adjust himself to its demands and force it to conform to his. In this effort lie peace and accomplishment. It is the highly practical philosophy of positivism that Spencer advocates. What can be made to appeal to man's senses constitutes the only material upon which he should center his attention. The time spent upon the problems of metaphysics is time wasted. Spencer's thought is utilitarian throughout. In this it prepares the way for the still more practical philosophy of pragmatism.

PRAGMATISM

In the subjective idealism of German thought we found that the idea produced reality. In Schopenhauer we discovered that the will-to-live, irrational will, constituted objective reality and its development of form. When to this idea was added the biological concept of natural selection and its supplementary doctrine of the "survival of the fittest" there arose, as a logical consequence, the school of philosophical thought called pragmatism. The chief exponent of pragmatism in Germany was Friedrich Nietzsche.

Nietzsche was born in 1844 and died in 1900. In his philosophy he was influenced by the thoughts of Schopenhauer and Spencer as well as by the biological investigations of Charles Darwin. The period of his life corresponded with the progress in scientific accomplishment and his philosophy represents not only the materialistic tendencies of the period but also its social tendencies. The concept of the State as attempted realization of specific ends, to which individuals must yield, is definitely outlined in the pragmatism of this philosopher.

In his thought Nietzsche stressed the principle that might makes right. The will-to-power must be cultivated by the individual man and by society. The will-to-power means the will-to-conquer. Nothing must be permitted to stand in the path of the progressive development of the superman and the superstate. Our notion of morality by which we feel it a duty to care for the aged, the sick and the weak must be driven from the

minds of men. There is but one possible code of morality and that is based upon force. Only by force can we accomplish what we seek to accomplish. Christianity with its respect for the individual regardless of his bodily condition is a hindrance to "the survival of the fittest". It should be abandoned and for it war should be substituted, since war is the most effective instrument to annihilate the weak. The sword and the cannon will do in a short while, for the progress of those who deserve to prosper, more than all traditional morality, religion and philosophy have accomplished in the history of recorded thought. Spencer had asked the question—What knowledge is of most worth? He had answered it by saying "science". Nietzsche answers it by saying that the only knowledge of value is that which has a direct bearing upon life.

Ernest Mach who died in 1916 was another follower of pragmatic philosophy. He believed with Spencer that science was the one subject of greatest value to mankind since by reason of it adjustment to environment could be made more accurately.

INSTRUMENTALISM

William James, who died in 1910, spent the greater part of his life in the field of psychology. In philosophy he is usually classed as a pragmatist. It seems, however, more correct to classify him as an instrumentalist. James believed with Nietzsche, the German pragmatist, that the only knowledge of value is that which furthers life. He held that personal interest in the last analysis colors

our interpretation of what essentially furthers life for us. We are but parts of a stream of world consciousness and that is real which suits our purposes. Everything else, so far as we are concerned, lacks the essence of reality. Therefore that is true *for me* which will yield satisfaction *to me*. Those ideas which function correctly for me are true; if they do not so function, they are untrue. It is immaterial whether or not ideas conform to objective reality or to reason. If they are efficient practically they are to be approved. Upon this basis James approved of the notions of God and of soul. He approved not because they were intellectually or rationally true. They were to be regarded as true because they offered practical explanations, which worked out to the benefit of the individual and of society.

John Dewey is, at the present time, the foremost American instrumentalist. He believes that there are but two tests of the validity of systems of thought. These are:

1. Do they help the individual in his effort to conquer his social environment?
2. Do they serve to better the condition of social units?

Dewey thinks in social terms. He believes that philosophical speculation is idle if it be not directed toward an understanding of man in his social attitudes and toward society as a means of individual realizations of potential capacities. The tests he applies to systems of thought are essentially the same as those advanced by William James. His is a system of utilitarian morality and ethics. If a trend of thought works for you it can be approved by you as truth. The underlying principle

of an instrumental system of social ethics, such as Dewey approves, is anarchical. It reminds us strongly of the sophistry of the pagan period. It scoffs at God and at any effort to determine the primal cause of reality. It on its own part has no explanation to offer concerning ultimate reality other than the impossibility of man's knowing anything about it. It deprecates philosophical inquiry and satisfies itself with a system of utilitarian ethics. American instrumentalism is hardly worthy of classification among respectable systems of speculative thought. The worth of James lies not in philosophy but in psychology; and Dewey deserves mention not for contribution to speculative thought but for his improvement of the classroom control of the learning process.

REALISM

Alexius Meinong, who died in 1920, and Edmund Husserl are the chief exponents of the German realistic movement. We think first of Germany in the development of modern realism because it definitely shows the presence of an impulse to break away from the subjective idealism which dominated Teutonic thought over so long a period. The realistic reaction is a psychological tendency. It offers objection to idealism basically on the proposition that consciousness is the awareness of reality. Consciousness is not only aware, but it is aware of something. There is actually present something which is given to consciousness and not contributed by it. The thing is known by reason of the data it presents out of which perception frames the consciousness of an object present to sense.

One of the most noted of present day English realists is Bertrand Russell. His realism is not nearly so clear cut as that of the German philosophers and borders closely upon idealistic concepts. Russell thinks of sense data as independent of mind but at the same time he maintains that things would have no existence if they were not sensed by a mind. Mind however is not the same for Russell as it was for Bishop Berkeley, whose philosophy the language of Russell seems to describe. For Russell "mind" is a view of the world from any angle. It means variety of appearances at places and times where and when it is possible for the sense data to act upon a physical brain.

In his philosophy Russell shows the influence of mathematics upon his thought. He regards matter as partly spiritual and mind as composed in part of matter. He advances the notion that both mind and matter are not essentially different but are both products of an antecedent world-stuff which he calls "neutral particulars." There is much of fancy in Russell's philosophical concepts. There is in his nature something of the poet and much of the mystic. His realism contrasts forcibly with the realism of the German school.

IDEALISM

The idealism of the twentieth century has expressed itself in Germany in the critical thought of what is often referred to as the "Marburg School" because of the association of its proponents with the University of Marburg. This philosophy is representative of an effort to

adapt Kant to modern life. It is sometimes called Neo-Kantianism. Hermann Cohen, who died in 1918, was a representative of Neo-Kantian idealism. Cohen opposed the notion that anything was given by objective reality to thought. To him thought created what was incorrectly referred to as "given." The only true world to Cohen was the *"thought world."*

Another representative of the "Marburg School" was Paul Natorp, who died in 1924. Natorp thought in terms of society. He conceived of community life as divided into three levels of possible attainment by the individual member of the social group. These levels were the economic, the regulative and the creative. It was the duty of the individual to perfect himself so that he would attain the highest level and so become not only a cultured but also an active force in society.

In France today the most powerful philosophy is that of spiritualistic idealism. This philosophy is a direct outgrowth of Kantian thought, though it opposes Kant's thought in many important particulars. The spiritualistic idealism of present day France may be said to have originated from the studies of Ravaisson-Mollier, who died in 1900. As professor of philosophy at the University of Paris he helped to mould the thought of Lachelier, Boutroux and Bergson. These three represent the thought of Ravaisson-Mollier when they contend, as all three do, that the explanations of sense phenomena are to be found not in physical laws but in the free activity of the Absolute.

Henri Bergson is undoubtedly the greatest idealist of the present day. His thought while basically related to that of Ravaisson-Mollier, of Lachelier and of Boutroux differs from theirs in one characteristic notion. Bergson

conceives of the universe as forced upward in the evolutionary process by what he calls the *élan vital* or living impulse. Without this vital urge the theory of biological evolution is to Bergson lacking in adequate explanation. Matter is not to be regarded as inimical to spirit. Matter is something to be overcome since it threatens to engulf us. It however is not hostile to us. It is friendly since it affords us the opportunity to secure spiritual freedom.

In Great Britian idealism centers around university life. With this philosophy are associated the names of Edward Caird, who died in 1908; Bernard Bosanquet, who died in 1923 and F. H. Bradley, who died in 1924.

Both Caird and Bosanquet duplicate the philosophy of Hegel. Bradley is the representative of English idealism who has affected most markedly the course of contemporary philosophical thought. In his book, "Appearance and Reality," which was published in 1893, Bradley outlines his effort to achieve a knowledge of reality. He portrays his search in most original manner and explains that the only objective reality we can know is the reality which thought constructs. If, however, we act as if our knowledge from immediate experiences is true, it will be valid. Our experience will in a sense be a contact with the Absolute. It is true we can never know the Absolute thoroughly but we can learn something about it from our experience. The Absolute is not merely a mental product. It is not dependent upon subjective idealism for its existence though our world is the world of personal thought. In the Absolute are merged all differences. Therefore in our immediate experiences we come in contact with a difference, which is merged in the superpersonal Absolute, and so we are saved from the philo-

sophical agnosticism of Spencer. While we can not know all of the Absolute, our lack of thoroughness is compensated for by the immediate contact which we acquire through our proximity to sense data which force themselves upon us.

NEO-SCHOLASTICISM

The strong impulse given to the promotion of the revival of Scholastic thought during the latter part of the nineteenth century can be attributed, as we have previously indicated, to Pope Leo XIII. As Msgr. Pecci, as early as 1858, he planned an academy which would devote itself to a study of Thomistic philosophy. The Academy of St. Thomas was actually established in 1872. The many currents of subjective idealism, of utilitarian ethics and of avowed or implicit pagan tendencies were matters of superior concern to Msgr. Pecci during his thirty-two years residence at Perugia as bishop. When he ascended the throne of Peter in 1878, he at once made the most of the opportunity to direct the thought of both clergy and people to the problems which presented themselves and the dangers that would be encountered unless effort were directed toward their solution. It was with this thought in mind that in 1879 he issued his Encylical "Æterni Patris" calling for the revival of Scholasticism.

Pope Leo XIII was a scholar in the field of philosophy. He was thoroughly familiar with Scholasticism in the purity of its thirteenth century form and in its decadent expression during later centuries. He was likewise possessed of a thorough knowledge of the trend of

modern thought. During his residence at Brussels as papal nuncio from 1843 till 1845 he proved himself one of the greatest diplomatists of all history. The year 1846 was one which brought Msgr. Pecci many rich experiences. In that year he travelled throughout Europe, met many eminent men and returned to Italy not only with a breadth of view but also with a knowledge of political and social conditions which few European monarchs could even approximate.

As a result of his experiences the future pope was impressed by the need for a stabilization of thought upon a rational basis if society were not only to be continued but actually to be saved from destruction as a result of its own follies in philosophy. Pope Leo felt that the world was approaching a crisis from which it could be saved by an appeal to its reason through philosophy. Events of succeeding years proved the validity of his thought.

In his emphasis upon the need for a revival of Thomistic thought Pope Leo had in mind no artificial restoration in modern life of thirteenth century speculation. St. Thomas was to be studied as a mariner studies his compass. We are to steer our course not through mediaevalism but through modern life. It is true, Leo XIII taught, that modern civilization if it will but read St. Thomas of Aquin, can find escape from the many perils that beset it. In the study of the masterful philosophy of the thirteenth century Schoolman, Pope Leo suggested four approaches:

1. The study of original sources rather than interpretations of St. Thomas through compendia of his philosophical tenets;

2. Exclusion of all problems which though interesting to the thirteenth century thinker are unprofitable in the solution of problems connected with the betterment of modern thought;
3. Exclusion of all subtleties which suggest Scholasticism in its decadence;
4. Extension of the Scholastic system by a close study of the results of the scientific progress made since the time of St. Thomas so as to determine what is theory and what is fact.

Pope Leo XIII had in mind, therefore, not a mere historical approach to Scholasticism. Though its history was to be made clear, its reasonableness and adaptability to modern conditions were also to be manifested. The perfection of Thomistic philosophy called for a close study of empirical science. In both phases of Neo-Scholastic activity, that connected with revealing genuine Scholasticism and that connected with its perfection by eradicating from it scientific concepts which had been proved false and substituting for them recent additions to the world's stock of scientific knowledge, Pope Leo XIII had in his own time the hearty co-operation of scholars throughout the world. In recent times the number has been augmented by reason of the effects, I believe, of the World War. Since that struggle, mankind has given evidence of returning to a concept of a soul nexus. Through a recognition of an abiding personality it is obliterating the false distinction between mind and matter which has existed in all philosophical thought since the time of Descartes.

With Descartes, it will be remembered, Scholasticism seemed to disappear. It retired within the Church and became identified with theology. Pope Leo XIII called



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Charles Darwin

1809-1882

it forth. Neo-Scholasticism by reason of its leadership and the progress it has made in the past sixteen years, even in Protestant circles, is no longer to be regarded narrowly as Catholic philosophy, except in the broad sense that Catholicism stands for universality. It is the philosophy of the profound common sense of Aristotle and St. Thomas of Aquin adapted to modern conditions.

The leaders of Neo-Scholasticism are legion. They are to be found in all countries. Among the outstanding exponents of Neo-Scholastic thought are Baeumker, De Wulf, Mercier, Maher, Picard, Geyser and Gemelli. In one sense it is unnecessary to mention even these since so many men of prominence exist today in the field of Neo-Scholasticism. Thomistic thought is securing recognition in university circles throughout the world regardless of the religious note which permeates these institutions. True, bitter opposition is manifesting itself. This opposition is indicative of strength. Neo-Scholasticism is worthy of notice. Within the next hundred years it will, I believe, be worthy not only of admiration but of acceptance as the only rational explanation of those concerns, the knowledge of which man has sought since earliest times,—God and his own soul.

CONCLUSION

We have made the effort to trace the development of philosophic thought from earliest times to the present. Throughout the period of approximately three thousand years many systems of thought have manifested themselves. We realize how easy it is to become bewildered in the field of philosophical inquiry. For that reason we have tried to point out to the student, as we advanced in our study, the essential worth or falsity of philosophies proposed for consideration. Therefore, there is, in a sense, little need for a formal conclusion of our thought.

Philosophy seems to many to give evidence of more retrogression of thought than it does of progression. True, at times it is difficult to maintain composure when we see doctrines that we know are reliable thrown into the discard and false notions, proved over and over again to be sources of error, substituted for them. Even in apparent retrogression, however, there is progress. The errors of a Neitzsche while they work havoc for a time, eventually result in an intense and serious effort to achieve fundamental truth. The progress of Neo-Scholastic thought in this twentieth century is due, in large proportion, to the popularity of Neitzche during the nineteenth. Progress is manifesting itself in both natural science and philosophy.

This progress is steady. St. Thomas of Aquin added substantially to the thought of Aristotle. In like manner Neo-Scholasticism is adding to the thought of St. Thomas. The line from Aristotle through St.

Thomas to Neo-Scholasticism is a line of progress. Along this line runs the truth of speculative inquiry. Parallel to it, supported by it, though in no sense identified with it, is the line of faith. Philosophy teaches that both faith and reason are sources of truth since both are derived from the original source of all truth,—God. In this concept lies the possibility of achievement by each individual of a superior personal philosophy of life. If the study of the progress of philosophy results in the progress of individual and social life it will have been well worth the time spent upon it.



THE PATH OF TRUE PROGRESS IN PHILOSOPHY

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